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ABSTRACT
The development of laughter is little understood 
even though it is an area of human behaviour that 
long intrigued psychologists and philosophers. A 
framework for understanding is required. With guid­
ance from existing literature, observational data is 
used to develop such a framework. It is argued that 
no one single approach can, in principle, explain 
the phenomenon. Laughter occurs in too varied sit­
uations for it to be possible to claim that it is 
due to one single cause. Moreover, laboratory 
studies usually require subjects to laugh at 'funny* 
stimuli on cue. As a result, they have focussed on 
responsive laughter rather than on the conditions 
under which subjects try to make others laugh.
Given this background, observational data is useful. 
In this study observational data from a longitudinal 
study of two children and from a study of children 
in a playgroup are used to argue that very young 
children not only laugh responsively but also create 
occasions for their own laughter. Moreover, while 
their ability to laugh develops in many ways linked 
to their cognitive and social development, they can 
still laugh at the kinds of situations that made them 
laugh when they were very young. It is concluded 
that observations have helpfully added to ways in
which the development of laughter has been conceptualised, 
It is also suggested that some observations of laughter 
in young children have implications for research on 
how young children are capable of intentional behaviour.
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V: INTRODUCTION
' •, '-
"Our deepest insights must - and should - 
appear as follies"
Nietzsche. The Birth of Tragedy
i f
There is little historical literature on the 
development of lau^ter. Through the ages, philo­
sophers have had many, usually casual, things to say 
about laughter. As far back as 1473, Erasmus com­
plained in In Praise of Folly that there were too 
many theories of laughter - and not enough jokes.
But philosophers were interested in adult laughter.
They did not study how, and why, adults developed 
the ability to laugh, in general, or to laugh at 
specific jokes, situations or predicaments in 
particular. One could read all writings on lau^ter 
before Darwin and never guess that children laughed.
A brief survey of some of the philosophical 
ideas on human laughter may help to highlight some 
important, but unresolved,issues. Laughter is a 
very powerful behaviour - an odd adjective perhaps - 
and it seems to separate the human species from 
the rest of the animal world. Henri Bergson said 
"man" was the animal who laughs. Frankl has observed 
in The Will to Meaning (1971) that human beings are the 
only creatures who are able to laugh. For Frankl, the 
ability to laugh at oneself, and at one's situation, is one 
of the hallmarks of humanity. Frankl argues this in the
context of a larger theory about man's 'need* for 
meaning but, without accepting that, it is hard to 
quibble with the view that our ability to laugh at 
things, at people, situations and, especially, at 
ourselves does set us aoart from other species. There 
has been one report of a chimpanzee, Lucy, making a 
joke but, otîi0î%7ise, the literature on apes has v> 
merely reported that they laugh. Wolfgang Kohler, 
an advocate,after all, of the abilities of ape», 
noted (1925); "I have never seen an anthropoid weep 
or laugii in quite the human sense of the term".
Ail chis could have indicated to psychologists 
that laughter should be a ratlier rich field just like 
language, another specifically human capacity. Where 
is the person who never laughed? Could it not be 
argued that one has to laugh (sometimes at least) to 
be human? Uoia& sapiens could really be homo ridens. 
but, until recently, psyciiologists were not stirred 
by any of these arguments. HcGtiee and Chapman (1980) 
in Children's Humour trawled tiiu literature from 
1900-70 and found a total of only 60 papers published 
on children's humour, leas than one a year.
It is not just metaphysically that laughter is 
such a powerful behaviour. From a nhyslological 
point of view, it appears to be one of only four 
actions in which we appear to cease to be in control 
of our bodies. You cannot become helpless just in
talking. Yet when we laugh, when we sneeze, when 
we have an orgasm and, possibly, when we are in a 
religious trance or frenzy, we are helpless. You 
cannot stop yourself laughing sometimes. You can 
have a fit of laughing like you have an epileptic fit. 
Wolfenstein (1955) reported a case of mad, continuing 
laughter in a six-year old boy. Less mad. The Lancet 
recently noted (1982) with a mixture of alarm and 
humour, that 25% of student nurses had admitted to 
having an experience of "giggle incontinence", laughing 
so much they wet themselves. The Lancet urged res­
traint on humour. Bottle upI
Yet, there is one tradition that recognises corned^  as of 
fundamental psychological importance. The Greeks 
saw that there was _ more to comedy and the laughter 
it provoked than a good giggle. Comic poets were 
honoured as much as tragic ones. Aristophanes was 
treated as seriously as any of the great Greek tragic 
playwrights. The Greeks seem to have grasped that 
comedy could be a liberating force,freeing the mind 
of its usual shackles.
In his Poetics, Aristotle argued that comedy 
and tragedy sprang from similar religious roots. Both 
forms of drama developed out of improvisations that 
accompanied religious rites. Comedy began as a kind 
of prayer. Aristotle believed that the origins of 
comedy lay in the actions that took place during the
procession in honour of the god, Phales, whose 
emblem was a giant phallus. The procession started 
off marching with the great phallus at its head, 
paused to pray at the shrines of Dionysius and 
then moved on,singing Dionysiac songs which may well 
have been obscene. One of the objects of the cult 
of Dionysius was to explore all sorts of sensual ex­
periences. Experienced to the full, they helped 
achieve spiritual and physical ecstasy. Perhaps, 
people had to laugh as part of the process of reach­
ing such a state of sensual ecstasy. Aristotle seems 
to have thought so. A psychologist observing the 
comic rites of the Dionysiac procession might well 
have concluded that the laughter helped the par­
ticipants to release erotic energy. The cock up Wcis 
the root of comedy. Freud argued (1905) that 
laughter gives us pleasure because it allows us to 
express erotic or aggressive thoughts that would 
otherwise be forbidden.
A long time ago, then, the psychological richness 
of laughter seems to have been recognised. Centuries 
before Freud, the idea that laughter opened up the 
expression of taboo thoughts and feelings seems to 
have been current. Laughter could also provide a safety 
valve. In an essay on ancient comedy, Sypher (1955) 
writes :
"Thus it happens from the earliest times the 
comic ritual has been presided over by a Lord of 
misrule and the improvisations of comedy have the 
aspect of a Feast of Unreason, a Revel of Fools - a 
Sottie".
Comedy allows us to take off masks that we have 
to put on to deal with others who wear masks to deal 
with us. And, by a magical counter-point, we can 
only take off our daily mask usually through putting 
on another mask. At some Greek comic festivals, all 
normal conventions of behaviour were set aside. Abus­
ing and making fun of the most respected institutions 
at specific times was a way of making it easier to 
live with, and through them, for most of the year.
The mediaeval Church understood this well 
enough. Just before Lent, the monks used to appoint 
one of their number to be a Lord of unreason and chant 
the liturgy of folly during whidi an Ass was worshipped 
and the mass parodied in a ceremony no less religious 
in its profane way than the revels of Dionysius. When 
the monks celebrated this mock mass, known as the 
ludi inhonesti, they brayed the responses. Nietzsche 
adopted a similar device in Thus Spake Zarathustra.
One scene brings together in Zarathustra’s cave two 
kings, a retired pope, a magician, a conscientious 
man and other "higher men" and this glittering panoply 
were "all kneeling like children and devout little 
women, adoring the ass”. The ass is no land). And
Nietzsche goes on to set out part of the liturgy 
which is to be brayed.
"Plain looking he walks through the world. If 
he has spirit he hides it but everybody believes in 
his long ears".
"But the ass brayeds Yea Yuh".
"What hidden wisdom is it that he has long ears 
and only says Yes and never No. Has he not created 
the world in his own image, namely as stupid as pos­
sible?".
"But the ass brayed: Yea Yuh".
Throughout the ass-mass, the ass brays the same 
response. Zarathustra rejoices in this Ass Festival, 
roguish ritual, and praises the higher men7 "how 
well I like you since you have become gay again. 
Verily, you have blossomed. It seems such flowers 
as you require new festivals, a little brave nonsense, 
some divine service and ass festival, some gay old 
fool of a Zarathustra, a roaring wind that blows your 
souls bright". With a final blasphemous flourish, 
Zarathustra adds:
"And when you celebrate it again, this ass fes­
tival, do it for your own sakes and do it also for my 
saüce. And in remembrance of me".
Yea Yuh*.
In so far as Nietzsche held a consistent 
belief, it was that one could get at truth through 
the excesses of tlie Dionysian orgy. He wrote in 
The Birth of Tragedy, "our deepest insights must - 
and should - appear as follies".
Shakespeare had long before taken this advice 
in writing the grave-diggers' scene in Hamlet and the 
antic-wise Fool of King Lear. Modem playwrights have 
continued to use comedy to highlight the plight of the 
human condition. In Beckett’s Waiting for Godot, 
the tramps, comic and tragic, grovel, sweat and eke 
out jokes on the edge of eternity. The tramps are 
ridiculous and, by their very ridiculousness, tragic.
Such black comedy, laughter on the metaphysical brink, 
has had little psychological attention.
One writer on humour. Max Eastman (1921) who was 
the friend and biographer of Chaplin understood that 
the causes of laughter have a sombre side. Eastman 
noted as causes sexual ineptitudes, pomp, stinginess, 
stupidity, bad taste, politicians, vermin, tran%)8, 
excretory functions and corpses. As T. S. Eliot 
observed: "Humankind cannot bear too much reality".
Laughter offers subversive relief, a relief we often 
need. Satire cleanses.
When psychologists and philosophers after the 
Greeks looked to the theatre for theoretical inspiration, 
they seem to have usually missed these roots of the
comic. Bergson in Le Rire concentrates heavily 
on farces. He writes blithely as if the only kind 
of laughter is that to be found in em audience for 
Moliere and Labiche. Le Rire is studded with exanç)les 
from Moliere, Labiche and French farces. It takes 
genius to know just how, and just when, to make a 
politician lose his trousers behind a potted plant 
while three of his mistresses are hiding in a cup­
board. But farce is not the only form of comedy. 
Bergson thinks laughter is always intellectual. His 
main formula states that we laugh when something 
mechanical is "encrusted on the living". This assumes 
that one kind of comedy typifies all occasions of 
laughter. Bergson saw Moliere's comedies as studies 
in obsession with one idea: it could be said his 
theory is also very single-minded.
The English author. Max Beerbohm (1939), was 
also interested in what made audiences laugh.
Being of a more practical turn than Bergson he del­
ivered a more specific list. "Mothers in law, hen 
pecked husbands, Jews, twins, old maids, Frenchmen, 
Italians, Niggers (not Russians or other foreigners)" 
all provoke titters in the stalls. Mystifying, it 
is, why Russians should seem so sombre to Max. From 
nationalities to peculiarities. Max went on to cite 
as risible "fatness, thinness, long hair worn by a 
mem, baldness, sea sickness, stuttering and bad cheese" 
Beerbohm argued that all these were funny because 
they made audiences either feel contempt or because
the sadists in the stalls loved to laugh at the suf­
fering of others. Did Beerbohm put in "bad cheese" 
as a joke or as an insight? We don’t yet know. 
Experimental confirmation of the bad cheese effect 
is still awaited.
Psychologists and philosophers have, by and large, 
failed to study laughter with the kind of depth that 
literary critics have brought to the subject of comedy. 
Yet if comedy has the almost religious power it has 
been claimed to have, it must force us to laugh at 
profound dilemmas that face us in our lives. Human 
beings can laugh at themselves, see their own actions 
from a comic perspective. It is remarkable feat 
but one which psychologists curiously have tended 
to ignore even though there are a number of interest­
ing, scattered observations of how small children 
develop the ability to laugh at themselves. Instead 
of studying these admittedly difficult aspects of 
laughter those psychologists who have been interested 
have tended to study the reactions of subjects to 
jokes that are often very obvious and poor.
Philosophers have hardly been any better and have usually 
failed to follow on the insights of Aristotle and 
avoided what for the Greeks had been the fundamental 
roots of comedy. It is curious how ragged most 
philosophical views on laughter have been. There are 
many lofty statements about the importance of laughter. 
Rabelais wrote :
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"Mieux est de ris que larmes escripre
Pour ce que le rire est le propre de l’homme".
Or:
Better to write of laughter, if you can.
Laughter, not tears, is the proper mark of man.
But this is hardly a theory. Empirical phil­
osophers have, it seems, had little substantial to 
say about laughter and many of them have not found 
time to consider anything as frivolous. Hobbes (1651) 
does have a theory of laughter but it must be said 
he manages to squeeze all the fun out of it.
He almost elevates laughing into a vice. His brutal 
analysis remains famous
"Sudden Glory is the passion which maketh those 
grimaces called laughter . They are caused either 
by some sudden act of their own that pleaseth them; 
or by some the apprehension of some deformed thing 
in another by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud 
themselves".
Those who are not gifted have to seek every 
scrap of good they can find in themselves. This 
drives them to laugh at "the in^>erfections of others". 
In the country of the blind, they guffaw at the man 
who has also lost his leg. Hobbes does not approve; 
he merely observes. True, to laugh excessively at
11
the defects of others "is a sign of Pusillanimity" 
but, for Hobbes, life is about power. According 
to Heyd (1982) Hobbes argues that the only other 
possible cause of laughter is absurdity. This, 
again, seems narrow-minded.
At least, however, Hobbes noticed laughter.
Locke and Bishop Berkeley did not deign to have an 
opinion about it. David Hume in his Treatise on 
Human Nature has nothing to say on the subject 
though he does discuss malice.
Kant, too, did offer a few fragments of 
thought on laughter. He devotes a small section of 
The Analytic of The Sublime to a definition of the 
comic. He refers to the "humourous manner" which 
is "allied to the gratification provoked by laughter". 
Unlike Hobbes, Kant does not see laughter in terms 
of struggle. He calls humour "the talent for being 
able to put oneself at will in a certain frame of 
mind In which everything is in lines that quite go 
off the beaten track (a topsy turvy view of the thing) 
and yet in lines that follow certain principles".
Kant distinguishes between people who can choose and 
people who can’t choose to see the world in this 
topsy turvy way. He writes simply enoughs
«
"If you can’t choose, you have the ’humours’.
But if you can make that choice, ’you are humourous*.
Kant does not, however, have any doubt that the 
comic is an inferior form of art. He statess
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"This manner belongs to agreeable rather 
than to fine art because the object of the latter 
must always have an evident intrinsic worth about 
it, and demands a certain seriousness in its presen­
tation".
The 19tii Century saw a little more interest in 
laughter though no mention of children’s laughter.
Pirie (1858) noted in An Inquiry into the Nature . . 
of the Human Mind tliat incongruity was the cause of 
laughter. "To cause laughter", he elaborated, "the 
incongruity of the fact or idea presented to us must 
not only imply some obvious absurdity but it must be 
of a very unexpected kind"• The French psychologist, 
Leon Dumont (1862) argued that it was contradictions 
that provoked laughter. "Le risible peut etre défini;
N  ^  ^
tout objet a I’egard du quel 1*esprit se trouva force
/N A
d’affirmer et de nier en meme temps la meme chose’.
Vasey (1877) also resumed what writings there had been 
on the subject. Sully (1892) argued that it was 
wrong to believe "these sources of ludicrous effect 
can be reduced to one". He anticipated Freud in 
suggesting that some kinds of laughter might be "an 
escape valve arrangement after a state of central 
tension". Sully made one of the few observations of 
children in this field noting that "the range of 
ludicrous aspect in their case is surprisingly narrow" - 
an observation which much of the data in this study
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will refute. Sully saw laughter as a mark of a 
high self-conscious culture which could use it to 
forget "the heap of cares". Nevertheless, he clearly 
came to no acceptable conclusion for Hall (1897) said:
"We are persuaded that all current theories are 
utterly inadequate and speculative and that there are 
few more promising fields of psychological Inquiry".
Others saw it as promising too. Bergson published 
Le Rire first as magazine articles in 1900: Freud’s 
book on jokes was published in 1905. There was a 
feeling the subject merited attention.
American psychology largely ignored laughter 
however. William James seems not to mention it 
in The Principles of Psychology (1890). John B.
Watson observed a number of situations in which children 
laughed at the Manhattan Day Nursery, but never 
concluded these observations.
Interest fizzled out though McDougall (1919) 
claimed there was an instinct to laugh and asked one 
crucial question. What is the survival value of 
laughter? He went on to suggest that the result of 
laughing is "a promotion of the respiratory and cir­
culatory processes and perhaps other processes vital, 
a general stirring up ...". McDougall also claimed that 
laughter removes d epression "by exerting a generally sti­
mulating effect" on the whole organism. He then, it seems.
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loses some sense of realism and rhapsodises. "But 
it does more than this, it diverts us; that is to 
say, it has a quite peculiar power of arresting 
the stream of thought, and inhibiting all other 
bodily functions". We do not walk while laughing and 
McDougall believes, we do not even stand while laugh­
ing if "the laughter impulse is excited in maximal 
intensity, we are apt to sink down, our knees loosened, 
and to roll and shake helplessly upon the ground".
What could possibly be the value of such behaviour?
McDougall asks us to imagine the of early
man, prey to the depression caused by all these 
burdens. Nature needed a remedy so that "while 
leaving men delicately responsive to the more intense 
emotional expressions about them, should spare them 
the unnecessary suffering involved in sympathetically 
sharing all the minor pains and distresses which 
were the daily lot of each member of the group".
So nature gave us laughter, the "tendency to laugh 
when confronted by the spectacle of any of the minor 
mishaps and distresses of his fellows". McDougall did 
not want early man to laugh at real disaster so by 
some miracle of discrimination, man learned to laugh 
only at what was not really serious. "We laugh when 
a mam hits his thumb with his hammer; but we shrink 
in sympathetic pain if his hand is crushed in a 
machine". This may be true but it is not correct to 
state that we only laugh at mishaps or minor tragedies.
15
Tliere is gallows humour as well as fantastic humour. 
McDougall tried to cram too much into one all en­
compassing theory. With few studies that obsen^ed 
what actually made people laugh, experts persisted 
in trying to find the one key, the magic formula 
that would explain all occasions of laughter.
Such an approach is seductive but, perhaps, misguided. 
Laughter is, and is a response to, many things and 
many situations. By forcing subjects to respond to 
jokes rather than seeing where laughter happened, 
psychologists have tended to ignore many aspects of 
laughter including how we create laughter and the
i.
connexion between emotions and laughter.
It may reflect the psychology of psychologists 
that many have been attracted by the theory that 
we laugh at the suffering of others in power-bursts 
of Hobbes* Sudden Glory. In the flamboyantly 
titled The Secret of Laughter, Ludovici (1932) 
extended this argument. We laugh in order to survive. 
Laughter is almost a weapon. We bare our fangs and 
teeth when we laugh.
In The Secret of Laughter Ludovici laid far less 
stress on what seems a much more interesting idea.
To laugh is a sign of superior adaptation. It could 
be argued that one of the most valuable of qualities 
is to be able to laugh at oneself in an unmanic way.
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That reservation is necessary (though difficult to 
define) because there are a few psychiatric con­
ditions in which patients do giggle all the time 
at their own antics. But, usually, one admires 
people who can see themselves with enough detachment 
to tell funny stories about themselves, to enjoy 
being kidded, who can see the ridiculous side of 
their own behaviour. Ludovici threw out and then 
failed to expand on that interesting idea. He 
returned to the analysis of laughter as a sign of 
power.
Before examining in detail the research on 
children's laughter, it may be worth resuming the 
hazards history reveals. Though literature and 
history pointed to laughter as a complex response 
touching the silly, the spiritual, the subversive as 
well as the humourous, psychologists nearly always 
paid attention to only one sort of laughter based 
either on incongruity or contradiction. No one was 
interested in children's laughter much. Those few psy­
chologists and philosophers who studied laughter 
at all seemed to imagine they could find one, not very 
complex theory to account for it in all its variety. 
Though almost no studies observed adults or children 
laughing, there seemed to be little doubt that the 
solution would be simple. Henri Bergson's Le Rire 
can be viewed as an example of this tendency.
Bergson argued that we laugh "when something mechanical 
is encrusted on the human". The translation is itself 
a little odd since the French says "du mécanique plaque
17
sur du vivant". Encrusted does not suggest that 
aggressive slapping of plaque. Nevertheless, the 
heart of Bergsons theory, relying much on farces, is 
that we laugh when someone else is reduced to an 
object. The French philosopher, Jeanson (1950), 
writing on Bergson, notes that the comic demands; 
"quelquechose comme une anaasthetsie momantee du 
coeur. Il s'addresse à l'intelligence pure". This 
view of Bergson suits Anglo-Saxon prejudices, seeing 
in the French a fetish for rational humour. Bergson 
argued also that society used laughter in order to 
enforce conformity. We laugh in groups ^  someone.
The butt of laughter is the eccentric, the man who 
commutes in his swim suit; ridiculed, he leams his 
lesson. He buys a suit for the office. Bergson's 
stress on conformity marks him as a product of his 
time. But what is most striking is how rigid and 
formulaic his ideas are. Where Le Bon thought he 
could write equations for the psychology of crowds, 
Bergson thought he had cracked the equation for 
laughter.
The cinema did Bergson a favour. Good exairç)les 
of people acting as machines were to be found in the 
silent screen comedies which followed the publication 
of Le Rire. There were however few examples of 
Bergson's theories being tested till a youthful 
H. J. Eysenck reported (1942) standing around wait­
ing for people to be forced into acting like machines 
either because they slipped on banana peels or because
18
their hats were blown off in a high wind, Eysenck 
observed some examples of such incidents but not 
everyone laughed on the cue! People let down the 
theory.
Bergson's theory drew its data almost entirely 
from the stage. Though there were a few references 
to authors like Pascal and Mark Twain,he really 
seemed to believe that an analysis of farces could 
explain the totality of lau^ter. He ignored the 
emotional aspects of laughter, its subversive side 
and the human ability to giggle at plain silliness. 
The young Eysenck, ready to witness laughter, seems 
a slightly comic figure. But his results are 
among many that suggest laughter is more complicated 
than esirly theories allowed. It also ^^aidly 
typical of the history/of laughter research that, 
after three studies, Eysenck stopped being interested 
in laughter. Higher things claimed him. The point 
remains, though. Attempts to forge a simple theory 
for all laughter failed. Research on children 
suffered from a similar bias.
19
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There is no simple starting point to the study of 
children's laughter emd the following review is thematic 
rather them historical. Early ideas on laughter have 
influenced and guided research. It is worthy especially, 
looking at the ways Darwin (1872), Freud (1905) and Bergson 
(1911) influenced research because one legacy of their work 
has been high ambition. A theory had to cover all aspects 
of children's laughter, and, consequently, to be ruthlessly 
exclusive. Only one such theory was needed to explain all 
laughter. The parsimonious inperative - the wish to formulate 
this one elegant, all-encompassing explanation - has not 
served lau^ter research well.
Darwin (1872) observed facial expressions auid gestures 
in apes that were similar to laughter and argued that one of 
the functions of laughter must be to act as a powerful social 
signal - usually of appeasement. He also noted that laughter 
was, in many ways, like a reflex. He wrote:
"The imagination is sometimes said to be tickled by a 
ludicrous idea; and this so-called tickling of the mind is 
curiously analogous with that of the body".
Darwin added:
"Yet laughter from a ludicrous idea, though involuntary, 
cannot be called strictly a reflex action. In this case, 
and in that of laughter from being tickled, the mind must 
be in a pleasurable condition: a young child, if tickled by 
a strange mam, would screaun for fear. The touch must be 
light, and an idea or event, to be ludicrous must not be of 
grave import".
21
It took roughly 70 years for a psychologist to test 
Darwin's proposition about tickling. And it may be that while 
the Victoriauis only laughed at things that were duly light­
hearted, we have become blacker and more soured. They had 
W. S. Gilbert: we have Ssonuel Beckett. The impact of the pre­
vailing culture on children's humour, however, is a field that 
has hardly been touched on.
What Darwin suggests is that when he laughs, the child is 
not just responding to something funny but to a particular sit­
uation. In fact the Darwinian approach has stimulated many 
studies that emphasise laughter as a social response rather 
than as a response to anything funny. The purpose of laughter 
has nothing essentially to do with the experience of humour. 
Ambrose (1960) took this line of reasoning, perhaps, to extremes 
by suggesting that laughter is a degenerate form of crying.
Foss (1961) lays great stress on laughter as a social signal. 
Piddington (1933) and Chapman and Foot (1974) have looked at 
the social effects of laughter amongst children. Darwin also 
stressed, as we have noted, that laughter was like a reflex - 
a point that he owed, partly, at least, it seems, to Herbert 
Spencer.
Spencer (1860) developed the notion of laughter as a 
reflex. But he argued that the function is to discharge excess 
motor energy. Spencer made what seems to be one of the first 
direct claims about laughter and children. He saw that children 
tended to run about a great deal and, often, to laugh out of 
"pure glee". Spencer claimed the growing child is full of 
energy euid, as this energy bubbles over, he laughs. Spencer's
notion certainly guided some early systematic observers of 
children in tlie classroom like Kenderdine (1931) and Ding and 
Jersild (1932)^,^/.^^^^ who were all too ready to observe that 
very young children laughed for "no reason at all". One of 
the few fairly definite conclusions to which it is possible 
to come is that such pure "motor" activity laughter is only a 
small autiount of all child laughter.
While Darwin and Spencer saw laughter very much in terms 
of its external uses and causes, Freud (1905: 1928) saw the 
laugh as a sort of inner break through. The joke, by cloak­
ing forbidden thoughts, allowed them to erupt into consciousness. 
To work, a joke has, first, to conceal its true meaning and, 
then, to reveal, nay, expose it. Freud took as an example not 
just smutty jokes but hostile ones. A certain Herr N said of 
a friend that "Vanity was one of his four Achilles* heels". A 
splendid funny insult since most of us make do with just two 
heelsI But Herr N would never have allowed himself to openly 
criticise his friend. In a joke the hostility could break 
through. Freud compared the condensations of the joke-work to 
that of the dream-work.
For children, Freud implied that laughter was a form of 
release. Jokes would allow some of their conflicts - like the
Oedipal conflict - to«t.^ , .express itself. And the release
of tension would offer some relief. Freud's analysis led to 
work by Jacobson (1947) Wolfenstein (1951, 1954), Grotjahn (1957) 
which we ^hall consider later in some detail, unfortunately, 
though not surprisingly, their work usually ignores that of 
psychologists who were "inspired" by Darwin. Until recently.
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the psychoanalytic tradition tended to be ignored uy more 
experimental researchers. Both MoGiiee (1971, 1973) and Rothbart 
(1973), however, have taken a little notice of the insights of 
Freud into children's laughter.
One other major psychologist to develop a theory of laughter 
was William McDougall (1903:1919 - 1922:1937). He did not speci­
fically attend to laughter in children and little notice has 
been taken of his suggestion by most workers in the field of 
children's laughter. McDougall proposed that man learned to 
laugh in order not to expend too much energ^ on sympathising or 
distress at life's minor mishaps. There is no point in weeping 
your heart out if your best friend ha^ just stubbed his toe or 
tripped over Bergson's proverbial banana peel. When he has to 
have his leg amputated, it's a different thing.
In order to be able to laugh at such minor mishaps, man 
has to be able to sort out the serious from the not serious. 
McDougall*s thmory is, incidentally, not adequate because we can 
laugh at quite horribly tragic events or at things that are not 
mishaps. Nevertheless, the child would have to leam how to 
identify an event that's fit to laugh at - a minor as opposed 
to a major mishap. How does a child achieve this skilled dis­
tinction? As we shall see, little research till the very recent 
past has even considered this to be a question.
There appear to have been, in all, 5 major approaches to 
the study of children's laughter. As has been suggested, these 
approaches have tended to exclude each other so that a particular 
investigator tends to only embrace one of them. et, until the 
1970s, few psychologists stuck long to the study of laughter.
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Washburn (1929) published one study - and then no more. 
Kenderdine (19 31) did likewise: Brumbaugh (1939 : 1941) seems 
to have altered interests after two papers. Brackett (1933 : 
1934) also seems to have contributed just two papers. Leuba
(1941) did one study. Wolfenstein (1954) is something of 
an exception as is Grotjahn (1957). In other words, there 
was little continuous research on the subject and rather one 
has the feeling of a set of isolated attacks on a very com­
plex problem, each producing interesting but fragmentary 
results.
McGhee and Goldstein (1972) reviewed the number of studies 
done on laughter and humour. Out of 101 empirical studies, 
fifteen analysed children's laughter or humour. Early 
research held a balance between experimental studies and 
those that relied largely on naturalistic observation.
Washburn (1929), Kenderdine (1931), Enders (1927), Ding and 
Jersild (1932), Brackett (1934), Wilson (1927) all used a 
considerable amount of observation and ware content to start 
by seeing either what made children laugh or under what cir- 
cums tarn ces children laughed. Others did have a more experi­
mental approach like Brumbaugh (1940) .and Jbeuba (1941).
The field certainly did not produce a welter of work. One 
book took children's laughter as its main theme - Children's 
Humour by Wolfenstein (1954) as did the thirty-page pamphlet 
Laughter in the Nursery Class by Blatz, Allen and Millichauip 
(1936). Grotjahn (1957) in Ais Beyond Laughter dealt at 
some length with children's laughter. But the point is that, 
until the late sixties, the area was largely dead with 
occasional studies that did not seem to lead in any coherent 
direction. Often, psychologists seemed to lose interest.
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Since the late sixties, the situation has changed. A 
number of psychologists have made laughter their speciality 
and there are signs of prolonged interest in various aspects 
of the subject. This is not, however, a totally unmixed 
blessing. The study of laughter has moved, perhaps, too 
much into the laboratory. Goldstein and McGhee in their revised 
bibliography brought up to date to 1976 (1976) found nearly 40 
new studies of children's laughter and humour. But 25 of 
these were experimental: 8 observational: 3 theoretical.
Most of the 25 experimental studies looked at humour since 
it is easier to get children to rate the joke experimenters 
give them than to catch them laughing in the laboratory. This 
emphasis on experimental studies will be questioned. Among 
their possible disadvantages is the fact that they tend to 
focu attention on stimuli that will make the child laugh. It 
will be argued that stimuli, in themselves, do not usually make 
a child laugh. The context of the whole event is important. 
Next, children enjoy producing funny material as well as react­
ing to it. But a laboratory is not the best place to make up 
jokes or funny stories and, anyway, children are not usually 
aaked to do that.
In the review that follows, I have divided approaches 
into the study of laughter in children into five separate 
traditions.
A. Observational Studies where the aim is to see 
what makes the child laugh and what the situations are 
in which the child laughs. Often, the child sets these sit­
uations up himself.
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B. Psychoanalytical Studies. These stem from Freud's 
interest in humour, jokes and wit. What unites most of 
these studies is the conviction that almost all laughter 
means more than it seems to mean.
C. Social effects studies. Many writers agree that 
one of the functions of laughter is social. It helps bind 
groups together. This body of work examines laughter as
a social phenomenon.
D. Cognitive studies. These represent an attempt 
to look at laughter in intellectual rather than emotional 
terms. It is the very opposite superficially of the Freudian 
approach although some workers who use it (î4cGiiee 1971) 
stress it is only one of a number of possible strategies
for studying laughter.
E. Arousal studies. These have an interest in the 
physiological correlates of laughter and tend to attempt 
a synthesis - especially of B and D.
This is not an arbitrary division. Usually those 
interested in one approach have stayed consistently with it. 
In this there is no harm but it does often seem that 
researchers are hankering after one grand theory that will 
account for every laugh. McGhee (1971) advocated the value 
of many mini-theories. This seems a very realistic view.
Too many situations cause laughter to have only one cause. 
There are plenty of alternative theories but, as will be 
argued, though some of them are convincing some of the time, 
none is yet convincing all of the time. It is, in terms of 
effort, a new field of psychology and there is much that is 
basic yet to find out.
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OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES
One would expect observational studies to enable us 
to answer some very basic questions about the development 
of laughter. Such questions include: when do children 
begin to laugh : what do they laugh at : how do the events or 
stimuli they laugh at alter through time: what effect, if any, 
does personality have on the development of laughter: how much 
of a child's time is taken up laughing. Clearly, the answers 
to such questions would not enable us to say why children 
laugh but they would provide a base of data from which to 
build.
In the 1920s and 1930s, observational studies were 
fairly common. Washburn (1929), Wilson (1929), Kenderdine 
(1931), Ding and Jersild (1932), Brackett (1933) all based 
their work on observing either in the home, the nursery or 
the classroom as did Enders(1927) and Blatz Allen and 
Millichamp (1936). Commentators like McGhee (1973) have been 
critical of the quality of much of this early research. There 
is some point to the criticisms he makes but that is no reason 
to abandon observation. Rather, it is a question of 
improving and refining the way in which children are observed 
as Groch (1974) did, for example.
Before going on to analyse the results of those obser­
vations, it is important to realise that few even of those 
studies just looked at children over a period of time and 
noted what made them laugh. Washburn (1929) , for example, 
tried out on her subjects a number of stimuli to record ho^ /
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successful they were in njüting them laugh. Brucibaugh (1939) 
adopted a similar approach as, more recently, Sroufe and 
Wunsch (1972) and Sroufe and Waters (1976) have done.
Wilson (1929) adopted the slightly different approach 
of asking mothers to keep a diary of what It was that made 
their children laugh. The only record of pure observation in 
the hone, in fact, would seeir to be Valentine (1942). Valentine 
and his wife as part of the research for the psychology of 
early childhood observed their own children from O to 5 years.
In a rich chapter, Valentine pin-pointed, as we shall see, a 
number of points that any theory of laughter will have to 
accommodate.
Pure observational studies asually in nursery schools - 
have been a little more frequent (Enders% 1927: Kenderdine:
1931: Ding and Jersild 1932: Brackett: 1933). The latest - 
and perhaps most useful - study is that by Groch (1974) 
which has suggested a few crucial areas that need investi­
gation. Some psychoanalytic observers have also spent time 
recording the jokes children tell in class but these studies 
have usually been heavily influenced by preconceptions so 
that they are less observations than confirmations. (Wolfen­
stein: 1954).
WHEN DO CHILDREN FIRST LAUGH?
Most Of the research presented suggests that laughter 
begins round about 4 months. Washburn (1929) reckoned that g 
it was at this age that the baby first responded by laughing
29
usually in response to a stimulus like Washburn cooing 
"come on then - give us a smile" and laughing! Sroufe and 
Wunsch (1972) found that at 4 months babies were alrea dy 
quite receptive to both auditory and tactile stimuli like 
kissing the stomach, listening to noises like Boom and Aa ah! 
The fact that they were able to laugh at these suggests some 
earlier ability. After all, Washburn (1929) only came to 
observe the babies at 4-weekly intervals from 8 or more weeks 
on. They might have laughed when Washburn wasn't there. 
Sroufe and Wa^^ters (1976) in a much more methodical study 
that followed babies at weekly intervals also concluded that 
it was at 4 months that they were first able to elicit laugh­
ter. They added, also, the interesting point that the 4 
month baby does not laugh as soon as a stimulus is presented 
but with a latency of between 1 amd 2 seconds.
There have been, however, observations that suggest that 
laughter does occur earlier. Wolff (1963) observed laughter 
in a 5 week old baüoy. Valentine (1942) recorded the follow­
ing observations about his own children:
Day 29 first laugh of child Y
Day 39 first laugh of child B
Valentine's wife notes that in both these cases the laugh 
appears to be associated with contentment after feeding. 
Valentine attributes this to an "overflow" of good feeling. 
Two of the other children also laughed before 8 weeks. Child 
C did so at 6 weeks: child A laughed at 7 weeks. It has to 
be pointed out that Washburn only began her observations at 
8 weeks or, with some babies, a bit later.
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The case of Valentine suggests an explanation. If 
parents are observing the baby, they are much more likely to 
notice the first laugh than the psychologist who drops in 
onoe a week or once a month. How many times has a baby 
taken his first step or uttered his first word in a lab 
oratory. By 4 months, laughter may be quite easy to elicit.
In this context, Valentine first noticed laughter not in 
response to an attempt to elicit it - even by its mother - 
but as a response to 'contentment' before 30 days. Valentine 
noted also the first instance of 'social' laughter much later. 
He wrote:
"Day 81 - Child Y, the first real laugh in
response to my own laugh"
and on
"Day 115 - Child B repeatedly laughed when his
mother and I laughed to him even when 
he was beginning to whimper".
The age of first laugh is theoretically inqportant since 
some writers like Ambrose (196 3) want to delay laughter until 
the child can realise that there are two competing schemes 
in mind - one fearful and the other funn • As we shall argue, 
this as^ivalence theory of laughter is useful rather than 
total.
WHAT KINDS OF THINGS MAKE CHILDREN LAUGH?
Washburn (1929) tried out the following devices on 
her subjects:
31
1. Waahbum chlrruppad, looked down and aaid 
"Come on give us a awile". ^
Thia elicited laughter early, once at 12 
weeks but only once thereafter at 24 weeka.
2. K "threatening" turn of the head done in a 
sudden fashion. Washburn held the baby's hands 
in her own, shook her head from side to side 
and then ducked till it "hit" the baby's body 
upon which she uttered a long "Ah-Baa". Then, 
she withdrew. This rather bizarre action was 
very successful from 16 weeks on in eliciting 
laughter.
3. Rhythmic Hand Clapping: Washburn said
as she extended the baby's hands and "Bo” 
when she clapped them together. This elicited 
laughter in cases at 20 weeks f on.
4. Rhythmic Knee Drop in which the infant was 
held and then dropped 4 to 6 inches. This 
elicited laughter at 20 weeks and on.
5. Peek-a-Boo* Washburn used two versions.
This elicited laughter both at 16 eeks and 
then at 20 weeks onwards.
6. Tickling* Washburn addressed herself to 
tickling underneath the jav-bone or knees.
This elicited laughter <wily once, however.
. . .
4% j
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7. "Elevator"t Holding the baby below the 
shoulders, Washburn raised him above her head 
and jiggled him, smiling and speaking to him.
This worked from 24 weeks on.
8. Washburn ducked behind and reappeared from 
under a table. This also worked at 24 weeks on.
unfortunately, Washburn does not note clearly how 
successful these various items were. It is hard to under­
stand why tickling failed so miserably to evoke laughter 
and why chirruping at the infant also only produced one laugh 
in IS subjects. It may be because Washburn "performed" the 
action to be laughed at and Washburn was a stranger. It 
will be argued, later, that it is not particular stimuli, 
but a total situation, that provokes laughter.
There are also methodological problems with the study. 
Washburn did not follow the same 15 babies through each age- 
level and it is hard to use her evidence for developmental 
trends. She found, for exasple, that some tactile stimuli 
(like tickling) only led to laughter later than some social 
stimuli. In their systematic study, Sroufe aind Wunsch (1972) 
came, to the opposite conclusion.
Ambrose (1963) argues that Washburn's study shows 
that for a young child to laugh there has to be (1) sudden 
onset of the stimulus (2) a rapid change in the level or 
sort of stimulation and (3) an Intensity of stimulation 
that is high but not too high. We shall see that this for­
mulation while useful, cannot cope with all the observations 
around.
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Wilson (1929) also found that loud noises, being
bounced up and dcr^ n and games like peek-abo did make very
young childron laugh according to tîie diaries that mothers 
kept. Brumbaugh (1939) reported similar findings but again, 
he tested certain items out on children rather than watched
what made them laugh in situ.
The most systematic study to date is that by Sroufe 
and Wunsch (1972)^ . They used a number of undergraduates 
to observe what made 70 babies laugh from 4 months to 12 
months. Sroufe and Wunsch prepared a list of stimuli and 
divided them into auditory, tactile, visual and social 
stimuli. They hoped, therefore, not just to see what made 
babie:; laugh but to trace a developmental pattern. Sroufe 
and Wunsch offered the hypothesis that auditory and tactile 
laughter items would make the children laugh earlier than 
visual and social items because the baby's brain would not 
be able to process the more complex visual and social items 
till about 9 months of age.
In their first study, much laughter was reported. The 
following graph (GRAPH I) reveals the detailed results.
The problem was that Sroufe and Wunsch suspected their under­
graduates had been a little free in recording instances of 
laughter. They, therefore, trained some undergraduates 
thoroughly and gave them instructions on how they should get 
the mother to perform each joke. There was no point for 
example in comparing the item, "ShakingihS?? " if one mother 
would make endearing abrupt noises doing it while another 
mother did it in total silence. Babies witnessed a much
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GRAPH I
What Makes Babies Laugh -
T A B LE 1
rtRChNTAGE OF LAUGHTER BY ITEM FOR STUDY 1
It e m
Auditory:
Lip poppinK ..................
Aaah ...................................
Boom, boom, boom , . , ,
S y n th esizer .......................
\Vhis|)crinK .......................
Squeaky voice ................
Tactile:
Blowing hair ..................
Kissing stomach ___
Coochy-coo .....................
Bouncing on knee ____
Jiggling over head .........
Social;
Playing t u g   .......
Cloth in mouth .............
donna get you ................
Covering baby’s face .
Peek-a-boo  ..................
Chasing, crawling after
Visual;
Covered face ..................
DUapin aring object . . ,  
Sucking baby bottle
Crawling on floor .........
Walking like Laurel . . ,
Shaking hair ....................
Holding in air ................
Total
l i ' i f l T T i i "
A ge in M o n t h s
4-6 7-9 10-12
12 25 14
17 46 32
12 21 23
8 21 9
12 25 18
4 38 32
8 17 9
29 83 54
S 46 41
12 46 9
25 75 86
4 42 45
4 25 59
21 54 82
12 42 36
12 62 -82
4 38 • 68
4 25 54
4 25 32
4 17 36
4 21 36
4 33 54
21 54 86
8 42 68
10 37 43
Y " -- Y
- -
Sroufe A. and Wunsch J. P. 1972
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more automated performance. Mothers were also instructed 
not to practise in between the monthly experimental sessions - 
an instruction that seems frankly unrealistic. What kind of 
a month did the baby have if its motlier could not play peek- 
abo or be jiggled overhead.
In the second study, Sroufe and Wunsch studied 10 male 
babies of 4 months % 13 male babies of 7 to 8 months: 13 male 
babies of 11 to 12 months. They tested the 10 4-months 
olds each month till they were a year old.
In the 4 month old, auditory and tactile stimuli were 
quite effective in eliciting laughter. Aaah, Lip-Popping, 
Boom-Boom, Whispering, and all were successful to some extent. 
Three tactile stimuli were also quite successful - kissing 
the stomach blowing, bouncing on the knee and jiggling the 
baüjy overhead. Most tactile and auditory stimuli were much 
more successful when the baby was 7 to 9 months. And some 
visual and social items made the 4/5 month old laugh. The 
most notable were playing "Gonna Get You" (Social), Peek-abo 
(Social), and the mother shaking her hair.
Sroufe and Wunsch found that the babies laughed more 
the older they got. The items were successful in eliciting 
laughter at:
4 to 6 months 13.5% of the time
7 to 9 months 24% of the time
10 to 12 months 25% of the time
And, despite the fact that 4/5 month olds laughed at
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some "social" jokes, at 7 months Sroufe and Wunsch found a 
dramatic increase in social responsiveness so that the bsiby, 
aware of others, could laugh at and with them. Valentine
(1942), we shall see, observed this process much earlier.
The "social" jokes that depend on contact with another reached 
a peak at 7 to 9 months and stayed there. From 7 to 9 months 
to 10 to 12 months, Sroufe and Wunsch found a decrease in the 
"funniness" of tactile jokes though this was significaint 
only at the.  ^^ 10 level and, also, an increase in the
effectiveness of visual jokes like mzdting an object disappear 
or the mother sucking the babies bottle or herself crawling 
on the floor. It is clear, however, that this is a far more 
complex "joke" than another visual joke like the mother shak­
ing her head. To see tdie bottle joke, the baby has to realise 
that tlie mother is doing what the baby usually does and that 
she ought not to be doing it: she is "playing baby". This, 
rather thaui the fact that they were visual may explain why 
the badsy has to be 10 to 12 months old before there is a 
properly comic response.
Sroufe and Wunsch (1972) made a number of other telling 
observations. First, older beüsies laughed much more quickly 
at jokes. Secondly, older babies sometimes tried to get 
mothers to repeat the stimulus that had provoked laughter.
They also found in their longitudinal study of the 10 babies 
that 7 out of 10 babies first laughed at their mother crawl­
ing around the floor in the month or the month after they 
first began to crawl. Before the baby can crawl and accepts 
it crawls, there is nothing odd about the mother crawling.
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sroufe and Walters (1976) dunllcated many of the find­
ings of Sroufe and Wunsch. They also noted that as the child 
grows, older he prefers to laugh not just when a stimulus is 
produced but In anticipation of that. The baby known he is 
going to be tickled and starts laughing. It is a way of 
making sure that he will be tickled. The baby at 10 to 12 
months is no longer a passive being waiting for something 
funny to be done to him. Yet most research on children's 
laughter has cast the child precisely in this role.
Valentine (19 42) reported the following observations of 
his own children. He found, contrary to many ideas, that
the first laughter he recorded from all of his children did
not seem to be due to anything sudden or incongruous. All
his children from Y who first laughed at 29 days of age to
A who first laughed at 7 weeks, laughed first in response to 
a feeling of well-being after having been fed. Only a little 
later did laughter emerge as a response to another person or 
another face. Child B at 10 weeks and Child Y at 11 weeks 
would begin smiling and laughing in response to one of their 
parents' faces. Valentine noted that %dien child B was 0.8 
months t
"Does not cry when laughed at: he was crying bitterly 
himself because something was taken from him and when we 
laughed at him, he laughed too".
Valentine argue 1 that much laughter is bound up with 
social relationships but, evidently, not all laughter is. 
Valentine recorded that the sight of a bright or pleasing
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object could make a child laugh. Child B at 11 weeks also
laughed at the sight of a silver rattle. Prayer (1909)1^ 
found "loud laughter at objects that please still frequent 
in the 9 month".
Valentine also noted an informal experiment in regard 
to tickling. Child B laughed at 3V months whan his mother 
kissed his feet or tickled his ribs. Valentine's other 
children also laughed when tickled much more easily than in 
the Washburn study. Leuba (1941) as the prelude to an ex­
periment found it not too difficult to make his children 
laugh by tickling them from when they were 80 days old. 
Valentine attempted the following esqperiment. He got his 
wife to tickle child Y as she normally would. As long as 
the mother was smiling, the child lauded but Y ceased to 
laugh when her mother forced birself to look stem. Equally 
when Leuba donned a mask, he found his children also did not 
laugh when tickled. Instead, they tended to act fearful. 
Darwin (1872) said that for tickling to work the child has 
to be in a good mo<!*d. It seen» important that even tickling, 
the most stereotyped stimulus to evoke laughter, cannot be 
viewed just as a stimulus. Whether or not tickling succeeds 
in making a child laugh depends on the context in which the 
child is tickled. There are however exceptions to this - 
like the solitary laughter at a pleasing object.
Valentine also noted laughter as a response to a mild 
shock or surprise. Tearing a newspaper up often got a good 
laugh. He saw, too, that all his children enjoyed the re­
petition of a joke. Lau^ter at mere repetiticm is puzzling 
and perhaps, important. Valentine offered no explanation of
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It. An instance witla Child Y (at 2.11) showed this. *Y 
pulled a desk slide out I pushed it in and so on: after 
tlie 3rd and 4th tiine, a slight chuckle. Then loud laughter. 
Tills is also an interesting instance in which laughter is 
not caused by some tiling sudden but by a slow build i;ç>. 2^ iany 
theorists have been attracted by the idea that suddenness is 
a sine qua non of making you laugh.
Valentine was more doubtful about instances in which 
children laughed just because they recognised an object or a 
face. Adults do sometimes laugh when they recognise each 
other - a sentimental instance is when two lovers who have 
been quarrelling bitterly laugh when ttey are re-united.
Valentine also noticed teasing laughter when his children 
were quite young. "At 1.2% Child B teased his mother when 
she wanted to take something away from him by holding it out, 
saying Tata and then dragging it away when she tried to take 
it. Child B laughed until he almost collapsed". Laughter 
plays an interesting part in the interaction between children 
and parents. At 4 and 5 years of age, a child'# triumph over 
an adult is often accompanied by hearty laughter. At 2.11 
child Y laughs "when she has done anything naughty she makes 
up a heart laugh to make her mother laugh". So, of course, 
that mother will forgive her.
At 1.3, Valentine also noticed the first sort of hostile 
laughter - laughter when another is discomfitted. At 1.4,
B always laughed when his mother pretended to cry. In 
theoretical terms, this ia an important observation. For if 
Bergson or McDougall were right, one would expect the first 
laughs to have something to do with the discomfort of anot er.
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Valentine aise noted laughter during play associated 
with t!\e shear joy of roving - & topic to which we shall 
return later - but he does not go rmch into this. H© also 
found his children could laugh at something beautiful and 
that, from about 3 years they could enjoj»- puns. Child X 
heard her LWther read out of the iMipery "Great speech by 
proriier. House sirept off its feet". K looked up from her 
porridge and laughed: "Houses aren’t swept off their feet", 
she said astutely.
The observations Valentine made led him to conclude that 
by the age of 3 or 4 it seems "that all types of laughter in 
adults have appeared in children". Valentina believes that 
there is no single explanation of laughter - a modest view 
since many writers have tended to write as if tlieir one
E
theory would cover all laughter*. An account of laughter will 
have, according to Valentine, to deal with the followingi 
laughter as an original expression of intense pleasure after 
feeding: its biological and social value in developing bonds - 
especially between parents and children; laughter as a 
weapon or expression of hostility: the way in which, as the
B
child develops, he experiences more pleasure in lau^ter in 
80 far as it sets energy free. Valentine does not define what 
he means by energy, however, but adds that when the repressed 
energy is considerable, laughter is intensified. Oxildren 
like a joke at the expense of others they dislike. Finally, 
laughter can be nerv.,ous especially if one has failed at 
some task.
These studies in the borxe highlight how very complex
D
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the occasions of laughter are. They do not in themselves 
lead to any single theory of laughter being observations 
though an account of laughter must make it possible to 
explain the different varieties of laughter. Observational 
studies are particularly valuable because, as Chapman (1973) 
found, laughter tends to evaporate in the laboratory. Many 
workers have taücen this as a reason to suppose that studying 
laughter is, somehow, less valuable than using rating scales 
to test humour. This surely is a supreme rationalisation. 
Instead of devising more subtle means of observation, 
psychologists are invited to opt for indirect observation 
through getting children to fill in rating scales. Berlyne 
(1969) noted that only 15% of studies looked at laughter.
McGhee and Goldstein (1972) found only 13 out of 122 studies 
used lau^ter as a dependent variable. This seems an un­
fortunate and possibly unnecessary state of affairs, especially 
as careful and long observational studies in the home do not 
seem to make laughter evaporate. It is very surprising in­
cidentally, that no psychoanalytic students of laughter 
have studied laughter in the family since an analytic account 
of laughter centres round the way in which children use 
laughter to protect themselves from adults. And adults 
dominate not just the home but the classroom.
IN THE CLASSROOM
Early studies by Kenderdine (1931) and Ding and Jersild 
(1932:1940) appeared to show that nursery school children 
laughed often for no good reason. Tlieir laughter was often
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associated by motor movements. This laughter of "pure glee" 
would seem to confirm Spencer’s notion that laughter was a 
way of discharging excess motor energy. An early study by 
Enders (1927) and by Blatz, Allen and Millichan^s (1936) also 
looked at laughter in the classroom through naturalistic 
observation. In the case of the latter study they believed, 
a little gramdXy, after loss than 3 months that they had solved 
the whole question. "Laughter" they said, "is a social tick" 
Q.E.D. Groch (1974) studied a nursery school class of 30 
children. 16 of the children were boys, 14 were girls. 11 
of the children were 3 years old and 19 were 4 years old.
Groch’s method was, first, to do a pilot study which yielded 
a number of possible "types" of laughter. With a colleague, 
she then prepared a list of some 20 categories and fitted each 
laugh into her pre planned category.
First there was RaSiOnsiva Humour when the children 
reacted to some event or thing that they were not the author 
of - like finding a baby peanut on a shell or seeing a child 
fall off a chair. In this catagory, Groch also included 
children responding to jokes amd listening to stories. .
Second category was that of Productive Humour. In this 
a child had to laugh at or because of something he himself 
had done. Groch included in this category - clowning, being 
silly, being absurd. An absurd remark would be: fish is
taking a snower". also included lumour that was intended
to laininiise injury to self—esteem like when a child accidentally 
trips over and then laughu at his own plight. Teasing also 
camo in.
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Tha third category was goatila humour. In this, Groch 
Included ridiculing others, being rude or hostile to them 
and sheer defiance.
Her fourth category va* a iniscellaneovio category v;hich 
included using humour words like a child laughing and saying 
llm ha and also, laughter of "pure glee" that just went with 
excited motor activity.
Agreement with her colleagues on classifying the incidents 
in uacii 90 xninute bout of observation was good. The following 
table shows the division into various sorts of laughters
Both boys and girls laughed more at jokes they made 
themselves than at jokes othern made. With boys the predom­
inance of productive humour is particularly marked (45%) as 
against responsive huiriour (26%). But girls also tended the 
same way (39% productive 34% responsive). A not incon­
sidéré jle amount of humour was hostile. Boys also showed a 
lead in this though 7% of the girls’ laugiiter was also hostile.
Groch's results also suggest that the laughter of so- 
called "pure glee" is not tnat frequent. "Activity^ laughter 
accounted for 7% for boys and 5% of girls’ laughter. Also 
both aexds soiaetimes laughed just because they used a "funny" 
word like lia via!
Unfortunately, Groch does not give many specific 
exas^loa in her paper. But her work does suggest that it 
would be rash to look at children’s laughter essentially from 
the point of view of how they react to jokes. The teacher's
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"funny" stories seem to have been singularly useless In 
getting laughs - unless one aasuraes that In 42 hours almost 
none of the stories told had any comic element in them.
Both the cognitive and the psycho-analytic approaches, how­
ever, tend to focus on that,
Groch's also noted that children laughed In situations 
In which they v/era warding off an Injury to their self-esteem. 
If you can laugh at yourself, you haven’t made such a mess of 
things. That children should show this skill so young is 
interesting given that so many writers on psychotherapy 
claim that one index of good adjustment is, precisely, 
being able to laugh at oneself.
Shermam (1975) looked at the occurence of group glee 
in a classroom of 37 children. Elaborate video taped obser­
vations found that in freaplay glee was rare. In white 
male children, aged 51.7 months, there were only an average 
8 incidents per hour and even among non-white girls, the 
most gleeful of all subjects, it was only 2.8 incidents. 
Sherman made the curious observation that . one sort of 
lesson yielded less glee; lessons which made the children 
do physical things yielded far more - up to 32 incidents an 
hour, unfortunately, Sherman offers no explanation of these 
observations either in his 1975 paper or in a later one - 
(1977).
At prosant, observations have fallen Into disfavour.
For example ^  in the latest bibliography offered by
lie Ghee and Golds tain (1976) of some forty studies into 
children since 1972, only eight seem to be basically 
observational wnile thara have been around twenty five 
experimental studies. One problem is tliat though laughter 
is eeuiy to spot and hard to mistake, it is not so easy to 
evoke - especially in the laboratory. In the laboratory, 
however, laughs may iievar come. Police at al (1972) admitted 
that t my had never observed a class 4 laugh” as they call 
it, a very long, hysterical outburst of laughter. Yet 
laughter is not infrequently like this, as we snail sea.
From tills review of the observational studies, it 
seexar. plausible to argues-
(i) that it is possible to elicit laughter from 
a baby aged four months but that the first 
laugh probaoly occurs earlier - though not 
in the presence of experimenters necessarily.
(ii) Uiat stimuli which show suddenrchange and 
high intensity are amongst those that most 
often cauu# laughter, but that they are not 
the only ones to provoke laughter even in the 
ten months old baby. Examples of a slowly 
growing An ah sound (not sudden)% whispering 
(low intensity) and, more complex, 
mother crawl around, seeing mother _südç_baby28 
bottle. These suggest that the baby develops
46
an ability to (1) identify his own role and 
(2) to see the Incongruity of hie mother 
acting it out.
(iii) that as the baby grows older, he widens the
range of what he can find funny. It is worth
recalling tnat Sroufe and Wunscft (1972) found 
tnat their subjects could laugh at visual and 
social stimuli after seven months, they did 
not stop laughing at tactile or auditory stimuli 
Hocently, I attempted tickling and kissing the 
stomach of (1) my nineteen month old son and
(2) my five year old son. Both laughed. The 
repertoire of what you can laugh at increases 
but the child does not stop enjoying earlier 
kinds of jokes though the circumstances in 
which he laughs at "younger" jokes may alter.
(ivj that repetition is crucial to laughter. There­
fore, while a stimulus may have to be a sudden
surprise sometimes, at other times, it is just 
what is expected that provo)ces the laughter.
(v) that children find a great deal of pleasure 
in setting un their own laughs - in creating 
humour as well as in reaction to it. Studies 
need to examine children's production of 
humour as well as their reactions to it.
(vl) that a young child laughs not to any particular 
stimulus but to a particular situation though
soma stimuli whan "delivered" by a familiar 
person gaems always to avoke laughter. Ambrose 
noted that quite often Washburn's subjects 
whimpered or cried when she did the knee-drop, 
triad to tickle them or, even, played peok-abo.
He cites this aa evidence that the level of 
intensity that helps produce laughter must be . 
middling and that this "middling" level 
fluctuates. Valentine (1942) noted, however, 
some infallible ways of getting his cn>m children 
to laugh. In a next chapter, I shall offer 
similar evidence for some acts - like jiggling 
overhead and peek al^ o - with ray own two children. 
It Bewns likely that Valentine's children 
experienced "being laughed at by Daddy" and 
mine "being jiggled by Daddy" which is more 
than just a stimulus but a unit of l^ehaviour. 
That unit of behaviour seens to provoke laughter 
quite constantly. One recalls Valentine's 
observation that by Day 115, Child B could be 
made to laugh - even if he was ^hinpering - 
by Valentine laughing at him. It is hardly 
an Insight to suggest that a joke which went 
down well in one situation fails in another. 
Research needs, therefore, to broaden out from 
just presenting stimuli to children to see if 
they laugh at them. This approach will lead 
us later to examine the way in which tne cnild 
perceives an ambiguous situation and how that 
perception may determine whether or not he 
laughs.
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It 1.3 iicxijf time to turn to othar approaches to tlio 
development of laughter.
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC TRADITION
Freud (1905) was one of the first writers to bring a 
scientific approach to tiia whole subject of laughter. The 
title of Freud*3 boox, ho\fov«r, was Jokeg and Their Relation 
to the Unconscious. Though nuah of what Freud aeu to say 
refers to laughter, his central them© ruiaalned tlie nature and 
power of jokes. Nearly all the subsequent psychoanalytic
uJ
work on children and laughter has concentrated very heavily 
on children's jokes. This has been, perhaps, unfortunate.
It would seem from Groch (1974) that vao^ t, of the 'events' 
vhicii children laugh at are probably not jokes. Wolfenstein 
whose long study of cliildren's humour centred on their jokes 
said that, often, children devised or repeated very imperfect 
versions of adult joka-. This did not however lead Wolfen- 
stein into considering in much detail, Uie other things that 
make children laugh. Instead, she often anal sed why children 
could not produce such "good" jokes. Psychoanalytic investi­
gations into cnildren's huaour nearly always concentrate on 
verbal humour and usually examine humour in one of two set­
tings - t)ie classroom or the consulting room (Jacobson 194 7) • 
No studies seem to exaiidne humour or laughter between parents 
and children. All in all, surprisingly few psychoanalysts 
have written in any way about children and laughter. Apart 
from Wolfenstein (1954), Grotjaim (1957) devoted üomo sections 
of his book, J eyoud Laughter, to cliildren's laughter.
Jacobson (194?) wrote t.*o interesting case histories tixat 
involved humour. Kris (1962) offered some ideas on tiie
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relationship of ego development and the comic. These are all 
the major contributions. Mora minor contributions were made 
by Hester (1924), Herzfeld and Pragel (1929), Dooley (1934, 
1941), Sachs (1973), King and King (1973) and Ranschoff (1975), 
Not all of these writers were formally psychoanalysts but 
their work reflects considerable sympathy for psychoanalytical 
concepts about laughter.
Freud saw two separate forma of laughter. The first 
was harmless wit which had no sexual or aggressive content.
The pleasure in such jokes came frcxn the fact that they con­
densed a number of thoughts. The psyche took delight in such 
economy of thought. The second sort of laughter was tenden­
tious laughter in which a joke allowed usually forbidden 
thoughts to coiv^ e througii into the surface. Freud gave a 
number of examples of sarcastic jokes made by polite Viennese 
who would never permit themselves to be openly rude. An 
example is:
Herr N said of a friend: "I drove with him
te te a be te".
Herr N would never have crudely called his friend a 
beast or a fool. But, cloaked with humour, the thought 
could break through. Similarly, dirty jokes permitted sexual 
thoughts to be tliought auid spoken - and Freud saw the telling 
of a dirty joke as a form of seduction in which the teller 
tries to "seduce" his audience.
Freud wrote little specifically about children's jokes.
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His theory did, however, lead to a number of psychoanalysts 
examining various aspects of children's humour, usually jokes.
No specific predictions were made by Freud for children's 
laughter. But if jokes provide a way for oppressions to 
break through the usual defences of that psyche, one would 
expect certain ages to reflect certain preoccupations. During - 
and; soon after - toilet-training one would expect jokes con­
nected with that. During, and soon after, the oedipal phase, 
one would expect jokes that are connected with that, reflect­
ing (or coping with) the anxiety of that phase of develop­
ment.
As we shall see, no psychoanalytic investigation has 
done justice to the richness of Freudian ideas because the 
methodology of such empirical studies there have been has 
been flawed. And empirical here does not mean experimental.
Hester (1924) as part of the requirement for a Master's 
Thesis collected stories from children in the latency period 
and found that their favourite theme was that of falling - 
a common sexual symbol according to Freud. Dooley (1934) 
observed that patients sometimes produced humourous fantasies 
when working with their oedipal disappointments. One patient 
imagined herself as a tiny ant who was in danger of being 
crushed by her huge father. She felt this predicament to 
be funny. Dooley often found that patients experienced 
fantasies like the one above as funny or as a joke though they 
had not elaborated or con4bnsed them into a joke. Dooley (1941) 
argued, in dealing with humour and masochism, that humour is 
closely involved with the super-ego. Classic Freudian theories 
argue that the super-ego is the heir of the Oedipal conflict.
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When the child realiaee that he cannot 'have' his mother or 
that she cannot 'have' her father, it helps create a super­
ego, a sort of conscience*
Kris (19 38:1962) looked at the role of laughter in ego 
development. He argued that the essential pleasure In the comic 
allows one to look at things again as one did as a child.
When adults talk nonsense, they are recapturing something 
from their childhood. It can be unnerving to observe how 
easily parents of young babies slip into and enjoy baby talk.
But the fundamental point that Kris makes is that there is 
more to the pleasure of laughing or comedy than the fact that 
a joke embodies psychic eoonony as Freud suggested. When a 
child laughs, he is often mastering some anxiety or emotion 
in himself. To laugh is not, in itself, to conquer the 
anxiety since in order to manage to laugh the child needs 
already to have conquered the anxiety. Kris writes % "The 
comic alone cannot overcome emotion or it presupposes a 
certain control over anxiety before it can become effective.
Once it has come into being, however, it combines a sense of 
mastery with a feeling of pleasure". For Instance, Kris 
makes much of the observation (which, incidentally, will be 
challenged by some of the present %rriter's data) that a child 
only laughs at a movement after he has mastered it because 
before that it arouses too much anxiety. Kris offered an 
analysis of the double-edged character of the comic. What we 
laugh at is closely bound up with "past conflicts of the ego", 
and that laughter helps the ego to repeat its victory and in 
doing so once more to overcome half assimilated fears". This
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is why children love joke situations to be repeated. For 
to repeat a joke or a funny situation is to return to the 
original conflict and experience a new victory over it.
After this analysis of laughter as a means of conquer­
ing anxiety or a thrust through habitual defences Kris then 
adds paradoxically "The coisproinise achieved by the comic is 
the foundation of a phenomenon well known to psychoanalysis t 
The comic as a mechanism of defence. We know it from clinical 
experience. Here it can appear in various guises to ward off 
master and ward off emotions, above all anxiety".
One should not be misled by the word master. It means 
simply that laughter gets the upper hand and prevents or 
represses any expression of the anxiety as Sachs (1973) and 
Ransohoff (1975) suggest. To laugh perpetuates the anxiety. 
Kris gives a graphic exanqple. He discusses a case history 
of a man who was always cracking jokes and adds: "Psycho­
analysis teaches us the outcome of such an attitude. The 
clown will not remove his cap and bells until he has conquered 
his anxiety”.
Other analysts like Brill (1941) also make much of 
laughter as a defence mechanism. We appear to have, therefore, 
a position where psychoanalytic theory sees laughter both as 
a signal that anxiety has been conquered and how nice that 
it is which affords pleasure and relief; at the same time, 
laughter also prevents relief from anxiety since the patient 
laughs rather than confront what is wrong with him. Mo one 
seems too concerned by this paradox, however.
Kris did not provide any observational data of hi® 
own* The major study of children's laughter done by a 
psychoanalyst is that of VJolfenstein (1954). There are, 
sadly, a number of methodological problems with her study. 
Wolfcnstein never makes it quite clear how she collected her 
data. Her book examines the humour of children from around 
four years up to around fifteen years but she never states 
how many children she talked to, let alone how mauiy children 
of different ages. In her book, Wolfenstein examines a 
number of themes - joking and anxiety, sex, names and double 
meanings; riddles and the legend of the moron; the develop­
ment of the joke facade and, finally, children's understanding 
of jokes. Her method is to use the jokes children told her - 
or, sometimes, children's reactions to particular jokes #he 
told them - almost as a kind of illustration. It is sad to 
sound like a carping behaviourist but it is almost never 
possible to be sure h o , many subjects either produced or 
listened to a particular joke, let alone what the average 
reaction was. It would not matter mudi if Wolfenstein were^ 
offering specific case histories. It would be most valuable 
to be able to relate the sort of humour a child made up and 
liked to his own experiences and personal situation. A few 
times, Wolfenstein does this but only in the lim ted sense of 
explaining why one child liked one joke but she never broadens 
her analysis out to a full case history.
Wolfenstein argues that children use jokes "to alleviate 
their difficulties". She adds:
"They transform the painful into the enjoyable, turn
54
impossible wishes and the envied bigness and powers of the 
adult into something ridiculous, expose adult pretensions amd 
parody their own frustrated striving". (p.12)
Very young children especially use jokes to cope with 
their envy of adults and school age children "turn their 
frustrated curiosity into a major theme of joking". Children 
try to transform a painful situation of being small, ignorant, 
fearful, into a joke, "especially their disappointment and 
envy in the oedipal phase". Wolfenstein then, in effect, 
illustrate this theme, by examples. For instance, a six 
year old girl Rita draws a picture of a man with huge ears 
topped by an even huger hat. Rita then relates: "Once there
was a funny man. He has ears on one side and ears on the 
other. His hat was as big as the world". She laughs. "When 
people tried to walk they couldn't. Every time they had to 
jump inside his hat". (p.39)
Wolfenstein analyses this joke as follows:
"She thus makes a joke of the size of the penis which 
she symbolises as a hat and of its procreative power (all the 
people inside it). She exaggerates the size of what the man 
has so that it becomes at first incongruous (the oversized 
ears and hat), then incredible (the hat as big as the world)". 
Wolfenstein also argues that Rita jokingly reverses procreation 
since the entire population has to jump inside the hat or 
penis — a way of mocking the father's phallic power. Also, 
if people have to jump inside the hat or penis their wish for 
the "living reunion" with father-in-hat, is exposed as 
most inconvenient.
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This analysiit may appear bizarre or incredible.
Certainly, there is no proof of it except how plausible it 
appears and, to the present writer, it appears elaborately im­
plausible. Wolfenstein offers no details about Rita that 
might make it less so. On the other hand, her account of 
some jokes is quite convincing, k ten year old boy, Alfred, 
who had learning difficulties was worried that Wolfenstein 
might think him defective. One day he came in with his 
jacket and cap on backwards and said: "Some people think 
I'm backward. Isn't that ridiculous?" By deliberately 
making himself outwardly backwards through Us clothes, Alfred 
ridicules the idea that he might be really backward. And 
as young children often place their clothes on backwards, 
Alfred can safely invoke this earlier stage. It also suggests 
his present learning problems will pass and become as trivial 
as those of dressing oneself. Wolfenstein concludes that 
children use jokes as a way of coping with feelings of 
anxiety guilt or disappointment, and arguw that mastery 
gives plea ure - a theme we shall return to.
In her second chapter, Wolfenstein examines Sex, Names 
and Double Meanings. She explains the fascination the young 
children have with playing with words as the result of two 
basic ambiguities that plague them namely am I a boy or a 
girl?: and am I loved or hated? Hence, children love games 
in which they switch names. Wolfenstein's best example of 
this, however, gives far from clear evidence. A group of 
4 year old children were switching naioes. Herbert says to 
Carol: "You're Billy". And he says to Billy: "You're Carol".
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He gives other children others' names. Wolfenstein reports 
no specific laughs here. But when Herbert calls Susan by 
the teacher's name and the teacher obligingly replies:
•I'm Susan", "That is hailed by particularly loud laughter 
from the children", Wolfenstein adds. But if children are 
anxious about their identity, one would expect that it would 
be threatening to have the teacher assume a child's identity. 
In fact, the laugh is simply explained by the teacher using 
a child's name be ug supremely incongruous.
In her third chapter,'Wolfenstein also explains that 9 
year olds are addicted to Heinie jokes where Heinie is both
a child's name zmd a slang word for bottom. Here is an
example of sudi a joke. The mother of Heinie asks a police­
man:
"Have you seen my Heinie?" - i.e. ray child
Policeman ; "No, but I'd sure like to". - i.e.
I'd love to see your bottom
Wolfenstein makes much of the fashion of such jokes.
In the fantasy of the joke, the child gets to see what 
he longs to sec - the mother naked. It is surprising that 
Wolfenstein ecphasises this so aa in her next chapter - on 
jokes riddles and the legend of which appear round 6 years 
of age - she stresses the a-sexual nature of jokes in the 
latency period.
WolfenF: te in stresses that children from, rou<^ly 6 years 
to pre-puberty prefer riddles to jokes. Wolfenstein offers 
this, first, as a universal generalisation. She adds that
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for children between 7 and 10 riddles make up 30% of all 
their jokes. In a footnote, Wolfenstein, then, says that 
this is true for children in expensive New York private 
schools, at least. She explains their liking for riddles 
as due to their precision. Riddles parody the questions 
(often sexual) which the child has asked and never really 
had answered. The child goes further in his love of riddles 
and parodies the whole of adult knowledge. The "correct" 
answer to a riddle is, often, really nonsense. Yet, conversely, 
the child can make use of the fact that he knows the answer 
to a riddle to lord it over children who don't. These are 
rich ideas. Wolfenstein goes on to point out that the answer 
to a riddle depends on knowing without looking. As the 
"latency" child has begun to feel guilty about wanting too 
much sexual knowledge (looking), a devotion to riddles helps 
free him or her from the guilt that is still linked to wemt- 
ing to know too much.
Unfortunately most of the examples Wolfenstein adduces 
are fairly explicitly sexual. If the love of riddles is a 
means of the child protecting itself from its earlier sexual 
curiosity, what is one to make of:
"What made Miss Tomato turn red?"
"She saw Mr. Green Pea".
Hardly subtle but hardly inexplicit.
Wolfenstein also analyses the riddle:
"Why does a fireman wear red suspenders?"
"To hold his pants up".
Again, the sexual theme is hardly concealed. In some
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cases, there are elaborations of the riddle which are 
interesting. She adds: "An eight year old boy is led to 
think of suspenders as robbers^ who, for her, symbolise 
castra tors. The boy never says robbers for he asks: "Why 
don't they have gangster pictures on the suspenders. Then, 
they could really hold your pants up". Is this elaboration 
necessarily sexual?
Some of the riddles do seem much more likely to con­
ceal a repressed sexual meaning like:
"What is a lady always looking for but hoping never 
to find?"
"A hole in her stocking".
But not all the riddles are like that.
Wolfenstein uses these examples as preludes to her 
analysis of moron jokes. The moron appears to be a lumbering 
adult figure, never a child, never a being the child would 
want to be, a Caliban figure. The moron is an aspect of 
themselves the children do not want to admit. Here is one 
joke :
"Why did the moron throw the clock out of the window?"
"Because he wanted to see time fly".
This joke is about flying (sax), about stupidity (what 
a silly ideal) and about aggression (throwing out). Many 
children of 6 or so fantasise throwing their younger siblings 
out of windows and, thereby, turning the clock back to when 
they were the only and adored child. Flying also symbolises
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their desire for sexual experience while the idiocy of the 
riddle pokee fun at the idea of discovering anything sexual.
If latency children have to repress their fantasies and, 
therefore, enjoy precise jokes like riddle , they would 
certainly cwidense much into their jokes. But can this riddle 
about the clock quite boar the interpretation Wolfenstein puts 
on it? After all, what is thrown out of the window? A clock. 
In hi# long list of sexual and other symbols in the Intro­
ductory Lectures, Freud never mentions a clock as either a 
sexual symbol or the sort of object that would stand for a 
sibling. A jewel case is the cloaeat he gets because that 
contains sexual "treasure". And, then, what is it that 
flies? Time. Freud argued that planes, rockets and zeppelins 
are sexual symbols because they fly and wrote that dreams 
"in which the dreamer flies himself" are often dreams of 
sexual excitement. But time is neither an oojoct an animal 
nor the dreamer but a complete abstraction. Even in terms 
of Freudian theory, Wolfenstein seems to be asking this joke 
to mean too much.
It would be interesting if one could show tli#t children 
of different ages prefer jokes of a different structure. And, 
we shall see that cognitive theorists argue Just this. Prom 
an emotional point of view, it is an attractive idea.
But Wolfenstein has really hardly begun to provide 
evidence for it. She offers only one - often a rather forced • 
interpretation of jokes. And in her concentration on riddles, 
she records fs* other "latency" jokes. Some that she does
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like the "Heinie" jokes seem to contradict her main thesis. 
Moreover, on® needs to know much more accurately the pro­
portion of different jokes that children of different ages 
tell. Only the "suspender" jokes seem to have to do with 
falling yet Hester (1924) found falling to be the main 
theme of latency jokes.
ïorukoglu (1977) claims that favourite jokes reflect 
the child's pre^occupations• One child said his favourite 
joke centres round father oeing asked to define war. He 
stumbles. Mother enters and tells him to hurryup, be pre­
cise, do it. The child says it's fine; he now knows what 
war means. The joke protects. Clearly, overcoming anxiety 
is involved in some jokes but the psychoanalytic case seeks 
to make this the main, if not the only, motive for jokes.
This seams unrealistic. For example, there is some recent 
evidence that children as young as five prefer neutral to 
aggressive jokes. According to Freudian theory, they 
really ought to prefer aggressive jokes since it would give 
them the chance to work off hostility - especially to their 
parents. King and King (1973) found they preferred bland 
cartoons. Moreover two studies of older children (Sachs 
1973 ; Ranschoff 1975) found that laughter was used as a 
defence against anxiety and sexual longings. In other words, 
the laughter did not help overcome fears but rather the 
laughter provided a way of not facing the fear. The view 
that all laughter is a way of transforming a painful ex­
perience into a pleasant one is too simple. Yet psycho­
analysts who admit this do not admit the paradox of their 
position. Laughter can be both a means of overcoming
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anxiety and a way of repression - but one must explain 
h w  this feat is achieved. Wolfenstein does not do this. 
Moreover, sne largely ignores a valuable suggestion of 
Freud* 3.
Freud (1905) stressed that one of the benefits of 
humour was that It allowed a person to laugh and, by 
implication, to cope or to accept his own mistakes or mis­
fortunes. Prank1 (1946) has made the ability to laugh at 
oneself a cornerstone of his own brand of therapy, logo- 
therapy. Grotjahn (1971) briefly explored the relationship 
between motivation and humour. In the context of such 
approaches, Wolfenstein might have studied how aware children 
were that they were laughing at themselves #ometimes to cope 
with or make less difficult a particular situation. But for 
Wolfenstein, when a child expresses anxiety through a joke, 
he is never conscious of that and so he can never use that 
skill to fortify himself. Take the joke Albert mads at 10 
about being backwards. Albert does not consciously see the 
point of his joke. It is not clear whether Wolfenstein did 
not find such examples because they did not happen or because 
she was not looking for them. This is a pity. Groch (1974) 
saw that 3 and 4 year olds tended to laugh sometimes when 
they had been the victim of sonie mishap like falling over 
a chair. I observed in a classroom a scene recently where 
a 5 year old rushed in wearing a cap. Two children saw him 
and laughed, saying "You*re wearing a cap" upon which the boy 
also started to laugh - and then left the room to get rid of 
his cap. Children do learn to laugh at themselves - as Freud 
predicted - but Wolfenstein*s study casts no light on that
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since they never know consciously the meaning of what they 
are doing. And to use humour to grow in that way is, in 
fact, a supremely self-conscious act.
The review of the psychoanalytic work in this area 
leads one to the conclusion that most of the ideas have not 
been adequately investigated. The evidence for the fact that 
pleasure in laughter is linked to anxiety or mastering anxiety 
is stronger than for almost any other rota. Later, we shall 
review some more recent work not too removed from that notion. 
It seems possible that children of latency age should prefer 
jokes of a different structure but the evidence does not 
show it. It seems possible, too, that children love word­
play because it reflects .ambiguities about sex but it seems 
much lii'^iar that children love puns because they are a way 
of stretching their linguistic skill. A pun by * 5 year ©Id* 
"Adele (his 17 year old aunt) is going out with her boyfriend, 
her toyfriend", could be interpreted in terms of jealousy.
The 5 year old reduces his rival from a man to a small, 
plastic thing, or it could be just a clever linguistic hit.
It is a pity tliat Freud's work has not generated more 
meticulous research because some of the psychoanalytic ideas 
appear valid. But they are not - as most psychoanalytic 
writers on the subject would have it - the whole story.
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THE SOCIAL APPROACH
Darwin (1872) argued that lau^ter was essentially a 
social response ratlier than a humourous one. Only as human 
beings evolved did they start to laugh because things were 
funny. Our ancestors did laugh before then to go by the 
facial expressions of socie apes and, then, laughter anist 
have been a social signal, a form of greeting or appeasement 
or, even, a kind of ritual that promoted unity in the primate 
group. Piddington (1933) made the social functions of laughter 
quite central. Bergson (1911) had already suggested that 
laughter is a social gesture, a device society uses to 
prevent behaviotUP that is too eecK^ntric from getting out of 
hand. The titter and the guffaw are but tools of social 
control.
There is some evidence that laughter helps create 
strong social and ©motional bonds between parents and children. 
Valentine (1942), Aiabroae (1963) as well as any decent book 
on child care would suggest this. Yet, there seam to be 
almost no studies that look at laughter as a device in the 
process of socialisation. There appear to ba no studies on 
how laughter can be used as a tool of social control though it 
is often said that children hate being laughed at. The gaps 
in this field appear tremendous.
Much early research looked at whether it was true that 
if you laugi\ the world laugns with you and that, therefore, 
you can't laugh alone. If laughter is really a social act.
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solitary’ laughter ou^t to be rare. The evidence is not con­
clusive though it Is suggestive, Enders (1927) noted that 
children tended to laugh m r e  when they were with another 
child than when they ware with an adult. Kenderdlne (1931) 
reported that nursery school children seldom laughed except 
when they ware with others. Wilson (1931) found and her 
diari«ts reported that children tended not to laugh when 
they were by themselves. Ding and Jersild (1932) noted that 
an older child found it easier to laugh if there was another 
child or adult present. But younger preschool children were 
not Influenced b such a presence. Perhaps, laughter is not 
basically a social act. It is just that, as wo grow older, 
we feel embarrassed about laughing out loud by ourselves. 
Children (and adults) are still found to laugh by themselves.
5 year old son will often hoot at cartoons that he watches 
by himself. It would be instructive to compare the situations 
in which children of different ages do laugh by themselves 
with those whan they don't though, given company, they might. 
This has not been done to date, however.
The majority of contemporary studies on the social 
aspects of children's laughter have been done by Chapsuan,
Foot and their co-wor)c3rs. Much of their work is of method­
ological Interest. Chapran (1973) showed how laughter can 
elude the experimenter if he lets on he is watching or, even, 
just there. Chapman and Foot devised their mobile laboratory 
in which children are observed while they play or listen to 
jokes. Chapman (1976) has hinted at some of the problems 
of relying on funniness ratings made by children. The weak­
ness of mea ureiaent techniques. Chapman notes, has its con­
sequences. "...it remains to be demonstrated formally that,
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for example, people laugh louder and are quicker to respond 
to humour when in company". Chapman and Foot are evolving 
a scale of mirth but this requires much systematic research.
Chapman (1973) showed that when children were listening 
to jokes tiirough headphones, there was more laughter if 
both children knew they were listening to the same joke - 
even though each heard it in private on headphones. A joke 
shared is a joke enhanced. Cliapman and Wright (1976) used 
9 year old confederates who ware trained to respond in par­
ticular ways while other children heard jokes through head­
phones. The more the confederates smiled and laughed and 
looked at the other children, the more these laughed and 
smiled. This could be due to the fact that if companions 
laugh and smile this is infectious and facilitates the same 
response. It could, alternatively, be a matter of infor­
mation. If you see X as funny, I should find X as funny. 
Chapman (1974) had already found that it did not matter whether 
children thought they were sharing the same joke or a different 
one. It is not the sharing of humour that matters but the 
sharing of the social setting. In dyads, when the confederate 
laughed more, it increased the extent to which the subject 
laughed, smiled and looked at his companion as well as 
increasing the funniness ratings given to jokes or funny 
stories. Chapman and Wright (1976) found that even when a 
confederate did not laugh or smile at all, a subject would 
laugh more than when alone. The presence of someone - even 
if he does not look at you - helps children to laugh more.
With adults this may not be the case.
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Chapman (1975) also tested the notion that the outsider 
In e group le likely to laugh less. Chapman had pairs of 
confederates to exclude a third person - the subject - by 
smiling and laugîilng at each other. In such a situation, the 
subject laudhed much less, if at all. The more the con­
federates ignored each other, looking and snllinc less, the 
more tîie subject tended to laugh.
By altering seating arrangements in the laboratory.
Chapman (1974) found that aubjects tended to laugh most if 
tiiey were gazing at eacli oUier aide by side or faofe to face.
The greater social intimacy there is, the more laughter is 
likely. A second experiment found th®t there was more 
laughter when children encroached more upon one another's 
body space.
These last two experiments have led Chapman to suggest 
that laughter acts as a safety valve against too much social 
arousal. Sitting face to face, producing much eye contact 
and encroaching each other's body space is a sign of h i ^  
•social arousal'. The child can't take so much. Laughter 
acts as a release. Chapman also argues, though it is not 
quite clear how his own experiments relate to tnia, that 
laughter alleviates various forms of motivational arousal in 
a way that is socially acceptable and physically safe. Chapman 
(1976) also reports a physiological experiment.
Chapman and Foot (1976) report some data on groups of 
children watching film* which partly develop, and partly con­
tradict, floras of these results. They found that children were 
very sensitive to the presence of another companion of either 
sex. Their smiling and laughter were both enhanced. Girls
J3L
were more affected by the sex of their companion than boys.
A boy made them laugh and smile more. The effect of an adult 
presence was ambiguous. If these develop the notion that 
it takas two - at least - to laugh, research on the distances 
between tlie children appeared to contradict the attractive 
findings with regard to body space. The distance between 
childr*3n up to 1 metre had no effect whatever on their 
laughter. Tlie curious finding was also made that children 
laughed more if the film did not have a soundtrack.
Cliapman and Foot (1976) readily admit that they are 
dealing with work in progress. They are looking at the way 
the social affects - and "causes" - of laughter differ between 
three and eight year olds. They do not claim to be study­
ing the whole of laughter. They write: "Our aim in the 
current research is to explore the ways in which laughter 
and otliar responses to humour function in children's social 
encounters". An account of hoi# laughter functions in such 
encounters is, at best, an Indirect attack on the social 
purpose of laughter, ttoreovar, both Chapman and Foot 
individually, jointly and with co-workers nearly always 
stu^y how children respond to funny stories - especially 
The Funny Green Hair and The Laughing Policeman. Yet the 
jokes children crack themselves are important. It could ba 
that in forming social ties, in using laughter against other 
children by excluding them. In telling jokes in order to 
•win* another child over, the jokes children make are far 
more crucial than the jokes they respond to. The method­
ological care that has led Chapman and Foot to devise their 
mobile laboratory where children can listen with headphones 
to funny stories is impressive. Forgetting the fact that
68
the situation may be a little artificial, it must ba said 
that it also neglects the way in which - either amongst 
themselves or with adults - children create laughter.
In their latest statement of their position. Chapman,
Smith and Foot (1980) stress again their findings that the 
mere presence of a partner increases the amount of laughter 
and smiling and laug)iter. They also report findings which 
show that two friends seeing cartoon slides together will get 
a higher "mirtii score" than non-friends. Both these studies 
highlight the "immensely oon^lex social responsiveness" and 
the authors continue to argue that one function of laughter 
is to act as a safety valve in the face of social
stimuli. While recommending their meticulous experimental 
approach. Chapman, Smith and Foot note: "Recognising that 
experimentation is not well suited to exploring when and 
why children tell jokes, or create humour and comedy we 
have broadened our methodology in several directions*.
Still concentrating on humour and jokes, these researchers 
promise results which will come from a mix of ethologlcal, 
socometric, observational, questionnaire and interview 
techniques. To date, however, their reports are still awaited.
Foot and Chapman (1976) offered then a modest definition 
of their aims which are to examine "the ways in which the 
social situation modifies by enhancement or inhibition the 
expression of laughter to humour stimuli". But, this seemed 
then a second-level question. The prime question must be 
the extent to which laughter is a social response and, if so.
€9
In what circumstance*. Much of what Chapman and Foot say 
is tangentially revealing here but one 7ongs for a more 
direct attack*
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COGNITIVE THEORIES
One of the common theories about laughter is that it 
is due to the perception of incongruous events or situations, 
Shultz (1972) spent much ingenuity in testing the ways in 
which subjects reacted to (i) jokes that presented an incon­
gruity - say, a cow with a sign hanging round its neck read­
ing OUT OF ORDER and (ii) jokes which offered a resolution 
to such an incongruity. Then, the cow not only has the sign 
but the milkmaid stomps angrily away from the mi Ik less cow.
It is possible to think of more gripping resolutions to jokes. 
It is also not so easy to be sure what joke is an incongruity 
joke and what joke is a resolution one. Rothbart», (1976) takes 
one of S iiultz*s jokes:
"Why did the Cookie cry?"
"Because her mother was a wafer so long*.
a wafer is, of course, away for
The answer appears to be a resolution of the joke but 
it alio offers a new incongruity. What else can you say about 
a cookie that has a mother? Much of the debate on Incongruity 
and resolution assumes that these are definite categories with 
jokes being either of one sort or the other. Shultz has even 
suggested that children at different developmental levels 
prefer different sorts of jokes. But an analysis of a real 
joke, a professional one, suggests how very elusive these 
definitions are.
In the New Yorker this joke appears:
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Where is the resolution here? It is not needed. One could 
have a second picture showing birds sitting in the nest or 
birds in a lounge. Would that be funnier? Sophisticated 
humour clearly needs oo resolution. The readership of the 
New Yorker is hardly confined to three-year olds.
Given this emphasis on incongruity, one might have 
expected a body of researchers to investigate the point at 
which children can discern incongruities and find them amusing. 
Knowledge of this is anecdotal. Sroufe and Wunsch (1972) 
reported that at 0:10 a child could laugh if it saw its 
mother crawling on the floor - a month after it first crawled. 
That this was to do with incongruity is clear when one notes, 
too, that it was only in the month or so after the baby had 
learned to crawl that the child/baby began to laugh.
Valentine (1942) noted laughter at incongruous situations 
early in the first year.
In my own observations of my own children I noted in R 
at 1 year the following behaviour. His mother, or I, would 
give him the dummy; then he would try to give us the dummy.
As soon as the dummy reached mother's mouth, R laughed. This 
happened even if we took care not to make any loud noises.
This kind of incongruity seems to be a sort of 
role incongruity. Mother acts as baby. Baby 'knows* 
that usually baby acts this way if anybody does and, cert­
ainly, that mother does not act like this. This 
"sophisticated" perception may differ from the perception of
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other Incongruities, from which the child learns to perceive 
Intellectual incongruities. The way in which the child 
manage s to do this has, however, been very poorly charted*
Most of the work involved has been McGhee's. McGhee starts 
out from a basic Piagetian position. Piaget made many 
observations that im/olved laughter in young children.
Shultz (1976) reports that his ov7n son, Kevin had made up a 
sensory-motor scheme for playing with toy cars. At 1:3,
Kevin emptied his juice bottle and began to push it on the 
side making his "car" noises. He smiled and laughed. Shultz 
calls this "self-constructed" incongruity and argues that till 
about 6 or 8 years - before they move on to concrete operational 
thought, children may prefer simple incongruities rather than 
resolvable incongruities. There is not much conclusive evidence 
for this. As the New Yorker cartoon suggests, adult jokes 
often enjoy a mixture of resolution and incongruity humour. 
Children might go through a stage of preferring 'pure' 
resolution jokes but it has yet to be demonstrated conclusively.
Shultz reports that children at 7 switch from a preference 
of "incongruity" jokes to "resolution" jokes. At 11 to 12, 
he argues, there is a switch back. Rothbart and Pien (1976) 
showed 4 and 5 year olds visual jokes as opposed to Shultz's 
ones. Here 4 and 5 year olds were to show no preference for 
incongruity jokes. It may be that to grasp the point of 
resolution jokes that are verbal, one needs a much better 
vocabulary than the average 4 or 5 year old. Horf many children 
of that acre know what a wafer is? It is not a question of
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what jokes children are conceptually capable of but of their 
linguistic îcnowledge. Rothbart and Pien (1976) is very
persuasive.
Shultz valuably points out that we very poorly under­
stand the way in which children begin to enjoy and to man­
ipulate incongruity, a process which Sroufe and Wunsch (1972) 
suggests starts at under 1 year. But having made that point, 
Shultz does not really offer a v#ry plausible way of proceed­
ing. His ovm use of• incongruity and resolution seems, indeed, 
too simplistic. Rothbart and Pien (1976) have recently 
suggested an improved analysis of basic joke-types. They 
argue that the child in the laboratory is confronted not 
just by two sorts of joke but by, at least, four. They 
analyse the following:
1. Impossible incongruity - those which involve cookies 
crying for instance.
2. Possible incongruity - an example would be a grauidee 
slipping on the proverbial banana peel. This may be un­
likely but it is not impossible in the world as we know it.
The tears of cookies are.
And if there are two sorts of incongruity, could 
tliere not be two sorts of resolution?
3. Con^lete resolution. Such a resolution settles
the initial incongruity. An example of such a resolution would 
be Freud's joke about the two Jews at the bath-house which 
revolves round the two senses of taking a bath. Once you 
realise that talking a bath here means washing, not stealing, 
the resolution is complete and final.
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4• Incomplete resolution where the matter is not so 
elegantly settled. An example would be where tine girl 
stomped away from tiie OUT OF ORDER cow and said "Maybe 
tomorrow she'll work". That doesn't resolve the oddness 
of an OUT OF ORDER description being given to an animal.
So far, however, Rothbart and Pien have not managed to 
perform any kind of study tiiat exaunines whether these dis­
tinctions - which sound plausible but not exhaustive - do 
emerge out of the way subjects respond to jokes. There is 
another problem too. It may well be that there are important 
differences in tiie ways that children react to visual and 
verbal humour. N. recently watched a Bugs Bunny cartoon 
in which Bugs was mistaken for a baby gorilla and swaddled 
in baby gear. This made N laugh. But the simple statement 
that Bugs Bunny is dressed up like a baby did not make N 
laugh. These differences need exploration. It may well 
be that very young children can grasp the notion of in­
congruity but that this is confused if you use jokes that 
are verbal and that depend on complex double meanings. Even 
then, children are capable of this quite young. Valentine 
(1942) reported tixat one child at 3:5 heard her mother 
read the newspaper headline: "Premier sweeps House off
its feet" and made the a/ift repartee; "Houses aren't swept 
off their feet". (And, incidentally, does the repartee con­
stitute an incongruity or a resolution 'joke'?)
Much of the research on incongruity and resolution jokes 
has been done in the framework of Piaget's developmental 
theory. This suggests, as we shall see, that before children
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are about seven, there will be severe conceptual constraints 
of tlie kinds of joke they can see. As a result, very little 
Icnov;ledge has been built up about how children under 5, say, 
respond to incongruities. There are good indications, how­
ever, from Sroufe and Wunsch (1972) , Sroufe and Walters (1976), 
Gro dx (1974), Valentine (1942) and nty own data that children 
of this age can respond humourously to conrclicated incon­
gruities and, also, to jokes which have a resolution. There 
needs to be work tracing in detail the development of this 
ability. For example, one might predict that it will take 
longer for a cliild to laugh at impossible incongruities than 
at possible ones. The lack of detailed naturalistic research 
here is regrettable.
One of the difficulties with cognitive research on 
humour and laughter is that often children do not laugh much 
at jokes in the experiments. Many experimenters honestly 
admit this and then blithely go on to study the humour 
response. This frequent inability to provoke laughter in the 
lab seems to stem from the positive awfulness of mainy of the 
jokes selected - Shultz* cookie joke is enough to make you 
cry. Also, it is difficult to measure mirth. Hence attention 
has shifted away to older children who can not only laugh 
but can also complete rating scales about funniness and 
attempt to explain the comprehension of humour. How children 
understand jokes has become a major topic in this field.
McGhee (1971, 1974, 1975, 1976) accepts Piaget's scheme 
of intellectual development and has focussed his attention
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largely on differences betv/een 5 and 9 year old children 
in the appreciation of humour. The effect on humour of t!ie 
transition to concrete operations is what often concerns 
McGhee though recently (1980) he has broadened his approach 
to look at creative aspects of humour. McGhee does not 
seem to take account of critics who have shown that Piaget 
under-estimates the logical skills of very young children 
(Donaldson s 1976 - Bryant : 1972). In a number of ex­
periments McGhee wanted to see the "cognitive resources" 
available at different ages and to relate these to the level 
of humour that a child can understand* McChee excluded ten­
dentious jokes and focussed on 'logical* jokes. He dis­
tinguished two main kinds of jokes (i) novelty jokes and (ii) 
incongruity jokes. A joke was a novelty if it involved some 
physical discrepancy. Young children could grasp this but 
just as novel, not as incongruous. McGhee's favourite joke 
seems to be a dog carrying a car across a road which is, 
admittedly, a novel way of fouling the footpath. An incon­
gruity joke involves no sucii aberration. This time, McOiee 
conjurs up a household in which the wife loves bargains. She 
sees dog-soap on sale super-cheap. She has to buy it. Then, 
of course. Father adds % "We'll have to buy a dog noiv". The 
incongruity is buying dog-soap as a bargain which forces you 
to buy a dog which means, of course, that it was no bargain.
McGhee tested 90 boys of age 5, 7 and 9. He first gave 
them a Piaget teat to determine if they were conscious of 
conservation of mass and weight. Then, each child was given 
a variety of jokes. They were asked to say if the joke 
was not funny at all, quite funny or very funny and 
also asked why it was funny and how they would change it in
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order to make it not funny.
The 5 year olds enjoyed all the jokes but were much less 
able to "interpret" them. There was a small tendency for 
the 7 and 9 year olds to appreciate more incongruity cartoons 
that had captions. With novelty jokes, all groups including 
tlie 5 year olds could alter tîie jokes so as to remove the 
humour. With the incon^uity jokes, the 7 year olds showed 
some traces of tlxis skill especially with the incongruity 
jokes and cartoons v/itli captions- The 9 year olds could do 
it but did not seem that interested.
McGhee's explanation of why 5 year old children managed 
to laugh at these jokes is interesting. First, he argues that 
children of this age can remember well enough to know that it 
is novel for a dog to carry a car. This appears to imply 
that children of this age will laugh at any odd juxtaposition - 
a proposition not tested and which seems unlikely. It's hard 
enough to get them to laugh at certain experimental jokes. 
Secondly, it supposes that children who respond to the in­
congruity jokes do so because they laugh for the wrong 
reason or for social reasons. McGhee bases his argument for 
this on tiie point that they can't interpret the humour. And 
not only can they not interpret it, it is beyond their logical 
grasp according to Piaget's theory.
McGhee argues that the ability to perceive incongruous 
relationships depends on the use of logic. If we can assume 
that the pre—operational child is unable to experience incon­
gruity, it would follow that if an expectation is "dis-confinned ,
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tiiat is if something unexpected happens, then "it would 
follow tiiat expectancy dis confirmation for such a child can 
be experienced only as novelty". But then the child ought 
not to be able to distinguish between, say, frightening 
novelties and funny novelties. Also, repeated incongruities 
would no longer be novel and, so, unfunny. But young children 
like jokes to be repeated and can certainly sometimes dis­
tinguish the new and fearful from the new and funny.
The young child ought not be able to appreciate the 
logic in the dog-soap joke tliough he could grasp the funny 
novelty of tha dog ferrying the car across the road. McGhee 
found that 5 year olds neither could explain why the dog-soap 
joke was funny or alter it so as to make it unfunny. But since 
McGhee found that conservers of weight could understand jokes 
tiiat required them to be conservers of mass, the ability to 
dissect and reproduce the logic of a joke may be a later skill 
than simply getting a joke. I can laugh before I can explain 
why I have laughed.
In looking at psychoanalysis, we examined the idea that 
humour either enables a child to master an emotionally dif­
ficult situation or expresses his or her mastery of it.
McGhee (1971) points out that this is a valuable idea and 
he himself studied how mastering links witli humour. McGhee 
is not, however, interested in emotional control but in con­
ceptual mastery. Bigler, Levine, Gould (1966) suggested 
tiiat children enjoyed most jokes that stretched them. McGhee 
developed their work. McGhee wanted to see if children who
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had just mastered a particular intellectual skill enjoyed 
those jokes which depended on using that new-found skill 
tlie most. Zigler, Levine, Gould (1966) had given students 
jokes of various degrees of difficulty. Jokes that were 
inode rate ly difficult to understand were rated the funniest 
and provoked most observed laughter. If a child had just 
acquired tlie conservation of weight, the 10 lbs. of mashed 
potato joke would "stretch" him still somewhat. Conservation 
of weight might not be an automatic act yet. He would still 
get some sense of triumph in seeing the joke. The same would 
go for recently acquired conservation of mass. Children who 
had just mastered that would also find it (i) possible to 
"get" the joke and (ii) a sense of stretching their capa­
bilities.
Shultz (1976) has argued that cognitive tension is 
increased or aroused by an incongruity that doesn't easily 
fall into place so that it can be explained away. There is, 
incidentally, no evidence to support this not implausible 
view. How do you measure cocfnitive arousal? People don't 
seek out the "euiswer" to a joke as they do to a riddle. It's 
handed to them. People aren't haunted if they aren't told 
the punch-line to a joke as they can be if you fail to give 
them the answer to a riddle. The details of McGhee's (1976) 
experiment are as follows:
McGhee developed specific jokes that were based on 
violations of conservation and class inclusion. Since these 
jokes should become less challenging with age, older children 
should enjoy them less. A typical joke was: Mr. Jones
ordered a pizza for dinner. The waiter asked whether to
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cut it into 5 or 8 pieces. Jones said: "Oh 6, I could
never eat 8".
Having tested the children to see which were conservers 
of weight, conservers of mass, McGhee found that (i) children 
often did not smile or laugh much at these jokes though they 
did rate them as quite funny. Maybe they felt tiiey had to. 
Also, McGiiee found that con ervers of weight only could grasp 
all tiie jokes that broke conservation rules. They understood 
tiie pizza joke as well as jokes like a boy who said he could 
not lift a 10 lb bag of raw potatoes but that he could lift 
a 10 lb bag of mashed potatoes. These children were roughly 
a year too logical according to Piaget. McGliee found that 
older children - i.e. 10.5 and students - found the jokes 
much less funny tlian the children in conceptual transition
with avmrmg# mg# for w#lÿ&t or 7*6 for aasè* This is all vary
yell but McGhee fails to explain how tlie conservers of mass 
who were not conservers of weight managed to get jokes of 
both kinds. He adds, a little lamely that, perhaps, the 
ability to grasp logical jokes generalises early on when the 
6 to 7 year old child is beginning to get all the various 
principles of conservation.
From McGhee's own careful work in tiiis field, it seems 
clear that neither of tlie tv70 l^>potheses he set out to test 
can really have been said to have been validated. Children 
do not need to have mastered a certain logical structure in 
the Piagetian sense before they can get jokes that violate 
tliat structure. There is no formal sense in whicii understand­
ing the principle of the conservation of weight ought to allow
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you, ipso facto, to understand the principle of the con­
servation of mass or of class inclusion. Secondly, the 
evidaaca for the fact that children enjoy jokes most which 
atretCM them is, at worst, doubtful empirically and, at best, 
capable of many differing interpretations. McGliee relies 
heavily on Ghultz' findings (1974) that children and students 
laughed most when they solved difficult riddles and also on 
similar findings of Hester's with anagrams (192 4). ?>ut there 
is every difference between a situation being psrcaivad «s 
one that is a problem-solving one and one that is a joke 
one.
W t  me talie a aftsal instance. I watched MASH with H 
who is 5.6. At one point, tlie MASH unit desperately needed 
an extra surgeon. Radar, the "fixer" Corporal, rang round 
other medical units to find one and the following exchange 
took place. Radart "They can send us a vet or a gynae­
cologist". Colonel: "That's wonderful. We need a surgeon 
30 we can have a vet or a gyno". N laughed heartily. Clearly, 
this joke must have been partly difficult - he knows what 
surgeon means and what vet means but does not know what 
gynaecologist means. The ideas ini^lved are quite subtle. 
Still, it seemed he did not laugh more at this joke than at 
other jokes and, in one sense, he seemed to be testing out 
whether it was right to laugh here. X was also laughing.
Most jokes in MASH -and children's T.V. programmes do not 
stretch, however, and make adults and children laugh.
There is something peculiar about the whol<* iasue of 
whether children en joy most jokes that stretcli them. tow
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ir.any jokes are difficult? It is altiost an odd question.
‘Xhe iaaue, nowovar, is linked to tJie question of cognitive 
arousal waicii wrll be the focus of the last part of this 
review. If jokes are "difficult", they should lead to more 
cognitive "arousal" and hence tlie relief from their resolution 
ought to be craatar and, also, the amount of laughter and 
perception of huiiaour ought to be greater, That this is a 
convoluted aquation seem clear, We shall latur examine the 
evidence for coynitivo arousal in the s^jecific sense that a 
particular sequence of thoughts that are not frightening 
should lead specifically to more arousal. But that is the 
rationale for tiiis line of expariiûeutation. The harder a 
joke, the more tlie arousal. But auch an approach presumes 
tnat a good proportion of our daily jokes are ones that are 
hard to get. This naem to go against axpericacuG. Jokes 
of tea cling to fairJ.liar patterns, topics, ideas : jokes can 
be very predictable. How many jokes involve new knowledge?
Few jokes in real-life are difficult in that sense. If they 
involve arousal, it may bo because of aeifual or aggressive 
content, not because of logical form. Hence a model tiiat
j t e .
is based on how people resolve logical problem that they 
ari^^set* by jokes is likely to be artificial to some 
extant*
McGhee (1974) was also interested in the idea that children 
tast what a joke is. The experinentt^'he performed was a very 
limited one, however. He gave children a nvrhox of alter­
natives to fill in as possible punch-lines and saw how well 
tiiey could explain their choices. ?n Instance Isi f^hy did
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the old man and his wife drive up to the North Pole?"
Funny Reply: "They wanted to see the Xmas Seals". Serious
Reply; "To see how cold It was". They were also given 
itbsurdlty Riddles : "why did the elephant lie across the
sidewalk?" Funny Reply; "To trip the ants". Serious Reply;
"To rest".
McGhee showed the children (age 8 to 12) 8 vzordplay and 
8 absurdity jokes. Their reactions were rated and they were 
also asked to rate the funniness of the jokes. They were 
then asked what the difference was between "jokes" that 
were found funny and those that were not. The children were 
then given 3 more riddles and asked to give a funny answer of 
tlieir own. Boys from Grade 4 (50%) to Grade 6 (90%) were good 
at justifying absurdity riddles but much less good at wordplay 
riddles. Girls were less good at absurdity riddles but a little 
better at wordplay. McGhee found there was very little in­
sight into the itfâchanics of wordplay. At Grade 4, no boy or 
girl could make a general statement about humour though they 
could still throw up quite apt puns. About 60% of the subjects 
who could make up a nice absurdity could not explain in what 
are, after all, tiaeoretical terms why humour is humour. To 
be able to explain why you laugh is not a necessary condition 
for laughing. Incidentally, my own observations suggest that 
children can sometimes explain why they laugh if it is an 
outburst of laughter, almost hysterical, rather than a 
humourous remark.
The other interesting point is tiiat though McOiee has
85
shown that laughing at a particular joke does not mean 
being conscious of why you laugh or find something funny, 
he also attacked the problem of the cognitive context of 
laughter and joking. One of the most intriguing notions 
about humour is whether there are any differences between 
the situation in which a joke is prepared for and that in 
which it is a surprise. If I say "I am now going to tell a 
joke" or if I accidentally or unexpectedly tell a joke, it 
comes out. There obviously are jokes of both sorts. McGhee 
(1975) has done a valuable study of the way in which the 
fantasy element is crucial for jokes. An event, he argues, has 
first to be demarcated as "not real" for it to be funny.
McGhee and Johnson (1975) worked on Reality-Fantasy as 
a major factor in determining whether a particular event was 
funny or not. McGhee and Johnson set up a series of situations 
in which children were asked to rate jokes. First they were 
given either a reality or a fauitasy background before seeing 
or hearing a joke. In the reality situation, E surreptiously 
removed some bits of clay so that a balance that ought to have 
balemced did not and what appeared to be the bigger ball 
(spherically) seemed to weigh less. Children were asked how 
unexpected auid how funny it is. In the reality-fantasy, 
children were told stories like the 10 lb mashed potato bag 
story and then they were given the same experience as the 
reality children. In the fantasy condition, children were just 
told 2 stories. In the fzmtasy-joke condition, children were 
specifically told that they would hear jokes. First, they 
heard the 2 stories.
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McQiee and Johnson found that the fantasy-joke children 
gave the highest funniness ratings and laughed most. These 
were followed by fantasy children, reality fantasy children; 
followed by reality children who had a hard time seeing the 
event as funny at all. There was the odd result that highly 
surprised children found jokes funny but did not laugh much. 
Again differences between laughter amd ratings emerge. This 
experiment is a novel departure amd a welcome one. A joke 
has to be seen ~ i.e. for what it is - a joke - and not a 
serious act in order for there to be a joke. It is probable 
that this is often true. Young children often preface a joke 
by saying "I aun going to tell you a joke" or "Here's a joke". 
Adults are also susceptible to this kind of behaviour. But 
laughter does catch us unawares sometimes. Here is a recent 
adult exaunple. I attended a case conference as part of the 
process of researching mental health facilities for a film.
In that conference, a therapist outlined the case of a 27 
year old Syrian who was a virgin and was fearful of sex. He 
was also socially inexperienced though he did now have a girl 
friend. The therapist gave him a book of sex instruction and 
also generalised support. She told the group: "I also told
him that he just didn't have to be a passive person who accepted 
everything that was done to him". Slight pause and then I 
added ".... which he passively accepted". Boorish as it may 
be to report success with one's own jokes, this caused much 
laughter in a situation where, first, little laughter was 
expected and, second, I was expected to be a silent observer.
The group were not slightly slow to laugh. The testing of
P.1
this kind of event is difficult but iinportant. Do we have
to rearrange our perceptions before we laugh knowing that it
is permissible to laugh now? Or do we actually learn to be
ready to laugh in most situations. Rothbart (1976) argues
forcibly that the situation has to be seen as not a problem- 
solving one for the child to laugh. McOiee and Johnson suggest
the same. Do we perhaps, develop the ability to be ready to
lauç^ generally as we grow up so that we actually have to be
very clear that this is not a laughing situation in order not
to laugh? There are also individual differences which Eysenck
(1949) 4# the disposition to laugh and to humour but
these have not been investigated at all in recent resear^
though Brodzinsky and Riç^tnyer (1980) and McGhee (1980) plead
they should be.
It will by now be evident that research has led to some 
but not that much clarity. Children of 4, 5 and 9 laugh 
roughly the same extent at different kinds of jokes but the 
older children interpret these jokes more easily. With arti­
ficial jokes that often are quite close to riddles, older 
children laugh a little less than younger ones. This may 
be due to the fact that older children get bored after say, 
ten jokes of exactly the same kind of logical type like McCSiee's. 
The evidence for children developing through stages of pre­
ferring different types of jokes is rather poor. So is the 
evidence for children liking difficult jokes best though, 
theoretically, this is an intriguing idea.
Research needs to free itself from the fascination of 
Piaget's stages of development. Bryant (1972) and Bower (1974) 
have shown clearly how inadequate Piaget's stages are if they 
are taken as absolutes. Young children are more logical than
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Piaget allows if the concepts tliey have to manipulate 
logically are offered in ways that they can grasp. Given 
that:
f (i) There needs to be detailed(workin^looking 
at the kinds of jokes - preferably in real life - that 
children enjoy. It is likely that not even the Rothbart 
and Pien (1976) analysis exhausts all types of jokes.
(ii) There also needs to be work on the relationship 
between cognitive jokes, or, more precisely, the structure 
of cognitive jokes and the structure of tendentious jokes.
Does a joke about excrement have to have a structure com­
parable to that of an intellectual joke? If not, why not?
Does an aggressive joke have to have the same kind of structure 
as an intellectual structure or can it make do with a simpler 
form? The division of jokes into purely cognitive ones may 
not be that helpful.
(iii) There needs to be work into the relationship 
between laughing at a joke and understanding it. Even under­
standing a joke can have differing elements. It can mean 
the ability to interpret a joke or the ability to reproduce 
a similar sort of joke? However, there should be a definite 
attempt not to become obsessed with the study of humour 
comprehension because this is technically easier than actually 
seeing what makes children laugh. The artificial nature of 
many of the jokes used in the laboratory makes it very hard 
to know what they imply about real-life lau^ter and humour.
To judge a child's capacity for humour on how well he can 
dissect a joke is an oddity which the discipline's mania
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for respectable results forces on workers, and, of course, 
workers force on themselves. How con^etent the explanations 
at different ages are would be interesting, however.
(iv) At what age do children laugh at what kind of 
"cognitive" jokes. This main point is not resolved.
(v) Work needs to be done on repetitiveness. Many 
jokes repeat very well. What are the reasons for that from 
the cognitive point of view?
(vi) There needs to be work on the way in which 
fantasy is important for joke perception of humour. What is 
tlie relationship between early play and early humour?
McGhee and Johnson (1975) have opened up a most interesting 
area of work that needs further exploration.
(vii) Finally, there needs to be work on when mature 
forms of humour emerge such as being able to laugh at or 
make fun of themselves and to use repartee. Links between 
the intellectual mastery of a joke and emotionally mastering 
situations ought to be analysed.
The work on cognitive aspects of humour often has focussed 
on what seem to be oddly intricate questions given that we 
don't really as yet have a convincing model of what jokes 
children at different ages can laugh at, enjoy and understand. 
That must remain the prime objective especially examining 
naturalistic jokes settings and situations than hitherto.
McGhee and Chapman (1980) in their preface to Children's
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Humour (1980) trumpet that: “This volume represents a 
further milestone in the resurgence of interest in humour 
and humour-related behaviour which has characterised the 
decade of the seventies". They list, as signs of this 
interest that “continues to spiral upwards", 106 publi­
cations on humour and laughter Tin children from 1970 - 
1979. Yet of these only 12 deal with laughter and only 
Groch (1974) and McGhee (1980) had any hint of naturalistic 
observation. In case, dhildren in a can^ were
observed for a series of eight one minute periods and rated 
against each other for:
(i) "Overall frequency of laughter in social 
interaction"
(ii) "Frequency of behavioural attempts to 
initiate humour"
(iii) "Frequency of verbal attempts to initiate 
humour"
(iv) "Amount of hostility apparent in the child's 
laughter"
Reliabilities were high; 0.72 to 0.89 for the older 
group and 0.74 to 1.00 (I I) for the younger group. But 
notice what an indirect exercise this is. Even presented 
with children in vivo, the psychologist gets ratings not 
of specifically when and at what they actually laugh, but 
how mu<di in relation to eadti other they laugh. The children 
are rated against each other. McGhee does at least link 
this data with previous data on the children.
Nevertheless, some of the Issues explored In recent work 
are obviously important - challenge in jokes, the more 
precise analysis of incongruity and, especially, the 
relationship between seeing a situation as a play or a 
fantasy and seeing a joke.
T O M O R R O W
Humour with no resolution
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AROUSAL THEORIES
In the last section, the question of cognitive arousal 
raised its confused head. The place of arousal has proved, 
and will probably continue to prove, important in the evo­
lution of research into laughter and humour. There have 
recently been a number of theoretical approaches offered 
that all owe a debt to Berlyne <1960 i 1972). Berlyne,argued 
that we enjoy humour because it allows us to experience 
either arousal reductions or arousal jags. An arousal jag 
is a moderate alteration in arousal. So, for example, going 
from a state of mid-arousal to a rather high (but not very 
high) state of arousal is a jag and ought to be pleasurable. 
Rothbart (1976) expresses the details of Berlyne*s theory 
as follows: "In Berlyne*s view, moderate boosts in arousal
may lead to pleasure while high levels of arousal are aversive 
In the arousal jag, slight and transitory jumps in arousal 
become pleasurable as a consequence of the drop in arousal 
that terminates them quickly". Berlyne elaborated this.
He wrote (1972) "laughter ... seems restricted to situations 
in which a period or a moment of h i ^  arousal is followed by 
sudden or pronounced arousal reduction. In short, our 
speculation is that humour and laughter do not work through 
pure arousal boosts. They appear to require arousal jags or 
arousal boost jags". Rothbart (1976) argues that Berlyne is 
suggesting that either an arousal jag or a sudden decrease 
from high arousal leads to humour. The arousal boost does 
not lead to humour. We shall return to these italics which 
seem to suggest that arousal causes humour.
There appears to be some confusion as to the kind of
arousal that is being discussed when humour is at issue*
Shultz (1976) makes much of cognitive arousal* When Berlyne
argues that collative variables like novelty affect arousal,
he seems to be talking of arousal that is different from
physiological arousal. Most of the collative variables
Berlyne identifies# m# novelty does,
also involve cognitive processes. I must recognise something
new or as frightening so that arousal first increases. In
other words, it would seem that one of the reasons why we
enjoy humour and laughter is because it reduces cognitive 
arousal or because it leads to jags in cognitive arousal.
There are some clear problems with this. The most obvious
is how do we actually measure cognitive arousal? Berlyne
does not offer any very clear indication. Shultz does not
offer any notion of how we measure or identify cognitive
arousal, McQiee does not either. Yet much of McGhee’s work
implies that jokes which are difficult and challenging lead
to greater cognitive arousal which it is a greater relief to
resolve and which leads therefore to greater laughter.
Cognitive arousal exists so far in the mind of the believer
as aui intervening varied)le which does not appear to clarify
the data. That is not to say that arousal is not important.
Physiological arousal may be involved with laughter and with
humour in some way. But, it could be argued that purely
intellectual and cognitive jokes which whi.p up no tabooed
or emotive subjects are unlikely to evoke that much
physiological arousal. But the interest that cognitive
theorists like Shultz and McGhee have in cognitive arousal
supposas that quits uneiuotlva stimuli incongruously placed 
create cognitive tension and arousal.
When it comes to physiological arousal, there is some 
evidence from adulte and a little evidence from children. 
Schachter and Singer (1962) showed how arousal could affect 
perceptions of humour. They gave subjects either epinephrine or 
adrenaline injections hidh were arousing or chlorproinazine 
which was basically tranquilising and reduced the level of 
conventional physiological measures of arousal. Schachter 
and Wheeler found that subjects who had had the noradrenaline 
which increased their level of aurousal perceived a funny film 
as funnier and a frightening film as more frightening. In 
other words, being highly aroused intensifies the experience 
of humour: it does not, however, create it, it seems. These 
findings do little to reinforce the arousal jag or reductions 
Uieory - a throwback to Herbert Spencer's notion that we laug^ 
in order to disctiarge excess motor energy.
In fact, the evidence with adults is the opposite of 
what one might expect from Berlyne's theory. Laughter and 
humour does not decrease physiological indexes of arousal.
Martin (1905) reported increased heart rate and breathing in 
subjects who found cartoons amusing. Averill (1969) found 
heart rate went up with mirth and concluded that humour led to 
greater arousal of the sympathetic nervous system. Fry (1969) 
in experiments that have sometimes been questioned claimed to 
show that both heart rate and ECG increases during laughter. 
Jones and Harris (1971) correlated funniness of cartoons with 
cardiac acceleration. Langevin and Day found heart rate and
GSR changes - both tending to increase in laughter. (1972)
All these designs were relatively crude with measures being 
taken in response to cartoons where arousal and humour were 
measured just at one point.
The most convincing evidence, however, comes from a 
study by Chapman (1976) and one by Godkewitsch (1976). In 
both these studies, undergraduate students were used and, as 
we shall see, the situation with children is intriguingly 
different. Chapman (1976) studies E.M.G. (electrorayograph) 
responses while subjects heard jokes. His subjects were 
female undergraduates as were Godkewitsch's.
Godkewitsch ingeniously divided the presentation of his 
jokes into three parts. First, subjects saw for 15 seconds 
one part of the joke body: then, for another 15 seconds, 
subjects saw the second part of the joke body. Finally, again 
for 15 seconds, subjects saw the actual punch line. Godkewitsch 
used two kinds of jokes - sex-jokes and "harmless” jokes. He 
also used female subjects exclusively since women show a more 
definite physiological response and since he thought the sex­
jokes would show clearer arousal effects with them. Godkewitsch 
measured heart rate, galvemic skin response and basal skin 
response, during both the presentation of the joke bodies 
and the delivery of the punch-line. He could, therefore, 
ingeniously measure whether or not arousal grew during the 
build up of the joke and was dissipated by the punch-line. He 
continued measuring for 15 seconds after the delivery of the 
punch-line. It is telling, incidentally, that there is no 
measure of that intriguing construct - cognitive arousal.
9<
There were 12 sex-jokes and 12 quite "harmless" jokes.
Godkewitsch's results were, certainly, interesting.
He looked essentially at heart rate, skin conductance and also 
asked for verbal self reports so that subjects could say how 
aroused they felt. All these three measures correlated well 
and suggested that a person's estimate of how aroused he or 
she is may well suffice to measure arousal in many situations. 
Godkewitsch found that during the presentation of the joke 
bodies heart rate tended to increase. Only one measure of 
skin conductance rose significantly. There was no evidence 
of any decrease in arousal after tlie punch-line. There was 
sign of continuing rise in arousal but this was much more 
marked with the sex-jokes where it was not so much incongruity 
as emotional subject matter that seems likely to have con­
tributed to the arousal.
Chapman's joke was also not an incongruous one that had 
no emotional overtures. It was about two brothers competing 
for gifts and involved manure. Hardly natural material.
In Godkewitsch's study, during the presentation of the 
actual joke punch-lines, all the measures of arousal seemed 
to increase. Basal skin resistance and galvanic skin 
resistance increase. The heart rate peak went up. Verbal 
self reports also indicated a higher degree of arousal.
There was no sign of cardiac deceleration. Moreover, the 
actual degree of humour experienced - judged by how funny 
subjects rated the jokes - appeared to var; positively with
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arousal. In other words, the more aroused a s»abject was, 
the more likely she as to find a joke particularly funny.
This squares with the Schachter and (1962) findings.
On the other hand, it could also be that the funnier a person 
finds a joke, the more it arouses them. There is no way of 
distinguish.Lng the tv/o and the two mechanisms may in certain 
situations overlap.
Chapman (1976) measured SMG by the frontalis muscles
of 18 female undergraduate students while they listened to
a joke through headphones. Ciiapinan had used these subjects 
before and was able to divide them into those who traditionally
rated jokes highly funny and rather unfunny. He measured
EMG every 10 seconds into the telling of the joke and up to
20 seconds after the punch-line. He found that EMG rose
regularly during the telling of the joke. There was a
positive association between subjective evaluation of a joke
and levels of arousal. So, Chapman also found that arousal
increases during the presentation of humour.
The findings of both Godkewitsch and Chapman suggest 
what seems to be a paradoxical situation. With adults, or, 
at least, with female undergraduates, arousal appears to 
increase during the presentation of a joke. In other words, 
when the to-be-resolved incongruity is being presented and, 
also, after the resolution is given, arousal increases. It 
has already been pointed out that half of Godkewitsch *s 
jokes and Chapman's one joke are not "conceptual". The 
effects are much less marked, Godkewitsch found, with the 
non-sexual jokes. This is vezry different from the model that
Berlyne, Shultz and others would like to present where the 
resolution of the joke is like the solution to a riddle and 
decreases the arousal built up during the joke body.
Curiously, however, the one study to have looked at 
levels of arousal in cliildren has come to a radically dif­
ferent conclusion. Sroufe and Wunsch (1972) found that after 
young children laughed there was a massive cardiac deceler­
ation. Tîiey argued that the baby did not know whether or not 
the stimulus confronting it was tlireatening or not. Once 
the baby found that it was not frightening and discharged 
that massive energy by laughing. Sroufe and Waters (1976) 
noticed similarly a muscular quieting in the instant before 
a baby laughed - a sign of the impending "discharge of 
energy”.
In observations of my own children - especially at 
three with N - there seems to be a period when frightening 
situations seem particularly to provoke laughter. Here is 
an example of N at 3:6:
"I threaten to jump on Nicholas. He knows quite 
well that I am not going to jump really but, at the moment 
that I stand over him, he begins to laugh".
A few days earlier, we had been playing a chase game 
and I finally caught up with Nicholas on the rug. Looming 
over him, arms outstretched, he laughs - the laughter here 
was usually quite a hysterical sort of laughter.
Moreover, N certainly often invited one to play this
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kind of frightening game as if it was a situation that he 
enjoyed - and wanted to test, in this, his behaviour 
resembled a young child asking you to play peek-abo. Dur­
ing the actual lead up to the laughter, N seemed to be 
highly aroused and, sometimes, the laughter would appear to 
calm him do^m. Sometimes, it just provoked an additional 
fit of laughter.
Rothbart (1973) argues that moderate increases in 
arousal will be pleasurable and lead to humour as "long as 
they are associated with the subject's judgs^nt that they 
are in a situation that is a "safe" or a non-threatening 
one". This is an intriguing and plausible thesis but, as 
we shall see, not a complete one.
On the basis of the evidence so far (and it is not 
extensive) it seems arguable that very young children often 
do not know whether a situation is one that is funny or not. 
They can only laugh when they have become sure it is a safe 
situation - and so there is a longish latency to the laugh 
which is also accompanied by a loss of arousal. The laughter 
is much more relief than comic. As children grow older - say 
3 may be a critical age - there are certain kinds of situations 
which they know are safe situations but others, especially 
involving aggression, about which they doubt. As a rule they 
like to and need to test whether it is a safe situation. As 
a result, one might expect very volatile results which some­
times gives high arousal and sometimes relief. It is notice­
able that as they get older, there are new levels of humour 
whicii children do not know how to respond to. At 5:6 N finds 
it difficult to cope with sarcastic teasing. Sometimes, of
IQO
course, it gets him in the emotional raw but other times, 
ho is confused as to whether or not it is a funny but nice 
remark or actually a funny and hostile remark. Children 
have to learn to understand quite different levels of 
humour. N can now (5*6) sometimes use humour for his own 
ends in a situation that is not such a safe one.
4/12/76 * At breakfast, I am quite angry with N 
because he is not sitting down. I tell him to sit down as 
I get up to take the toast off. For a few days, N has been 
quite angry with me for getting angry with him. "You 
stand up, I sit down, I stand up, you sit down, you stand 
up, I sit down", he grins at me. And I have to laugh.
But he is not at all consistent in being able to 
^  produce or to react to such a sort of humour.
Rothbart (1976) has argued that humour involves either 
arousal jags as suggested by Berlyne provided that these 
jags do not take arousal too high and as long as the basic 
situation is perceived as safe. The notion of the arousal 
jag seems Inadequate perhaps, since laughter is followed often 
not so much by fluctuations in arousal but by more or less 
a steady rise. But the perception that a situation is 
safe is important though it only seems to apply to some 
forms of laughter and humour. There are many situations in 
which it seems odd to talk of safety. Children often laugh 
while playing or talking.
We are at dinner N is 3:6.
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Aileen
David
Nicky
Aileen
Nicky
Aileen
Nicky
David
Nicky
David
Nicky
You're a dried prune, Nicky.  ^-
I'm a w#t prune.
You can be a watermelon. And you can be 
a watermelon.
I don't want to be the same thing as him. 
Than you can be a mosquito.
What's David? 
i David can be a lump. (N laughs). 
t A lump?
I David can be a light. (N laughs).
: That's better.
: You can be a pie. (N laughs). You can
be a lunp of light. (N laughs). You 
can be And a lamp. (N laughs). And a 
shrimp, (laughs)
The last statement is interesting. There is a quickening 
as David and Aileen are cast as a variety of objects. This 
sort of imaginative play in which much laughter is produced 
does not really fit the safety condition except on a banal 
level. The relationship between play and lau^ter intui­
tively seems important but to date, hardly investigated. 
Miller (1968) in her book on play only mentions laughter 
twice.
If, therefore, adults perceive joke situations as not 
threatening and so can allow their degree of arousal to 
rise while young children do not, it roust follow that there 
is a cross over stage. There comes a point during which
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children leam what sort of situation that might seem 
menacing is, in fact, funny, test their perception of it 
and become adept at this very social skill. We mock those 
who don't know when to laugh. It is arguable that, for 
different kinds of humour, this process happens at different 
ages. It does not take that long for a child to realise 
that Daddy playing the Dinosaur is not going to eat him up. 
On the other hand it is much harder to identify joke attacks 
and sarcasm as being safe when they are safe, in fact.
What is being suggested is that there are a number of 
different stages in the development of laughter amd that 
these stages involve different levels of both cognitive, 
social and emotional complexity.
At the beginning of this section, italics were used 
to underline sentences likes "the sudden decrease from high 
levels of arousal lead to humour", or, "the arousal boost 
does not lead to humour". It is isportant to understand at 
what sort of level arousal models and humour work. It is 
bizarre to say that arousal leads to humour with the impli­
cation that arousal causes humour even in a safe environ­
ment. Such an explanation at a physiological level is 
important evidence but it does not make it meaningful to 
claim that I laugh because I am aroused. That is only done, 
probably, because there has been some discussion of cognitive 
arousal. Writers on the subject have not been very careful 
to make distinctions between physiological arousal and 
cognitive arousal. There have been to date no studies of
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EEG or evoked potential which could, conceivably, inform 
us about the state of the cortex (which is not the same 
as cognitive arousal). It would be wrong to infer from 
that evidence arousal leads or does not lead to huoour.
There could be situations - though few have bean recorded - 
where arousal is sudi that a person laughs inappropriately. 
But "correct" laugiiter or humour can not be due to arousal. 
Rather, arousal itsult pa^ly depends on the actual
content of a joke since in the studies by Godkewitsch 
and Chapman the level of arousal rose during the telling 
of non-neutral jokes. In other words, it is because of 
what the subject sees the joke to be about that it increases 
arousal. Godkewitsch tacitly accepted this when he chose 
female subjects because they might react more clearly to 
the sex jokes but he does not comment except to suggest 
that arousal might act "as a mediating agent between per­
ceived properties of jokes and the humour response". It 
should be clear what sort of things about laughter and 
humour an arousal theory can tell us. And, when dealing 
with the lauÿi that is a repartee, arousal cannot change 
very mucli so that Godkewitsch argues "that humour cannot be 
explained simply in terms of cues that operate independently 
of arousal". Perbaps, an unaroused person will not laugh 
but to suggest that arousal always is a mediating or a 
major factor in when we laugh and how much we laugh is, 
perhaps, excessive.
To conclude:
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There would appear to be different kinds of physiological 
response among children and among adults when they laugh.
It is suggested that children have to learn when to laugh 
as they are less sure when to laugh and have to learn to 
perceive a situation as not being a frightening one. They 
test such situations by asking parents and other children 
to play with and repeat them. It is also argued that there 
is no one definite period of learning - i.e. at the age of 
four children learn like Valentine could be taken to have 
suggested. Rather, different kinds of humour require dif­
ferent levels of conceptual and emotional maturity before 
they can be judged as safe. Sometimes, as in one example 
for N, children can use humour to make a situation safe 
just like adults do. It is a tool for defusing the situation 
that could be threatening, Rothbart (19 73) would seem to 
want a more radical condition. It has to be seen as safe 
to be funny.
These conclusions suggest a number of studies both 
experimental and observational.
Finally, research workers must beware the temptation 
to be seduced by arousal theory which certainly has gen­
erated much of the most interesting experimental work. One 
cannot explain humour totally in terms of arousal. Schachter 
and Singer (1952) showed clearly enough that arousal affects 
the way you respond to a situation in terms of intensity, 
not the way that you label the situation. The very aroused 
person responds more to the frightening or funny situation.
105
But you cannot, therefore, explain why he find* a sit­
uation funny or frightening in terms of his arousal.
We need different levels of explanations. Arousal is 
an important factor and, clearly, children have to 
leam how to interpret their own state of arousal. 
Nevertheless, arousal is not the whole story.
Over the last 15 years, the question of how children 
develop the ability to laugh and to experience humour 
has not been resolved. It is easy to rehearse the in­
adequacies of previous approaches and suggest reascms 
for it. It remains true, however, that the emphasis 
on laboratory studies, particularly of humour, has 
tended to ignore some key questions about laughter.
The Sroufe and Wunsch study (1972) was a promising 
development even though their doservational techniques 
were only partly naturilistici howmmr there has been 
little follow up.
McGhee and Chapman (1980), in their summary, are 
pleased to note the "spiral" of interest in humour but 
do not ccwmnent on the absence of observations on child­
ren in the home over long periods of time. Oddly, their 
otherwise excellent bibliography does not mention 
Valentine's important contribution to this field.
There would appear to be some value in a longitudinal 
observational study. Sroufe and Wunsch's study is both 
longitudinal over a short period - and observational - 
in a limited way. It requires amplification.
106
These criticisms suggest that one area where work 
is needed is the garnering of observational data in 
situations as close to 'real life* as possible. One 
merit of this approach is that it could build on the work 
of Valentine (1942) to discover where laughter occurs 
in the context both of family life and in the playschool. 
The next chapter offers a 'case history' of the develop­
ment of laughter in two children; the one after that 
offers observations on a playschool. These seem to be 
useful alternative strategies for examining a behaviour 
that is often unpredictable.
Observational data may also shed light on one 
interesting problem. A# adults, we say that we can 
make someone laugh. Comedians on stage, and in real 
life, tell jokes with the deliberate intention of mak­
ing others laugh. Not all laughter takes this form but 
it is a frequent form of adults' laughter. The questi<m 
occurs of when, in the development of lau^ter, children 
become able to have such an intention amd to carry it 
through. How old can the deliberate comic be? This 
question is especially intriguing given some theories of 
the uses of laughter.
The use of observational data is not immediately 
likely to make theories of laughter any simpler. But it 
has been argued throughout this review that studies of 
laughter have been unreaü.istic, jumping to great con­
clusions from little data often taken from artificial
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situations. Students like McGhee have suggested that 
more mini theories are needed. This review of the 
literature has outlined some of the defects in all the 
theories, grand or mini, to date. Observational data 
would seem to offer a valid complement to the studies 
done so far in that they can flesh out developmental 
theory and explore the role of intention.
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METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this thesis is to look at the 
development of laughter in a naturalistic setting 
through an Intensive study of two children in their 
family setting and, also, through observation in a 
playgroup* One reason for approaching the subject 
through observation is that the study hopes to shed 
light on the ability of young children to act intention­
ally, something hard to capture in an experimental 
situation*
In general, developmental psychologists have used 
two quite different research strategies, the 'longi­
tudinal* approach or the 'horizontal* one. The longi­
tudinal approach focusses on studyisgr-the same children 
over a period of time. In 1916, for example, the be­
haviourist, John B* Watson, declared that the essential 
problem for psychology was to chart tlie progress of 
development. Once we knew how children developed, the 
science could move forward. Watson went on to carry 
out a series of observations on infants from the day of 
their birth on. The basic approach was not new to him; 
his doctoral thesis. Animal Education (1903) had followed 
a group of rats, day after day, through their early 
learning experiences, Watson used a very similar method 
with babies. Every day, he or his assistant.
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Rosalie Rayner, would spend an hour or so with each 
child being observed. Usually, the mother was present. 
They both observed the general behaviour of the child 
and performed a series of experiments which Included 
dropping the child on a mat, dunking him in a tub to 
see if there was a 'swimming reflex* and seeing how 
the baby reacted to a candle. Being Watson's subject 
might be risky but there is no doubt that the technique 
was impeccably longitudinal. Watson's study was never 
concluded because of his d&vorce which led, in effect, 
to his dismissal from John Hopkins.
Watson himself never rehearsed the advantages of 
the longitudinal approach since he seems to have assumed 
there was no other way to monitor development but his 
results do highlight some benefits of the method. It 
is helpful in gathering wide and complex data; it is 
possible to keep track of how each individual in a 
sample develops differently? ideas often occur for more 
systematic experiments as a result of impressions 
gained in longitudinal studies. Little Albert was 
initially, it seems likely, a baby in Watson's long­
itudinal programme. All these factors make the long­
itudinal approach particularly useful, perhaps, when 
studying a form of behaviour that has been relatively 
little studied.
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There is also in psychology a tradition of psy­
chologists studying their own offspring. Valentine 
(1942) and Piaget (1936) are far from being the only 
scientists to have turned their children into experi­
mental subjects. Since Piaget is usually studied in 
terms of the stages of development he proposed, it is 
easy to think that his first studies were the longitudinal 
ones of his own children. In fact, however, his first 
work was, it could be said, a flawed horizontal study.
The Language and Thought of The Child (1924) set out to 
chart, and compare, the conversations of children aged 
roughly between five and eight. Piaget wanted to cry­
stallise their cognitive development. In showing that 
children like Lev and Pia were egocentric, he was im­
plicitly compauring them with older children who were 
not so handicapped. It is that lack of an actual com­
parison group in The Language and Thought of the Child 
that permits one to suggest it is a flawed horizontal 
study.
Though there have been tremendous improvements in 
the research design of horizontal studies, the basic 
notion remains simple. Instead of studying the same 
child over time, the psychologist examines different slices 
of development. One gathers a sample of, for example, 
groups of three, five and seven year olds. It is then 
possible to see how such children will handle tasks such 
as Piaget's conservation problems. The results are then
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ganarallsad, in theory, at least, so that they are 
meant to Inform us of differences between all three 
year olds, all five year olds and all seven year olds. 
Much attention has been paid to the problems of research 
design within this general framework. Many studies 
critical of Piaget have focussed on the fact that he gave 
the same instructions to children of differing age group* 
Hughes (1975) and Donaldson (1979) have both argued that 
great care needs to be taken in telling young children 
what is wanted of them if one sets out to compare their 
skills witdi those of older children# Hughes* study of 
where children think a doll can be hidden la a good 
illustration of the horizontal technique. Hughes took 
three, four, five and six year old children, teok care 
to explain the fundamental problem to them and then 
studied how they handled it. Later, he made the problem 
more complicated and teased out ratiier more age dif­
ferences than in his first study.
The advantages of the horizontal approach are very 
different from those of the longitudinal one. It allows 
the researcher to focus on a very specific problem? it 
permits considerable rigour; one experis^nt leads, as 
with Hughes, to another more particular one. Ohere is 
also the practical benefit that horizontal research ; is 
generally quicker since one does not have to wait for 
the child to grow up. In the field of laughter and 
humour, the horizontal approach has dominated.
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McGhee and Goldstein (1984) in their two volume
of Humour Research cite no recent longitudinal 
studies, it seems.
The model for longitudinal studies remains Piaget's 
studies of his own children (1927, 1936). Longitudinal 
studies do not have to be quite as meticulous nor do 
they need to be carried out on the researcher’s own 
children. It is possible to return to the same children 
only every week, every month or, in a few cases, every 
year. Much depends on what kind of behaviour is of 
interest. Pew longitudinal studies, like Terman's of 
gifted children, last a whole lifetime but even far 
shorter ones do offer a kind of continuity missing from 
the horizontal approach. Finally, and perhaps Important 
in the field of laughter, longitudinal studies allow the 
psychologist to study ^ a t  he is interested in in the 
context of a child's whole life. An important example  ^
of that is, perhaps, Tiaard's study (1977) on late 
adoption, assessing the whole of the child's life, 
intellectual, social and emotional, over time through 
repeated visits.
It is important to stress that longitudinal studies 
do not have to be naturalistic. As will be clear frcxa 
the review of the literature, Washburn (1929) returned 
throughout a year to her subjects but she did not really 
observe how they behaved normally with their mothers. 
Equally, naturalistic studies do not have to be longi­
tudinal. Psychologists could sample the naturalistic
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behaviour of different groups of children and attempt 
to study tlieir laughter that way. In fact, however, 
few studies in the development of laughter have been 
either longitudinal or naturalistic, let alone both 
naturalistic and longitudinal. The closest has been 
the study of Sroufe and Wunsch (1972) as reported in 
the review of the literature, who looked at the question 
of when children up to 12 months of age laugh. But 
their method was to send a student once a month to take 
mother and baby through a series of tasks that were sup­
posed to make baby come out laughing. This revealed 
much interesting material but it was limited. The stu­
dents went into the situation with a check-list of 
stimuli, like bouncing on mother's knee, that ought to 
provoke laughter. Each mother and child were seen for 
an hour or two a month: thus, they could hardly see what, 
in a natural setting, evoked laughter. The study, 
therefore, hardly answers all the questions one might 
have about laughter up to 12 months. Moreover, no 
follow ups to this study that look at behaviour past 12
months have been published.
Two case studies r- observations over time
The first aim of this research is to describe my own 
observations of my own two children. I first began to 
record when Nicholas (hereafter N) laughed when he was 3 
years and 6 months old in October 1974. At that time, our 
second son, Reuben (R) was not yet born. He was b o m  in 
January 1975 emd I have tried to record his laughter since 
birth.
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Most of the observations have been simply written 
down in note form on the day when the laughter occurred. 
For some time in 1975 and 1976 I had available video 
and audio equipment so that I recorded some of our life 
in the house and, especially, at meals. But the bulk 
of the observation» were simply made by me with no ex­
ternal check on my accuracy. Clearly, this presents a 
number of methodological problems.
Without any other observer there, I might simply 
have been inventing some of the occasions of laughter. 
There is no clear cut an#wer to this except ^  say, first, 
that I did not and, second, that many of the situations 
in which both N and R laughed will seem familiar and 
plausible to people who have had young children. Also, 
those sections of our life that were recorded on tape 
(especially on audio) some reveal laughter, and jokes, 
hot radically different from those that I just recorded 
on paperV
There are two other objections - which are perhaps 
even more serious. Anyone who begins to observe a par­
ticular form of behaviour is bound to develop certain 
hypotheses about it. It could well be that the way in 
which I describe, and attempt to explain, particular 
bouts of laughter reflect my own particular hypotheses.
I might add that I started with no specific hypotheses 
in mind in October 1974 but, naturally, I have developed
114
more than a few since. It could well be that I have 
failed to note occasions of laughter that would con­
tradict some of these hypotheses - and that iny failure 
would not be one that I would be conscious of. I am 
conscious of the fact that I may well have failed in this 
respect at times but I have tried to guard against the
f
risk throughout. The second objection is ale- important. 
My children - especially N - have been aware of the fact 
that I am interested in laughter. It may well ha, es­
pecially when there was a tape recorder in the kitchen and 
a video camera in my room, that both N and R produced far 
more laughing than normal children would under the 
pressures of the "experimental*' situation. There may 
be some truth in this. But since my interest is not 
in measuring the amount of times a child laughs a day 
or a month - such quantification is premature - I do not 
think it is a crucial failure. After all, there are few 
laughs noted where It seems impossible to comprehend why 
the children laughed though there do remain a number of 
mysterious laughs.
The advantage of such long term studies in a family 
setting are clear. It allows one to sea the way in which 
a child develops his ability to laugh at things. It 
allows one to see tlic relationship between laughing and 
other parts of the child's life. These observations 
have to be treated as observations: they are neither 
experiments with all their attendant azmctity of research
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design or are they replicable, though sometimes I 
attempted small and informal experiments as will be seen. 
For all that, the way I have classified these observations 
Implies certain hypotheses. Explanations - all very 
poet hoQ - are also offered.
Methodological justifications are, alas, much easier 
to make them conceptual leaps. The data gatiicred is rich 
but it is hard to classify. The only attempt so far has 
been Valentine's. He argued that he had seen laughter 
at the following situations and in the following order:
i as an expression of pleasure and delight 
ii as laughter responsive to the laughter of 
another
iii at the sight of a bright or pleasing 
object
iv at tickling or jogging 
V at a mild shock or surprise 
vi at repetition 
vii at something that is comic or incongruous 
viii at laughter at mere recognition of his own 
face in the mirror 
ix laughter while teasing 
X laughter at the sight of mild discomfiture
in another 
xi laughter in the course of play
xii laughter as an attempt to appease
xiii laughter at incongruity in words and ideas
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Valentina also argued that, by the age of four, 
each of his own children had already laughed once at 
least for each of these reasons. Adults, moreover, had 
no other basic reasons for laughing; all causes of 
laughter were here.
The framework for examining the data hare is 
slightly more complicated. Valentine's list includes 
social items such as teasing or laughter in response to 
another’s laughter but he is still rather concerned to 
isolate the stimuli which will lead to laughter. The 
observations that follow suggest that one oamnot isolate 
situations and physical stimuli as neatly as Valentine 
wished. Many of the observations that follow attempt 
to describe in some detail, not just the stimuli that 
appeared to trigger laughter, but the social, even 
emotional context in which it occurred. To label a laugh 
as being caused by or at incongruity or mild surprise or 
noises may ignore some salient aspects of the social sit­
uation in which the laughter occurs. It may be a mixture 
of all three together that makes the child laugh and an 
identical stimuli in a different situation may yield only 
a smile or, even, nothing remotely risible.
Secondly, moat research has concentrated on seeing 
whether a stimulus, usually chosen by an adult, has made 
a child laugh. Laughter is seen as a response. The 
observational methods used here show that, very often.
115b
the child creates the chance for himself to laugh; he 
makes ht# own opportunities - to laugh himself and to 
make others laugh. There is nothing surprising in this 
since children seem to enjoy laughing and do not appear 
to wait around, glumly, waiting for adults to coma along 
to provoke them into it. Observational data makes it 
possible to, in principle, track not just the development 
of laughter but the development of the intention to create 
laughter.
It is in the light of these suggestions that, like 
Valentine, I shall offer a classification of the kinds of 
laughter I have observed and the age at which each kind 
first appeared. I have, however, reservations about 
this. It seems to me that, quite often, the children 
laugh for a number of reasons that are combined. Each 
reason for laughing is not exclusive. A second, and 
perplexing, reservation stems from the fact that the same 
situation or stimulus will, sometimes, make a child laugh 
and sometimes not. This is not a simple matter of arousal, 
for example, R at 9 months refused to play peek-abo 
because he was crying. Without such dramatic bad moods, 
both N and R have, a number of times, not laughed at 
events that made them laugh a little while before. This 
is also true of observations I have carried out in the 
nursery school and playgrounds. The classification shows, 
then, what can, not what necessarily will, provoke laugh­
ter. There are no guarantees. This fluctuating presence
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of laughter is, from a theoretical point of view, a fact 
that needs a good deal of explaining.
In order to make these observations as useful as 
possible to other researchers who may well disagree 
either with particular interpretations of particular 
laughs or who may with a theoretical angle, the material 
has been set out in the following way. Each section has:
i. an introductory section briefly explain­
ing the kinds of laughter included
ii. the actual observations. Each obser­
vation is numbered and there are letters 
for each section to label its origins.
Thus, the first observation of laughter 
due to elaborating a noise is labelled 
B.l. Chapter 4, on laughter in the play­
group, uses the same prefix for observations 
of the same kind of laughter so that it is 
possible to compare occasions when N and 
R laughed in the home with apparently 
similar occasions in the playgroup. Some 
observations are short; others long.
Included within the observational material 
are occasional facts about the children. 
Every attempt has been made to keep the 
observations distinct from the interpre­
tations but, sometimes a certain smail 
 ^^  - amount of interpretation may have crept 
into observations.
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ill. interpretative statements. These are 
comments on particular Instances of 
laughter and offer, at times, an immediate 
on-going interpretation. They will be set 
out distinctly in Italics since they often 
occur in the middle of a group of obser­
vations. This typographical distinction 
will serve to make them separate while to 
keep going a certain flow in the text.
Not every observation requires an atten­
dant interpretation and it seemed more 
practical to punctuate the observations 
with interpretations than to bunch all the 
observations at the back of a section.
That would have obliged the reader to refer 
backwards all the time. The interpretations 
occasionally include facts about N and R 
which, as their parent, I knew.
iv. a theoretical summary. Each section ends 
with a summary which involves theorising 
in the light of the observations on that 
particular section.
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This arrangement will, it is h%>ed, make it possible 
for other researchers to use the observations without 
being in any sense committed to my interpretations or 
theoretical ideas.
The classification offered has the following main 
headings derived from Valentine and the literature:
1. Laughter due to changes in arousal or due simply 
to high arousal. This category would include when 
children laugh at loud noises that are made at them or 
at noises which they themselves make. Each observation 
in this category is labelled with A for ease of cross- 
referencing.
2. Noises and their elaboration. This category 
examines the way t!ie children embroider and expand on 
the noises tiiey make and incorporate sounds like 
"Bulabaloo" into longer sequences of laughter. Each 
observation in tiiis category is labelled B.
3. Physical Games and "Glee”. This section does not 
include chasing gaurtôs which are examined under the 
section on aggressive laughter (section 13). Instances 
of laughter due to "Glee" or involving either "Glee" or 
physical games are labelled C.
4. Tickling. Observations of laughter involving tickl­
ing are labelled D.
5. Paek-abo. Observations of this are labelled E.
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6. Games like Peek-abo but which involve the 
appearance and disappearance of objects. These are 
labelled F.
There is a connexion between all these first 6 
kinds of laughter in that they all appear to involve either 
drastic changes in arousal or high arousal. It will be 
argued that even with these basic forms of laughter (where 
arousal appears to be a useful explanatory concept) a 
model which depends on arousal or changes in arousal cannot 
provide a total explanation; often, the children create 
the occasions for their own laughter. The remaining 
headings under which laughter is classified become even 
more coup lex to account for solely in terms of arousal.
7. Affection and Gentle Physical Stimulation. There 
are also under this one or two lau^s of "joy" included. 
Observations under this heading are labelled g .
8. Laughter due to Incongruity. This heading includes 
both verbal and visual incongruities. Incongruity involves 
also, perception of social roles. At 9 months, for 
example, R would laugh if he saw his dummy in his mother's 
mouth which is not where he would expect it. From an 
intellectual point of view, this kind of laughter is 
interesting because, when children are presented with an 
incongruity they often go on to elaborate it - and to 
produce new incongruities of their own. I shall argue 
that this is an important element in what one might call 
learning to laugh. The physiological actions of 
laughter may be innate but we obviously also "learn" to 
laugh. Incongruity often shades into Laughing at
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Nonsense auid Absurdity when there are no expectations 
rather than when there are expectations to be violated. 
Observations here are labelled H.
9. Rhymes and Puns. Under this heading come the 
rhymes and puns that the children make, developing in­
congruities and, at times, getting carried away by the 
lilt of rhymes. It will be argued that the making of 
some kinds of puns and, especially, rhymes, marks an 
important stage in which the child appears to assemble 
sonae of the skills he needs to begin to try to make 
jokes. Observations under this heading are labelled I.
10. Contradictions. The contradictions here are not 
logical contradictions but personal ones when the child 
refuses to do what a parent says or, simply, rebuts what 
is said to him with a firm "No". Observations under 
this heading are labelled J.
11. Jokes. This section examines the way in which the 
child begins to try to make jokes of his own using,
it will be argued, some of the skills whose development 
has been shown in sections 8, 9 and, partly, 10. 
Observations under this heading are labelled K.
12. Obscenity - from before the age of 2, children pro­
duce their version of dirty jokes. There is first the 
idea in itself and secondly, the fact that the idea shocks 
or disturbs adults. Observations under this heading are 
labelled L.
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13. Aggression. This heading includes both physical 
aggression and verbal aggression. It is not mock 
aggression which comes under pretending games. Aggression 
laughter is often close to "Naughty" laughter which fol­
lows. This often involves mock aggression. At 2.5 R, 
for instance, quite often has mock battles with N where 
both do know that they are playing. But laughter is
not confined only to such play fighting. Observations 
under this heading are labelled M.
14. Naughty Laughter. Perhaps the most interesting 
forms of this are when a child laughs because he is 
being told he is naughty, and in battles of contra­
diction where the child often says "No, I'm not" or 
"It is not" even though he knows, perfectly well, that 
he is or that "it" is the case. It will be argued that 
this kind of laughter is a necessary prelude to a child 
learning to laugh at himself and his own mistakes. The 
roots of irony may well be here. Also, laughter that 
depends on knowing of social skills and customs so that 
a child will laugh at a social gaffe. Observations' 
under this heading are labelled N.
15. Pretending and Games. This section looks at games - 
some long - which involve and provoke a large amount
of laughter as well as at the child's ability to pretend 
and act roles. Given the en^hasis on social incongruity 
presented in under heading (H) it sœmsiniportant to relate 
pretending to laughter since often when N or R play act 
at being Batman or some other creature, the performance
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is accompanied by laughter, squeals and giggles. 
Observations under this heading are labelled O.
16. Jokes Against Oneself. This section examines the 
ability of the children to maüce jokes against themselves 
It will be argued that this is an important kind of 
laughter and one which manifests itself quite early. 
Observations under this heading are labelled P.
This classification is tentative. It leaves out 
some important factors. These include the repetition 
of jokes, the way children learn jokes and the way that 
children use laughter in the way that they deal both 
with their parents, siblings and peers. One point of 
the classification is to show that there are very many 
kinds of laughter and that it is hard to "reduce all 
laughter to one or two causes" as classical theories 
like Bergson's tried to do. Rather, my observations 
suggest certain hypotheses about how laughter develops 
but accepts that there are, probably, ten or more 
"basic" causes for laughter. My observations serve 
also to question whether the traditional kind of 
"cause" is always appropriate since the children often 
create the occasions for their own laughter, an early 
intentional act.
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OBSERVATIONS OF MY 0V7N CHILDREN
In the following chapter, a detailed list of 
observations and interpretations is given under 
different headings.
HIGH AROUSAL AND CHANGES IN AROUSAL (A)
INTRODUCTION ;
One of the most touted ideas about laughter is that 
it is basically caused by changes in stimulation. One of 
the ways the baby learns to cope with them is by laugh­
ing. %Vhen the baby learns that the change in stimulation 
is not fearful, he laughs. This is an attractive thesis.
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It will be shown to be partially true. But it is not 
just sudden changes in stimulation that cause laughter. 
Sudden, and expected, changes in stimulation often 
make a child laugh. By the age of four, a child who 
plays "peek-abo" expects perfectly well what the end of 
the game will be. There may be a sudden moment of 
contact that provokes the laughter but it is anticipated. 
Also, simply high levels of stimulation without change 
will, on occasion, make a child laugh. One of the benefits 
of observing in one's own home is that, sometimes, long 
sequences of laughter take place in these games or 
sequences. Two detailed transcripts of such games will 
be set out later. In such sequences, it seems likely 
that some of the laughter is due to the fact that there 
is a high level of arousal. Almost anything seems 
funny - even actions or "events" that are normally 
quite neutral in terms of producing laughter. The 
problem comes when you tlien seek to attribute this 
laughter to sheer high arousal for (i) no one has car­
ried out objective physiological measures on people 
giggling hysterically as such laughter tends to elude 
the laboratory and (ii) superficially, it certainly seems 
as if laughter produces arousal quite as much as arousal 
produces laughter. If you oblige a child to stop laugh­
ing in such a sequence, he often becomes less aroused 
and "calm" quite fast. The arousal hypothesis also has 
to account for the fact that quite gentle and affectionate 
events or actions cam make people laugh.
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There are two classic forms of high stimulation 
that should lead to changes in arousal. One is tlie 
loud noise: tlie other are a host of physical games like 
bouncing a baby, tossing him or her up in the air and 
catching them, tickling. First, let us consider loud 
noises.
OBSERVATIONS :
From 5 months, R responded to loud noises by laugh­
ing - sometimes. Sometimes, it was just a loud noise 
like Boo. Sometimes, it was a loud word.
For exaunple when R is 7 months, I am reading to 
N and R a book called "The Stones in America” in which 
tliere are bison who charge. N turns to R and says 
loudly "R is going to charge". R laughs. (A. 1)
On video, from 7 months on, there are a number of 
instances of R laughing when either his motiier or I or 
N make a loud noise at him.
li^TERPRETATIVE:
One of the more interesting developments here is the 
way that N notices that he can make R laugh by pro­
ducing loud noises» From 9 months on, N provides 
R with physical stimulation that makes R laugh»
At 11 months, N can use his skill in producing 
loud noises either in order to make R laugh and to feel 
good or he can use it as a meains of teasing R mercilessly
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At 11 months, N first torments R by placing a block 
of LEGO on R’s head. Then, N says; "Bububububu" to R.
R is upset and does not laugh. N asks: "Is that funny, 
Dubie?". (A.2)
But also at 11 months, N is being naughty and pro­
ducing a series of noises that start as Woow. N tries 
to enlist R as an ally in naughtiness. He makes another 
Woow at R and R begins to laugh. (A.3).
IRTERFRETATIVE:
What is hard to tell is whether R is also laughing 
because he is gaining N not gust in the noise but in 
being naughty.
By 11 months, R can respond quite often to loud 
noises by laughing. Even if the noise may be a little 
frightening, this happens. In the transcripts of the 
games it is shown that at 11 months, R laughed at 
balloons being popped, the sound of them bursting and, 
also, at many of the high noises that were evoked during 
these games (p.18). More interesting is that R is beg­
inning to produce loud noises himself for the apparent 
purpose of making himself and also N laugh. The first 
instance of this is at 11 months when R begins to make 
deep cackling noises which make N laugh. R goes on 
making them for a little while. (A. 4)
By 11 months, too, noises have begun to be a part 
of games in which R responds to more than mere noises.
To get a laugh depends on a mixture of noise and move­
ment.
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At 11 months, R laughs at me jumping up and down 
in the corridor as I come towards him. (A.5)
INTERPRETATIVE:
As he laughe on Jumping up and down, up and down, 
this incident doea not aeem to he one in which the 
level of stimulation is changing much.
At 11 months, R can laugh at quite complex mix­
tures of rhythms. R laughs as I sing to him: "To bed, 
to bed, to bed, to bed". I add another "to bed" but 
this time he does not laugh till I tickle him. In 
tickling him, I say "Wooow". R laughs. I start to 
sing again "didididi - to bed". But this time the 
song gets only a smaller laugh from R although I try 
to make the last bed very loud and a big change. I 
sing "to bed" again. R laughs again. I am bored with 
the game now and he also seems to be; I say, quite 
seriously to him, "Maybe you should go to bed". This 
time, there is no laugh. (A.6)
THEORETICAL SUMMARY:
By 13 months, R can laugh particularly at loud 
noises that signify disgust. N makes loud noises like 
"pooo" and "yuck" and laughs at himself as he makes 
these. R laughs hysterically. This game is one that 
both of them enjoy considerably and it goes on a long 
time. It seems clear that R has already acquired some 
notion of disgusting things being funny. Originally,
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there is a clear link between loud noises and the 
disgusting but by 2.0, R can laugh at disgusting things 
that involve no great element of noise or noise change.
The noise of disgust is, w  shall see, important 
in the game of Mummy-with-Dummy which is the first R 
plays in which he toys with incongruities of role.
At one year, then R has developed the ability to 
laugh at loud noises. He shows no signs of being able 
to distinguish loud noises from loud nonsense but he 
is beginning to associate some loud noises with disgust 
or mess. In the next year, he will begin to exhibit 
"disgusted" laughs from ones based on noise. N is 
aware of the fact that he can make R laugh by producing 
such noises. Occasionally, N has developed certain 
characters and routines. One of these is a pompous, 
fat and loud man called Mr. Babu. Mr. Babu yells a 
great deal which makes R laugh. N has evolved a more 
complex routine involving Laurel and Hardy and imitates 
Hardy which makes R laugh. And R is beginning to act 
as if he knows quite well that he can make both himself 
and N laugh by producing such noises. Observations 
such as A. 4, A. 5 point to the conclusion that R* s 
intention is to produce laughter, both in himself and 
others - even at this young age.
NOISES AND THEIR ELABORATION (B)
INTRODUCTION :
Loud noises are, according to much psychology.
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both one of the few Innate causes of fear (Watson; 1931) 
and, also, one of the earliest reasons for laughing.
The hypothesis can, therefore, be developed that when 
sal infant hears a loud noise in a situation where he 
knows there is really no danger, he laughs.
At 11 months there are many instances of loud 
noises making R laugh, as we have seen. Between 12 
and 24 months, noises continue to fascinate R.
OBSERVATIONS ;
At 12 montï&s I address R in loud nonsense talk 
saying "Nabbabboloo”. He laughs, and, often, wants a 
phrase or one like it repeated. (B.l)
INTERPRETATIVE:
It is not olear still whether he can tell that this 
is not real language.
At 18 months, I say "Boo" behind R. He turns and 
laughs, expecting me to say “Boo" again. He laughs when 
I do though not as much as the first time. The sur­
prise provokes more laughing. The noise game does not 
hook him further as he begins to fish in my pocket. (B.2)
At 1.7 I get N to talk seriously and slowly non­
sense to R. P listens seriously. He laughs out, though, 
when N says something very loud - both when it is a 
real word like BUMP and when it is a nonsense word. (B.3)
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INTERPRETATIVE:
If R laughe at loud nonoenee, it eeeme much more 
likely that it ia because it is loud than because it 
is nonsense for now.
Pure noises which are not that loud can also make 
R laugh. At 1.7 he watciiea Play School when someone 
plays a tin whistle. R smiles at the sound and the 
smile expands into a laugh. R, laughing, puts his hand 
up to his mouth and does his chewing routine. Is he 
eating tlie whistle or imitating the action of blowing 
it? (B.4)
At 23 months, a slightly fearful noise seems to
provoke laughter. R is playing with Lesley who is 30
years old. He snaps and whizzes a strong stick at
her. She makes a fearful Oooh sound. R laughs. When
she does not make the sound and withdraws from the 
stick, R laughs much less. He needs her Oooh to make
him laugh more. (B.5)
At 26 months, Aileen simply makes a Plop sound 
with her lips as she attacks R*s ears. This still 
drives him quite hysterical. (B.6)
By the age of 3.6, N still laughed at loud noises 
but these had to be incorporated into more complicated 
games. At 3.6, for instance, Aileen and N were pouring 
imaginary wine out of bottles over each other. N, as 
he poured, would say Whooah and then laugh. Aileen
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would also make a noise as she poured the imaginary 
wine over N. He would laugh. I then tried to do it 
without making the noise - and N still laughed. It is 
not possible to know if he still would have laughed 
if this had been the first way round we played it. (B.7)
Often N now produces the noises that made him 
laugh. At 3.6, he and I are pretending to be a band.
He sings out Bulabaoo and laughs. By itself noise does 
not always make him laugh. For example, I accentuate 
the PEEP of a car's horn in a book I read to him without 
getting a laugh. Equally at this age, Aileen and I are 
making up nonsense. Loudly, N suggests "Babagoboola" 
but does not laugh. (B.8)
INTERPRETATIVE:
There ia aleo more of a ritual to N^a laughing. While 
R at 1,0 or 1,6 can laugh Just at the loud noise, N 
usually needs a oontras t. It oould be said that he 
requires a marked change in the level of stimulation.
It seems no longer enough for the noise to be a shook 
gust because it ia loud; it has to be a shock that ia 
both loud and inappropriate,
OBSERVATIONS ;
Also, the production of loud noises can come to be 
naughty. N starts at 4 to drum with his fork on a 
nappy pack and to make musical sounds. He laughs well 
aware that he is being naughty by making so much noise. 
(B.9)
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At 4.3 for W silence followed by a burst of noise 
is funny. N has seen a cartoon (Bugs Bunny) on TV which 
he thinks is very funny. A man is lulling a baby to 
sleep. He says, very softly, "Go to sleep, my little 
baby". But when he say# Baby, the man yells. And so 
the baby bawls. N lau^s each time the man shouts 
Baby. This sequence makes a deep impression on N 
because he repeats it in the bedroom in the evening 
before he goes to sleep. He goes through the "Go to 
sleep my little baby" routine a number of times, laugh­
ing each time he does so. A few days later, he repeats 
the whole sequence. He does it with a little bit less 
gusto though as much noise. He finds it very funny.
In the next weeks, he weaved it into games that he plays 
with R on a number of occasions. (B.IO)
At 4.9, a loud noise in a defensive position makes 
N laugh. He is under the kitchen table when R is "attack­
ing" him. I say "Boo" four times to N and he, trapped 
under the kitchen table, laughs. (B.ll)
INTERPRETATIVE:
I am not attacking N and it*s curious if laughter 
dispells fear that N should laugh when the much smaller 
R ‘‘attacks’* him.
Also, at 4.9, during a boisterous game, a balloon 
floats. Whenever I or Aileen or N push it, we say 
"Oah". This syllable together with tlie act of pushing 
the balloon provokes hysterical laughter. The synchrony
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of noise and movements seams inportant. This laughter 
builds up and up.
At 4.11, N is quite able to laugh still at simple 
disgust noises. One night N gets up and wants to talk. 
After a while, he begins to feed me a meal of all the 
things he finds under the bed. These include a book, 
a stewed pen top and bits of nappy. I say "Yuck" - 
disgustedly - to each of these incongruous offerings.
Each "Yuck" makes N laugh. The next morning, N plays 
a game in which he makes disgusting noises at R who is 
1.2 and laughs. (B.12)
At 5.7 N is still capable of laughing at loud noises, 
especially in the context of a game. There is something 
like hysterical laughter as N and Aileen do what he 
calls a funny dance. N begins to skip, pretending to 
be an ape, and to hop from one leg to the next. Aileen 
laughs and makes loud booing noises. These make N laugh 
even more and R laughs too. (3.13)
THEORETICAL SUmiARY:
Loud noises make N and R laugh. At 5.7, N can still 
laugh at loud noises pure and simple. But from the time 
of 5 months on, the way that loud noises are used in 
games by the cdiildren becomes more complex. Loud noises 
join in with movements and imitations and play acting. 
There seems to be a way in which the mixture of movement 
and noise does often provoke lauc^tar. Both N and R
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have become, R by 2.0 certainly, adept at producing 
noises together with movements in order to make them­
selves and others laugh. Again, the observations 
like the whoosh of B.7, singing Bulabaoo B.8 and B.12 
powerfully suggest that N intends to produce laughter 
and produces actions that are appropriate to this end.
The section on rhymes and puns will show that noises 
and sounds are elaborated by both N and R - often for 
laughs. There are instances with noises - some when 
tlie children produce laughter but others when they 
react - that fit the arousal jag hypothesis well.
Examples are when N enjoys the Baby Game, going from whisper­
ing to yelling or laughing in disgust on every new yuck.
But there are other instances when it seems less well 
supported. If in the middle of a boisterous game when 
all signs would seem to indicate a high level of arousal, 
does uttering "Oah" and pushing at a balloon signify 
an arousal jag? Yet "Oah" and the movement make N laugh 
hysterically. The arousal jag hypothesis is developed 
out of a model of cause and effect in which the laughter 
appears forced by the "jags". The contrast between this 
and the intentional model will be discussed later.
PHYSICAL GAMES ; PHYSICAL EXCITEMENT (C)
INTRODUCTION ;
Spencer (1860) argued that much of the laughter of
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young children is pure glee, excitement tliat spills 
over into laughter- In her analysis of children in 
a nursery class, Groch (1974) found that 7% only of 
the occasions of laughter could be construed as being 
pure glee. It is argued here that this kind of 
"uncaused" laughter is, actually, quite rare both 
in the home and in playgrounds though the evidence 
for playgrounds will only be alluded here a little.
But if pure glee does not seem to often lead to 
laughter, there are many kinds of physical action that 
can cause laughter. These do sometimes involve a clear 
change in the level of arousal. For example, if you 
toss a child up in the air above your h©gid and catch 
him - a game I have played and seen other parents play • 
then there usually is laughter. But other games which 
seem to involve either no obvious change in arousal - 
for exairtple, bringing feet together - or which 
depends on a consistently high level of arousal also
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seem to cause laughter. One such game is chasing which 
R plays at 11 months with N and which he plays with a 
friend of his, John, when they are both 1.3 and 1.4.
OBSERVATIONS :
On tlie videotape, there is film of R from 7 months
on laughing in response to various forms of physical
stimulation like being bounced up and down, being allowed 
to swing back and down between Aileen*s knees so that 
he loses support and might fall to the ground but 
Aileen always catches him in time. Sroufe and Wunsch 
(1972) found few children laughed at any of these 
before the end of their sixtii month. (C.l)
By 9 months, R can laugh at N*s physical actions.
He can see physical stimulation and laugh rather than
needing to have it done to him. At 9 months R laughs
at N stamping his feet on the seat of a chair. N 
repeats the stamping. R laughs again. N then slides
down the back of the armchair and nearly hits R. This
near miss makes R laugh though he might have been hurt.
(C.2)
Another instance of seeing physical activity 
making R laugh also from 9 months is when R is in his 
play pen. N charges around pretending to be an elephant - 
during which he walks very heavily and slowly - and 
then pretending to be a bird and flapping his arms.
It is dctte for the benefit of R and R laughs. (C.3)
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N has also evolved ways of playing games a little 
like peek-abo and tickling with R. At 9 months for 
instance, N gets hold of R*s feet and bangs them 
together. R laughs. And N does this knowing quite 
well it will make R laugh. N gets exactly the same 
effect by holding R's arms and waving them up and down 
straight up and down like a proper gymnastic exercise. 
R giggles like anything at this. (C. 4 see also M.4)
At 2.3, incidentally, I try to do both of these 
things to R. He smiles at me but there is none of the 
wild laughter there used to be. (C.5)
By 12 mon til s , Aileen picks R up and slings him 
above her shoulder and then down so that his head is 
near her bottom. Sh# then slides R gently up and 
down her back. He laughs tremendously at this when­
ever either she or I do it to him. (C.6)
INTERPRETATIVE:
This seems to he a good example of where the tension 
between danger and safety provokes laughter.
At 26 months and at 2.6, this gaune still makes R 
laugh. (C.7)
Also, at 12 months, R laughs enormously during 
what is called N*s Action Show. For N, this consists 
of juirping around on the bed, producing all kinds of 
somersaults auid would-be acrobatics. N appears to be
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imitating gymnastic displays he has seen on television 
and, ttiough he laughs, he often also provides a running 
commentary on what he is doing, on his "Super Jumps" 
as he calls them. R crawls on the bed - and laughs. 
Usually, R is not allowed on the bed. This may make 
R more excited and he certainly moves around a great 
deal. Aileen then holds R by the arms and, holding 
him, gets him to jump up and down on the bed. R is 
being "trampolined". He laughs. (C. 8)
At 1.1, R laughs because one of his limbs is 
"captured". R i s  in my arms with one sock off. We are 
on the porch. N points out to Hilda that R lacks a 
sock and laughs. N grabs hold of R*s foot. R laughs.
N says; "He's laughiag because his sock's off". (C.9)
INTERPRETATIVE:
R seems to me to laugh because N has this foot.
At 1.4 R and his friend John (also 1.4) are 
chasing each other in a vague kind of way. It is not a 
fully fledged "chase". Both R and John are quite 
capable of interacting in this way for short spells at 
least. They laugh as they "chase". (C.IO)
Seeing less dramatic physical gestures can make 
R laugh. We have already seen how at 9 months he 
laughed while N charged around the play pen. At 18 
months, N wakes up and waves his hands in front of R. 
While he waves his hands like that, N makes a sound as
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if sand were running through his fingers. R laughs. 
"Chasing" games between N and R are now quite common with 
an element of violence, as we shall see under aggression. 
(C.ll)
At 22 months my til rowing R down can make him laugh. 
(C.12)
At 2 4 months R, and 5.10 N, they have developed 
quite active games. They continue to play the Action 
Show in which R can now teüce part. R has begun to in­
corporate elements of what can be conveniently des­
cribed as his fantasy-life into the Action Show and 
leaps around saying he is Batman and laughing. N is 
more concerned to show off excellence and peppers his 
jumping with comments like "This is a Super-Jump":
But when N jumps, it makes R laugh and when R laughs, it 
makes N jump. They both laugh when Ai lean tells them 
to jump into her arms. Aileen bounces N on the bed.
He has gone from bouncing himself up and down to being 
bounced down. W laughs a lot at this transition. (C. 13)
IHTERFRETATIVE:
aurety, the change ia in the kind of bouncing - 
not in the actual level of atimulation, It*a interesting 
that N aometimea reaenta having to play at the level of 
R, But, tonight, there ia no sign of such resentment.
When R is 26 month#, Aileen picks him up and swings
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him up to her shoulder. R laughs - and so does N 
who is watching. A few moments later, R charges around
the room merrily but does not laugh. (C.14)
Often, given the opportunity, the children seem 
to turn glee and running into games. That phenomenon 
will be examined in the special section on pretending 
and games. At 3.6 N could <ften laugh when describing 
himself as a fire cracker and whistling around. (C.15)
At 3.7, N was in the garden in Greece laughing.
But such occasions of laughter - for no "reason" - 
tend to be rare. Making a fire cracker out of himself 
is, after all, a reason for laughing. (C.16)
At 4.9 N can still laugh at doing something physical
He stamps around the kitchen and laughs. Often N likes 
to wriggle into our blanket and to cover himself 
entirely with it. He laughs as he covers himself and, 
then, deliberately wriggles himself to the edge of the 
bed and, still in the blanket, falls off the bed. This 
makes him laugh. (C.17)
At 5.6, N has begun to listen to pop music and to 
dance. He quite often laughs as he dances, especially 
when he contorts himself into tlie shapes of disco 
dancers or of singers with microphones. On video 
tape, I recorded a number of instances in which, with 
a real microphone, N and his friends laughed themselves
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silly as they imitated being singers on the television. 
Here, at 5.6 N says that he is going to do a funny 
dance. He begins to skip and to hop from one leg to 
the next - he knows that this is not how you dance.
N laughs. Aileen laughs and makes Booing noises. N 
hops more. R joins in trying to hop. Both the children 
laugh until N, suddenly, rushes out of the room. Out­
side the room they begin to gun each other down and 
laugh. About two minutes pass, then N yells that he 
wants to do the funny dance again. He takes R by the
arms. R stamps his feet. N makes painful noises. R
laughs at those painful noises. (C.18)
lETEFFRETATIVE:
R seema to have a complex idea behind the funny, even 
ironic, movementa becauae N informa mer-
Nicholas : It's meant to be funny because
it's a crying dance.
Me 2 Is crying funny?
Nicholas : Yes - that sort of dance is.
Don't laugh.
Me 2 What can I do if it's funny
but laugh?
Nicholas ; It's over now. Don't laugh. (C.19)
THEORETICAL SUMMARY»
Observations C.18 and C.19 show, perhaps, how
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laughter due to high arousal is woven in with other 
kinds of laughter. Finally N had made an attempt at 
a conceptual joke - a crying dance is funny. Also, 
here, N tries quite deliberately to involve R which 
R likes.
There is very little evidence from these instances 
of laughter due to high arousal that the children laugh 
themselves out. If the object of laughter were to get 
rid of excess tension, tliere would have to come a point 
when, all tension gone, laughter flagged or, even it 
became unpleasant to laugh. On one occasion, N did 
say he was lauding so much it hurt but all he meant 
was that his face was acheing from so much laughing; 
he still went on, and seemed to enjoy going on, laugh­
ing. It is important to note from all the examples 
offered how often the child initiates the opportunity 
for laughing. This kind of physical laughter is, clearly, 
something the child enjoys and aims to get into. Bruner 
et al (19 76) in their account of peak-abo noted that 
only 3 out of 33 peek-abo games were initiated by the 
child up to the age of 15 months. By that age, R was 
often able to initiate occasions of laughter - and 
liked to do so. The child not only responds by laugh­
ing to outside stimuli; he acts very much as an agent 
who creates reasons for laughing.
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TICKLING (D)
INTRODUCTION t
Preyer (1909) got a baby to laugh at 8 weeks when 
he was tickled. Valentine first noted tickling in his
children making them laugh at 3% months. Sroufe and
Wunsch (1972) noted that the youngest age at which 
children could laugh when tickled was 4 months; the 
average age for most responding to tickling by laugh­
ing was between 7 and 9 months. Then, they found 
only 3 out of 9 children laughed when tickled - an 
odd finding surely.
OBSERVATION;
R first laughed when tickled at 4 months. By 
7 months, N was able to tickle R - and allowed to - 
which also made R laugh. Even by 7 months, tickling 
tended not to be always an isolated event but part of
other games. N and R were at ray mother's flat lying
on a soft furry rug. R was naked and cuddled up to 
N with his back against N*s back and his head on N*s 
shoulder. N laughs nicely and there is a little 
tickling intermittently over five rruinutes. (D.l)
It is an interesting case of a non-aggressive tickle, 
but, a few times, R pulls N*s hair which makes N laugh 
stridently.
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Also at 7 months, N tickles R as Aileen is rock­
ing him back and forth. R laughs. N tickles him 
under the chin. This is a game the two children can 
play for a long time witli R going on eating. As R 
laughs when being ticklod, the laugh is very much 
centred round the mouth. His head does not sway back­
wards, (D.2)
Between 7 months and 11 months, tickling is usually 
a fairly certain way of getting R to laugh. There are 
various parts that he can be tickled to near certain 
laughter on like the tummy, the chest, the toes.
But Aileen can also provoke laughter by kissing him
round the neck and the back of the ear. (D. 3)
JSTERFRETATIVE:
The laughter produced by such kiaaing looks very 
similar to the kind of laughter provoked by tickling.
But while tickling may be a modified attack, kissing 
on the ear or neck ie hardly that. The same effect 
can often by got by kissing R*a toee. But while ear 
and neck are essentially vulnerable, that can hardly 
be sustained of the toee. Also, unlike loud noises 
which as we shall see develop into games, tickling 
remains very much the same,
R, by 21 months, has begun to tickle other people
sometimes. And also the capacity not to laugh at 
being tickled. (D.4)
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At 24 months when R is not well, Aileen tries 
to cheer him up by tickling him. He does not burst 
into tears but ignores the whole absurd proceedings with 
some dignity. (D.5)
Given Leuba's (1941) emphasis on the friendly 
aspect of the "tickle", I attempted a small experiment 
on R at 2.5 when he is still highly ticklish, I lean 
back, yawn and close my eyes. I tickle him - in the 
tummy - and I make no noise. This blind, noiseless 
ticxle makes R laugh. (A useful test could be to 
tickle blind babies). (D.6)
lyT^PPRETATIVff:
It ie poaeibte to stand behind a baby and tickle him 
when there ia no way the baby can perceive the face.
One suggestion has been that tickling ie a modified 
form of attack. The child laughs, however, as he knows 
the person who is tickling him and that, basically, he 
ia not in danger. There are three problems with this 
hypothesis. First, how does one know the child knows 
it is safef Second, it is possible to tickle non- 
vulnerable areas of the body - like the toes. Third, 
in one experiment with B, as we have seen, I successfully 
tickled him while yawning and having my eyes closed.
By these gestures, I tried to negate every threat 
posture. If it is the tension between the threatening 
face and the friendly adult, why did R laugh then?
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At 6.3 N, 2.5 R, I try to get both N and R to 
tickle themselves. N rubs his chest and says he's 
not ticklish any more. I then tickle him. And he 
doubles up laughing. But the idea of tickling 
himself did not amuse him at all - amd he failed to 
make himself laugh. R also failed to make himself 
laugh though the idem of tickling did make him. laugh. 
As he doesn't laugh I ask him if he did tickle him­
self. "I did", R says and puts his hands to his arm­
pits again. The idea makes him smile but, again, he 
can't do it. {D.7)
By 3.7 N tickles competently enough to tickle 
me. I tickle N, He laughs. I let him tickle me.
He laughs. I stop laughing and I stop being tickled. 
But I still wriggle as if N had me in his power. He 
lauÿis but not as much as before. (D.8)
There is one other odd observation which suggests 
that tlie motive of attack need not be involved. At 
6.1 N lauc^ed twice in bed because he was being 
tickled by the cat. (D.9)
Also older children do not disdain tickling each 
other. At 4.11 N and his friend Judith are playing. 
Judith falls down on the sofa and laughs. She can't 
get up. N put out a hand to tickle her. "Don't do 
that", Judith laughs. (D.10)
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THEORETICAL SUMMARY;
Tickling remains, obviously a mystery but it 
is one of the more eccentric forms of laughter in 
that it fails to develop. This7may, of course, mean 
that it is very old but it is not very plastic. It's 
lack of plasticity and development sets it rather 
apart from other kinds of laughter though, yet again, 
it does seem tickling can be incorporated into more 
complex games.
PEEK-ABO (E)
INTRODUCTIONi
Peek-abo seems to be a veritable Jeu sans fron­
tières.” Studies of peek-abo have been reported not 
merely in Western Europe and America but also in 
cultures as far apart as Japan and Africa. Two main 
theories have been put forward for the popularity of 
peek-abo. First, it has been argued that this game 
in which the mother is generally the first person to 
play the game with the child, prepares the child to 
deal with separation anxiety. He sees that his mother 
disappears and appears. She disappears and he 'knows* 
that she will reappear. Bruner has also argued (1976) 
that peek-abo is a game through which the child learns 
the structure of social rules.
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There may be a third purpose to such games which 
involve the appearance and disappearance both of the 
mother and of the child. To set that in context, it 
is necessary to explain an unfortunate event in this 
research project. While studying the playgroup, I 
took a number of children to the Institute of Education 
studio. The idea was to film some of their laughter.
In many ways, the attempt was unsatisfactory because the 
children reacted so much to being in a television studio, 
The tapes of these sessions went missing, however, 
from Bedford College. During the session in the studio, 
we played to the children pictures of themselves - 
both of themselves watching T.V. and playing a variety 
of games. The children went in and out of visi ^  _J8  
naturally in their games and, also, using simple % d e o  
techniques, they were made to appear and disappear on 
television monitors. The effect was remarkable and, 
unfortunately, hard to describe in words. Giggles 
swept through the groups of children as they saw them­
selves appear and disappear off the television screens. 
There seemed to be little doubt that they knew they 
were seeing themselves come in and out of vision. It 
is tempting to compare this with the obviously rather 
more precise research of Duval and Wicklund (19 72) on 
the reaction of children to seeing themselves in the 
mirror. They found that the infants spent more time
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looking at themselves. There have been methodological 
queries about this work but it is true that mirrors are 
curiously fascinating. In myths, they often appear 
as aids to self-consciousness. Freud, of course, 
used the myth of Narcissus to suggest that the child 
who does not leam to recognise his own reflection 
for what it is is in peril of losing his identity 
(Freud 1913). Hamilton (1982) has recently attempted 
to bring together this Freudian idea with some of the 
latest work on developmental psychology. Looking 
at oneself is, therefore, a difficult, but intriguing 
area, liable to all kinds of over-interpretation.
The observations that follow record games of 
ordinary peek-abo and, also, games in which objects 
were made to appear and disappear. The observations 
also record games in which N and R either reacted to 
the appearance and disappearance of images of them­
selves - either on video or on sound tape. They also 
ire cord instances in which N and R created, for them­
selves, the opportunity to appear and disappear (on 
video or tape) and, apparently, monitored their own 
comings and goings. Very speculatively, on the basis 
of these observations, I want to suggest a third 
reason for the popularity of peek-abo. It is a game 
which offers the child the chance to control how he 
appears and disappears. That sounds highly metaphy­
sical but the observations appeared - admittedly in­
tuitively - as remarkably powerful.
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OBSERVATION ;
By 9 months, R is well practised in peek-abo.
In bed, one morning, Aileen attempted an experiment
with him. She tried doing peek-abo in four ways.
The first way was to hide her face, turn it towards 
him and say peek-abo at the same time.
By 9 montlis, R is well aware of the fact that heads
do not float off bodies. He laughs even Uiough he can
see the rest of her body. In the second condition,
Aileen says "peek-abo" but does not bother to hide her 
face or turn it away. This produces some laughter.
In the third condition, Aileen just turns her face away 
from R and buries her face in her shoulder. This, too, 
makes R laugh. (E.l)
At 12 months R can resist peek-abo. One day, he is 
annoyed. I try to play peek-abo. He looks cold. Later, 
a friend of mine called Mike is here. He and R play 
peek-abo but they use the syllables He Hum. R laughs. 
(E.2)
By 16 montiis, R can initiate peek-abo. After one 
game, R grabs a copy of the New Yorker out of ray hand
j
and uses it to cover ny face. He takes the active 
part. He laughs as he covers my face - which is, 
curiously, not the usual point of laughing. Also, now, 
the face need not be the part covered. Aileen covers
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and uncovers R*s toes with a blanket. He laughs on 
each appearance of the toes. (E.3)
At 30 months, R still enjoys peek-abo. Aileen 
ai^ d N and I sometimes play it with him. I hide behind 
the door &md come out saying "Peek-abo" which makes R 
laugh. He follows me into the room, laughing and then 
says "Boo" himself and laughs. (E.4)
n can also now play the game with his friend 
John who is also 30 montais. Each of them hides in 
a curtain and, then, steps out in one version or simply 
lets his face be seen. On each discovery of the face, 
there is a laugh from both but the whole game is much 
less formal than when played with an adult. At times, 
both R*s attention and John's attention gats too dis­
tracted for them to play the game properly. The 
laughter is much more random than when R plays with 
an adult or, even, with N. (E.5)
Another form of appearance - disappearance is one 
which always makes children lau^i. From 9 months or 
so, R laughed when he saw himself on a video screen and 
rushed around excitedly. (E.6)
When I first began to observe N, I had a tape 
recorder. The listening to himself on the tape recorder 
always made him laugh. At 3.6, I played back to N 
some of our talking after I had read part of 
Dr. Doolittle to him. He laughed hysterically and said:
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"I'm funny. That's funny. I'm funny", (E.7)
By 1.10, R has also taken to laughing whenever 
I take out a stills camera and suggest I am about to 
snap him. (E. 8)
IRTERFRETATJVE:
Systerioal laughter in such situations - involving 
photographs and tapes - is not an area which has been 
muoh explored. During the course of this thesis, the 
playgroup studied in Chapter S was brought to the 
television studio of the Institute of Education and 
filmed. The videotapes of these sessions were, un­
fortunately, lost from Bedford College before it 
was possible to analyse them. The videotapes showed 
one very remarkable form of behaviour as described 
earlier,
A comparable form of laughter can be seen in N and R, 
They nearly always laugh when they hear themselves 
appear on tape or see themselves on the screen. In 
their home, their situation in relation to the screen 
is different because they know where they have to 
dart up and down in front of the cameras in order to 
flash up on the screen. They have some control over 
their appearance and disappearance in a way that the 
playgroup in the studio did not have.
The powerfulness of the reaction to seeing themselves 
appear and disappear is very striking. It could be
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argued that here one ie dealing with a different 
form of peek-abo, 'inhere one of the ^functions* of 
peeh—abo is to defuse the terror of seeing mother 
aome and go, seetng the appearance and disappearance of 
one^s own self - and creating that as R and R do with 
the video screen sometimes - may also have a metaphysiaal 
edge. Could peek-abo also he a way the child plays 
with his own body-image and, even, identity? In 
peek-abo, the child * teases^ others when he takes the 
hut, perhaps, he also teases himself now 
that ho is secure in his identity. These are, clearly, 
difficult areas in which it is all too easy to claim 
too much hut something must account for the sheer force 
of the laughter witnessed in the talevision studio - 
_  and not to speculate on it might he all too timorous.
Allied to psek-aho are, in that laughter is produced 
by seeing each other, games in which children find each 
other,
OBSERVATIONS ; : - ■ ^ ^
When H 1.7 and *1 is 5,3, they face each otiier 
at the kitchen table at lunch. N pokes his head under 
the taljla, R laughs., Then % imitates N a;id tries to 
poke his head under tlie table. R partially nonages 
to do idiis. N laugri3. Sotîi give out aounis throughout 
the neaJc hut tlie ^>eab laughter is reached fhen N sees
R under the table, and R ,^ ees IT from under table,
(2.9)
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Even at 5.6, N can enjoy peek-abo. In the 
rddst of a boisterous game, Aileen insists on a minute 
of quiet. N manages to keep quiet for most of the 
minute and this "jag" from boisterousness to calm 
does not make ÜLm laugh. But, at one point,N breaks 
tlie quiet by hiding behind my chair and playing peek- 
abo with R who laughs. (E.IO see also P.17)
Even at 6.4, N can still enjoy games in which he 
hides himself - usually in blankets - and then appears, 
lie does this twice one morning, wriggling around, 
covered from head to toe and bursting out with a 
laugh. First, N does it on his bed. R is there, too, 
watching. R laughs as he watches N and also jumps up 
and down on the bed. Then, they play the same game 
on the big bad but R hides himself, peeks out and 
laughs as he appears. I try to initiate neek-abo with 
R but he does not want to play my garnet he wants to 
play his game. I also try to make a simple loud noise 
at him, "Boo", but it evokes no laughter. Then, out 
of the blanket, R begins to jump up and down and sing 
"Catcti tlie pigeon" which is the theme song of a cartoon 
show on T.V. (E.ll)
There is also laughter in the occasionally truly 
unexpected appearance. At 5.1, N ia in Helen's house.
N asks where Helen is and we all say we don't know.
N; "I don't know either but I'm going to look for her". 
He goes out of the room. They meet in the corridor.
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Il: "I was looking for you". Helen: "I was looking 
for you". They both laugh hugely at tills. (E.12)
INTERPRETATIVE:
There ie one interesting aspect to this game. It is 
something of a resolution to a problem. They found 
each other. And at B,l, N is still having difficulties 
in grasping resolutions quite often.
There are also games which do not involve the 
disappearance and reappearance of a person or part of 
a person but which involve things. R is fascinated 
by these and manipulates the situations so that he 
can play such games quite often - especially round 
11 mon til s or so.
PEEK-ABO WITH OBJECTS (F)
At 11 months, Aileen tried to teach R what it 
meant to get down. R was sitting in his high chair. 
She used her finger to make a gesture in which the 
finger swooped down. R laughed* Aileen tried the 
gesture with no sound. R still laughed. (F.l)
At 12 months, R is in the pram on the way to 
Blacklieath. He starts to drop his glove out of the 
moving pram. First, he shows me the glove. Then, he 
drops it. It d/sappears briefly from his vision.
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Then, I pick it up and toss it back into the pram.
He laughs as I bend to pick it up and, also, as I 
toss it back. He insists on repeating the whole
thing. (F.2)
Also at 11 months, we play a game in which bal­
loons are hidden and then appear. At one point Aileen 
hides both balloons in her sweater so that she looks 
huge. As the balloons appear from "inside" her, R 
laughs enormously. This happens twice. On each "ap­
pearance" R laughs. (F.3)
THEORETICAL SUMMARY;
Bruner et al (19f6) stress that the^^ject of 
peek-abo is to enable the child to begin to leam 
certain rules and structures. It is a game with a 
set form. The child learns that form. He begins to 
be able to start games off. He begins to be able to 
vary them. My observations neither serve to confirm 
nor to deny this. Rather, they suggest that peek-abo 
also enables the child to toy with the appearance and 
disappearance of his own self cUid that of his sig­
nificant others. There is also a question that the 
end of a peek-abo game is an anticipated surprise, a 
surprise that is not really surprise. Lastly, one 
should note that peek-abo shows again that a mixture 
of movement and noise - the appearance from, behind 
the pillow with a noise being uttered - is particilarly
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good at evoking laughter. It ia better than movement 
alone or sound alone though both of these, 
can sometimes evoke some laughter. There is also the 
fact that both N and R not only respond to peek-abo 
but create occasions for it - and, especially, for 
playing it together.
AFFECTION AND GENTLE PHYSICAL STIMULATION (G)
INTRODUCTION;
In his observations, Valentine (1942) noted that 
the first laughs of all of his five babies were 
simple expression of well being. I am a well-fed, 
well-cuddled baby, therefore, I laugh. 0ut Sroufe 
and Wunsch (1972) found that in their sample, 
laughter of well being was not found at all because 
they did not test for It shows the vagaries of
much research to date.
In these observations, I noted more with R and 
N what might be called affectionate laughter which 
is relatively rare. It first occurred with R just 
before 7 nvontha.
OBSERVATIONS >
He and N are lying naked on the rug at my 
mother’s. R is cuddled up agains t back and his
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head is on N's shoulder, N laughs a lot and R joins 
in the laughter. (G. 1)
At 9 months, R laughs often when he is held and 
happy. He often does this with N. One morning, I*m 
rea ding to N and holding R. R laughs. Part of this 
is that R quite often laughs now when N is laughing 
even though N ia laughing at him. Typically, there 
is a small pause after N haa started to laugh and 
then R begins to laugh. This kind of joining in 
laughter becomes very evident in the next few months. 
One of R’s most frequent phrases between 1.0 and 1.8 
is "And me". (G. 2)
At 11 months, I say "Hello" to R in his pushchair, 
R laughs and turns his plate upside down, (G.3)
At 1 year R and N (4.11) are in our bedroom.
R is in the bed but N is not in the bed. He creeps 
round the outside of the bed and gently comes towards 
R who coos and laughs. There is nothing sudden about 
it, no discontinuity of stimulation. It is rather 
lovely and both laugh throughout. (G. 4)
At 1.3 R and N (5.0) have developed a number of 
routines. N usually initiates these but R can imitate 
him and giggle. R likes It especially when W imitates 
Oliver Hardy - they watch the Laurel and Hardy shows - 
by puffing himself out, crossing his arms, saying
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sternly with a finger pointed; "A fine mess you've 
got me into*. (G. 5)
Sometimes, affectionate laughter can erupt into 
the middle of a quite aggressive game. At 1.9 R and N 
chase each other or, rather, N chases R and the games 
usually involve a lot of shooting. In the middle of one 
such game, N points a gun at R and says Gaga in a baby­
like voice. Both children laugh wildly. Then, N 
strokes R on the head with the gun. There is no actual 
laughter on this gesture, but, a second later, N points 
the gun again at R to huge laughter from both of them. 
(G. 6',see also M. 13)
Occasionally, too, N (5.9) is protective of R (2.0)
Me : I'm going to throw you out of the window.
N : Don't worry it's only a joke. (G.7)
THEORETICAL SUMMARY:
This kind of laughter does not fit easily into 
the arousal modal since it occurs at times of gentle­
ness. Nor do any of the observations here really 
support the idea that N or R wanted to produce 
laughter. Rather, the laughter seems here to mark or 
signal affection.
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT AROUSAL
Berlyne (1969), Rothbart (1973), Rothbart and
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Pien (1976) make much of the arousal jag hypothesis 
which was reviewed in the introduction. The -evidence 
adduced here must suggest that while arousal jags may 
sometimes happen at the same time as laughter, they 
can hardly be said to be a prime cause of laughter.
There are cases in which sudden changes In the 
level of stimuli - going from a whisper to a loud 
noise - do seem to lead to laughter. Even if we assume 
that changes in the level of stimuli equal changes In 
the level of arousal, it must also be noted that 
laughter can often occur without this happening. In 
the case of affectionate laughter, where is the jag?
If the hypothesis were right, one might expect laughter 
at orgasm rather than through affection and, though 
there are instances of such laughter, they are rare.
Second, there are a number of cases in which laughter 
seems to be provoked by a consistently high level of 
arousal. In such instances - like some of the boi­
sterous games - anything seems funny. Chases hardly 
seem good instances of arousal jags either. In such 
boisterous ga mes, also, the children hardly ever 
seemed to laugh themselves out which is what one would 
have expected if laughter were a way of discharging 
tension. Laughter seems, if anything, to have a tonic 
effect. It produces arousal rather than being a way of 
coping with arousal. This proposition needs some better 
physiological proof than that yet supplied.
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Third, the arousal jag hypothesis does not 
adequately explain why laughter sometimes does and 
sometimes does not occur when (i) children confront 
exactly the same stimulus and (ii) there seems to be 
no identifiable change in the level of their arousal 
due either to a change of mood or, say illness. Sroufe 
and Wunsch*3 data bears out the intermittent nature of 
laughter.
It must be argued, therefore, that while changes 
in the level of arousal do sometimes seem to occur at 
the same moment that laughter does, these "jags" are 
not always the cause of laughter; that laughter seems 
to be provoked by different sorts of arousal levels; 
and that as a "cause", such jags seem to beg too many 
questions. If, for example, you laugh at a repartee 
in a dinner party, in what sense could the words (and 
let us assume it's a hostile barb, not a dirty one) be 
likely to lead to chcinge in the level of arousal and 
how could the change be quick to "cause" tlie usually 
immediate laughter that follows the barb.
Like a number of hypothesis, the arousal jag is 
useful, partially true but far from being the global 
truth which its proponents sometimes seem to argue it 
is.
INCONGRUITY (H)
INTRODUCTION :
The idea of incongruity has often been seen as
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the root of all humour. What makes us laugh is that 
what we expect fails to happen. But, clearly, just 
the unexpected does not always make us laugh. We 
do not expect to see a man run over in the street 
but the sight does not make us titter. Only the 
violation of certain expectations can make us laugh. 
The problem with the development of laughter in the 
child is to see the kind of expectations whose failure 
makes us laugh.
The observations here offered suggest that the 
first incongruities are to do with roles. Already 
at 12 months, the child is a sufficiently keen 
social observer to know when his mother does something 
that, really, a baby should do. Sroufe and Wunsch 
noted that children often laughed at their mothers 
crawling in the month after they had first crawled. 
Despite this finding, most incongruity research con­
tinues to focus on things. Rothbart and Pien (1980), 
for example, studied the response of 8 two-year olds 
to a jack-in-the-box in the lab. Despite sessions of 
up to 21 minutes, only 5 of the children laughed leav­
ing the authors with "not enough data for a meaningful 
analysis" (p.14). Given the Sroufe and Wunsch find­
ing, this emphasis on objects is disappointing. R 
crawled very early - round 5 months - and I failed to 
test this in that month as I was not aware of this 
finding at the time. But R*s first laughter that is
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not due either to well-being or to simple arousal 
levels seems to do with this kind of incongruity.
Laughter that is due to incongruity with objects 
seems to con^ later. It involves exaggeration, mis­
takes and with N, as we shall see, there is by 5.6 
some sense of social incongruity. Children also often 
develop and build on the incongruity - which is an 
important exercise, I shall argue.
In the literature on laughter, much has been made 
of whether young children prefer jokes that involve 
incongruity or jokes that have resolutions. These 
observations show that young children do often create 
incongruous jokes early but that they struggle both to 
appreciate and to create jokes that involve resolution 
though, by 5.0 N is beginning to offer some almost elegant 
resolutions to jokes. Some observation of adult jokes 
in the New Yorker suggests, however, that it is not 
clear that they always prefer resolutions.
OBSERVATIONS ;
At 12 months, R is beginning to cope with one 
kind of incongruity. He is very amused by the dummy 
game in which either Aileen or I put his durany in our 
mouths. This game can make him laugh.even at tiroes 
when he might cry.
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At 13 months, one evening, he is in a very 
miserable mood and he holds out his dummy for Aileen 
to take. He inserts the dummy in her mouth and he 
laughs at that. At the origin of playing this game, 
Aileen put the dummy in her own moutli. (H.l)
With this game, Aileen often makes a noise that
sounds like disgust. At 10 months, R laughs when Aileen 
puts the dummy in her mouth and says "Yuck". But at
13 months, the noise is not obligatory. It might be
the action of her opening and shutting her mouth - 
Aileen raeüces her mouth very wide - which might trigger 
the laugh. But, by 13 months, R finds this amusing 
in itself - at least at tiroes. (H.2)
At 9 months, I attempt an experiment with R and 
do something incongruous to see if it will make him 
laugh. I put an empty fruit basket on my head. There 
is no reaction at all. I smile at him. Then, I put 
the basket on his head. At first there is no laughter. 
Then, I smile and I get a smile out of him - to please 
me, I suspect, (H. 3)
The first perception of an incongruity appears 
to be of an incongruity related to the self. R often 
joins in situations when N is laughing at something 
incongruous but then R laughs because he wants to be 
part of the situation. For instance, at 9 months, I 
am bathing N and R. N is being obnoxious and I threaten
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to smack him unless he brushes his teeth. I hold R.
N picks up the toothbrush and brushes his teeth but
an inch away from his mouth. Then, he puts the
brush near R* s toes. N laughs. "I'm going to brush
his toes". I laugh too. N adds: "I'm going to brush
his feet". N laughs and R joins in the laughter. (H.4 
see also N,11)
IHTERFRETATIVE:
R appears to perceive the social value of joining in a 
laugh long before he can see the reason for doing so*
At 9% months, R also laughs when he puts his 
finger in ny mouth and feels teeth. Aileen says that 
he does this quite often. This may be a preliminary 
to the dummy game. (H.5)
IRTERPRETATIVE:
It may be that it is a sensual game since he puts his 
fingers inside the mouth. On the other hand, the 
ridges of the teeth which one would not tend to des- 
oribe as sensual seem to be the particular stimuli 
that makes R laugh.
At 11 months, R begins to laugh at pompous language 
like "Nahbaloo". Often this is loud but, sometimes it 
is not. I msüce a number of efforts to say words like 
these without any odd facial expression. R laughs but
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whether he can or cannot recognise these as not being 
of the genuine language is far from clear. (H.6)
At 13 months, I try the dummy trick with R.
One evening I do it 6 times. I put it in my mouth and 
make a “Yuck" noise. He laughs hugely. Then I simply 
put the dummy in my mouth without a "Yuck". He smiles 
and laughs, but laughs much less. I then make the 
"Yuck" noise with the attendant contortion of the face 
that goes with it. R laughs hugely. (H.7)
ISTERPRETATIVE:
There seem to he two elements in the dummy game. The 
noise and face are by themselves able to trigger 
laughter. The simple dummy in the mouth is either 
not incongruous enough or not perceived as being 
incongruous enough to lead to as much laughter. But 
it does lead to some laughter. At %7 months, R 
laughs at this without my making the slightest noise.
Distortion of the face does seem to amuse rather 
than to frighten. At 9 months Aileen sticks her 
tongue out at R. He laughs. Aileen is careful not to 
make any noise. The laughter is still very loud. She 
does this about 5 times until R gets bored and stops 
laughing. (H.8)
16 3
By 15 months, there is the first example of R 
laughing at an incongruity that involves an object.
N has sat himself at my typewriter. R points to N and 
laughs. Partly, too, the ping of the keys as N hits 
them, but R clearly notices the fact that N is where 
I usually am and this makes him laugh. (H.9)
INTERPRETATIVE:
N from 3,6 on, seems to have some awareness of 
incongruity of roles: then N can swop roles and find 
that funny - playing games that may lead to his 
being able to handle sarcasm and being sarcastic at 
someone's expense.
At 19 months, R can make N laugh by doing in­
congruous things which R cannot recognise as being 
incongruous. R is playing with the pepper pot. He 
has it the wrong way round but he firmly believes that 
he is peppering on his chocolate cake. N cannot stop 
himself laughing at this. (H.IO)
INTERPRETATIVE:
N uses this ability - that he can laugh at silly or 
wrong things that ''the baby" can do - quite often.
The behaviour seems to fulfil, at the very least, two 
functions, The inappropriate behaviour of R confirms 
N in his own superiority in the fact that he is older 
and more competent. But, also, it is a way of playing
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with R and thus becoming closer to him.
By 19 months, also, R has begun to be able to 
pretend to eat. There is a particular gesture in 
which R puts his fingers close to his mouth, wiggles 
them auid then his mouth chews at them without quite touch­
ing. It is obviously like eating with his fingers.
N often points to edible things and R makes his"eat­
ing" gesture and laughs. More interesting is that 
R can now do this gesture when N points to toys.
R "eats" the toys - and laughs. (H.ll)
It is also hard to know how quite to classify 
some new experiences that R laughs at. At 19 months,
I take R to a launderette. We arrive and R is fas­
cinated by the sight of the ctothes spinning in the 
machines. He does not laugh out loud but he looks at 
the clothes spinning with the lower jaw dropped and 
mouth wide open. The next day we have to return to do 
some more clothes. The machines fascinate R a little 
less. But he laughs for about 30 seconds as he stands 
in front of a tumble dryer watching the clothes go round. 
About five minutes later, I have to put a new coin in 
a tumble dryer. I get R to watch hoping that he will 
laugh again. But though he attends to it, he does not 
laugh. (H.12)
Distortion of the human face makes R laugh as we 
have seen. At 1.8, he brings into tlie living room a
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plastic mask of a monkey face. R laughs. I ask:
"Is it you?" He says "Daddy"! (H.13)
At 22 months, I try on R the experiment mentioned 
by Sroufe. I crawl around the floor. I get no laugh 
frc«n R at all. All he does is to say "I sit here". (H.14)
By 22 months, too, Aileen and R are still play­
ing the dummy game. R has a dumny in his mouth. He 
puts it in Aileen*s mouth. Aileen makes no noise.
R laughs. She throws her head back and makes a 
"delighted" face - as if she were a baby who was 
delighted. But again, there is no noise and R laughs.
In tlie past, the noise was an important element. (H.15)
There is an interesting climax to the dummy 
game which involves N. When R is 1.11 and N 5.9, N 
is having a bath with Aileen. R comes in with two 
dummies. R gives one of them to Aileen and smiles.
The fact that R gave Aileen a dummy sends N into 
transports of laughter. N begins a long, hysterical 
outburst of laughing. R looks concerned rather than 
amused. The dummy then passes between Aileen and N.
As Aileen wails that she wants her dummy, N laughs.
H then demands the dummy himself. N sucks the dummy 
himself but this does not amuse him very much. It was 
Aileen wanting the dummy that was so funny. (H.16)
INTERPRETATIVE:
One obvious interpretation is that N is still too close 
to dummy-sucking age to really laugh at himself sucking 
a dummy. The game then goes from the dummy sucking
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to the rubber duok. Again there ie here an incon­
gruity, Adulte should he serious in the hath ’ 
and, whatever else, they should not play 
with rubber dueka. Both R and N want the rubber 
duok which makes both N and R laugh uncontrollably, 
They begin to splash each other, (Does R laugh much 
less because he is not in the bathf)
At 2.0 R can recognise incongruous behaviour in 
fj. hi insists on wearing Aileen's red jacket so that 
the arms are too long for him. N flails the arms 
around and they flap. R laughs - again it is not 
pure incongruity. (H.17)
At 2.1 R creates for himself his first truly suc­
cessful conceptual incongruity. R picks up a cucumber 
in the kitchen. He says "Cucuaber fly!" He grins 
at this. N picks up the joke. That week, we had 
watched a performance of The Flying Dutchman on tele­
vision. N had been mesmerised by it and had insisted 
on staying up. N now declaims: "Tonight, instead of 
NASH and The Flying Dutchman, we present The Flying 
Cucumber. This woman is in love with the image of a 
cucumber". (Oh Freud! What would you have given for 
this observation). N laughs and says he likes being 
silly. (8.18)
INTERPRETATIVE:
Over the next weeks, the notion of The Flying Cucumber
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is repeated on a number of oooasione, R, sometimes, 
himself brings it up. He knows that it was wett 
received. And, also, it is a way in which N, Aileen 
and I try to make him laugh, I will give in some 
detail here how this basic incongruity got played with 
because it introduces some-Mng which seems important. 
Children elaborate incongruities, They play with 
them. Often, the playing ie quite simple - the flying 
cucumber sometimes turns into a flying carrot, a 
flying potato (fust the kind of responses that make 
for high divergent thinking scores).
yfhile the first incongruities R responds to are those 
of role, the first incongruities he creates are conceptual 
The evidence of my two children suggests that the 
ability to elaborate on conceptual incongruities is 
the first playing with ideas and structures of ideas.
It precedes jokes - and the attempt to construct jokes. 
Later on, N began round 4,6 to try and put jokes to­
gether, Be understood some of the basic elements of 
Jokes and laboured to construct his own. It is arguable 
that the first skill a child learns, after the initial 
recognition that an incongruity is an incongruity, ie 
to develop that incongruity, to elaborate it so that 
its basic structure gets fixed in his mind. It is 
not unlike learning a skill.
Round the tiine of cracking the first flying 
cucumber, R is beginning to be fascinated by #^$man 
and Superman. He incorporates this with the flying 
cucumber. A month after the initial laughing at this,
R laughs a good deal about the flying cucumber. He 
often takes on the part of being the flying cucumber 
in which incarnation he whirls around energetically.
At 2.2, two months after the original, R picks 
up Aileen*s sandals and waves them around. He laughs 
as he says : "Flying boot" and dips them into his 
potty. I tell him not to - which makes him laugh but 
also makes him desist. (H.19)
Also, now, one evening at dinner, N is asking R 
testing questions about where we are. N is displaying 
his superior knowledge. After this, R gets up on his 
chair, laughs at a few gestures and says "Flying 
cucnimber" • He laughs - euid he seems well aware that 
it will make us laugh. (H.20)
Given that this flying cucumber has so lodged 
itself in R*s mind, I decide a few manipulations of 
it. first were to sub turn it into CRYING CUCUMBER •
tearful or airborne tiie vegetable is after all, in­
congruous. This gets no laughter out of R. I also try 
LYING CUCUMBER. Now, R knows what crying is though he 
probably does not know what lying is. There is no 
laughter with LYING either. Instead of playing with
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the first word, I try playing with the second word.
I say FLYING MÜKÜMBER. On this, R laughs hugely.
He likes this so much that he repeats it himself 
twice. (H.21)
The next day, we return to this theine. R is 
lying on the bed. He says first, with a grin, "I 
thought I was alone". I lie down by his side. After 
a while,he says "Plying Cucunt>er” and laughs. I lawg# 
too. I try, again, with "Lying Cucumber". R does 
not laugh. He says: "Flying cucurrber", again, and 
laughs. I say to him"Flying mumumber". Again, E 
laughs hugely. Finally, I say to him "Flying mBsinmer'*'- 
This also makes him laugh. (H.22)
Five days later, R repeats - and again, ae 
originates this repetition of the Flying Cucsomer 
The Flying Cucumber is not the only lncœigrisCTEsai«îî3 
laughs at. Ha pretends to drive a bus round tne fcittahen 
and laughs. Then he says "Swimming Bus" and imiBghzs. 
(8.23)
At 2.5, I try on R the idea which oomms toami 
Chukovsky - and which was this point that ate 
imagination had so amused her daughter at Î3 wsirtatr — 
that dogs miaow. R reacts to this by 
that dogs go "wof-wof". I try to tte üaÆom-
gruity by saying that dogs go "laoo-ssioc"• #2>^
cows go moo-moo. Yet he has by this a tgWLthe 3rtl<îhi
fantasy life. I change tack and I say to him that 
since he has just said "moo-moo” , he must be e :ow.
"No, I aren't", he says.
"But cows say moo and you just said moo-moo 
so you must be a cow".
"no" says R.
I repeat, again, the logic behind it. R now says 
to me : "You say moo-moof.
"Moo-moo" I say.
"You're a cow", he says and laughs. He enjoys 
that idea and laughs with a certain sense of triumph. 
(H.24)
By 2.5, as we shall see when we come to rhymes,
R has also begun to develop a feel for playing with 
incongruous rhymes and for elaborations based on them. 
Also at 2.6, R can make incongruous use of objects.
At breakfast, for instance, he tries to use a Mr. Man 
finger puppet as a spoon to eat cereal with. He laughs 
at himself - and wants us to laugh with him. (H.25)
When I began to observe N in some detail, he was 
3,6. Ha was already quite adept, at creating and expand­
ing incongruities as well as responding to them.
On holiday in Greece, I had missed N and Aileen 
and gone to look for tliem. When I returned to tlie house
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we were renting, Aileen said they were wondering if 
I had bean turned into a tree. N added: "I dc .ided 
you turned into an orange". He laughs. (H.26)
Later that evening, N says: "I decided you turned 
into a dog". He laughs at this and adds: "I decided 
you turned into a brick". He laughs. "I decided you 
turned into everything". (H.27)
INTERFRETATIVE:
This game with ite accent on changing into something 
weird ie, perhape, linked to games which are based 
on switching identities and roles - a developed version 
of the baby who laughs because he sees hie mother craw­
ling on the floor.
At 3.6, also we play a game in which Aileen has 
said that I am a prune. N says that we can both be 
watermelons. Aileen wants to be something different 
from me.
N : David can be a lump.
Me : A lump.
N : David can be light (laughs).
Me : That's better.
N : David can be a pie (laughs). You
can be a lump of light (laughs) and a 
light (laughs). (8.28)
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There are many other exanples from this time of 
this kind of stringing out with incongruities ^hat have 
a n obscene or a disgust basis.
At 3.11 N can enjoy the kind of sinqple incongruity.
He is playing with a roll of cotton wool and the new 
baby's powder. "They're sausages", he laughs. (H.29)
As R begins to be at all mobile and an active 
presence in our life, N derives a good deal of laughter 
out of him.
At 4.5 when R is 7 months old, N looks at R 
crawling under a diair and laughs: ”R is driving a giraffe". 
The comment is bizarre, to say the least. Two days 
later, R tries to grab hold of the broom which roust 
be five times his size. He leans on it and the broom 
falls down nearly hitting Aileen. N laughs. (H.30)
At 4.7 being in any way identified as being a baby 
roaücQS N laugh. One rooming he and R are in our bed 
and N laughs: "His dummy's in my ear". (H.31)
Odd things that seem, but may not be, incongruous 
make N laugh. At 4.7, N notices that there is a sponge 
on the kitchen balance. "Weighing a sponge", he laughs. 
(H.32)
INTERPRETATIVE:
Now it ie perfectly senaihle to Weigh a eponge hut a
V73
sponge àoec have that airy quality like the prover­
bial feather so it is not so strange N should  ^ ugh 
at it although an adult would not. But, if what he 
is doing is learning to laugh - and, to an extent - 
relying on adults to tell him when, then the laughter 
is understan dab Ie.
It is also important to notice when a sophisti­
cated incongruity fails. For example, in the 
Dr. Scarry books, tiiere is the story of Dr. Krunchew, 
andanimal dentist. After working all week on the 
molars of moles and the wisdom teeth of elephants,
Mrs. Krunchew packs off her hard working husband to 
the museum. There he is fascinated by the whale and 
her giant teeth. Scarry means one to laugh at the fact 
that, yet again, Krunchew finds himself facing teeth.
At 4.2 N laughs at this story but what he finds so 
funny is the gigantic whale. The adult irony that the 
dentist should hark yet again to teeth is lost on him. 
(K.33)
But also by this age (4.8) N can turn on an adult. 
On a bus, N asks who puts the posters on hoardings up.
I say companies hire people to put them up. N: "^hat 
are the iren called?" "I don't know. Poster putter 
uppers". This gets no laug^. N is not satisfied. I 
say "I don't know. They stick them. Maybe they're 
called stickers". N laughs knowingly. "No", N says, 
"stickers are things you stick". (H.34)
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By 5.3, N can grasp the incongruity that is 
reflexive. N can laugh at a W. C. Fields film in which 
Fields on the set always has whisky but he calls it 
pineapple juice. One day a joker puts pineapple juice 
in instead of booze. W. C. Fields says: "Who put the 
pineapple juice in my pineapple juice?" N laughs.
The funny thing is that that's what the pineapple juice 
is for. (H.35)
By 4.8 N is becoming interested in jokes - and we 
shall deal with that separately. His first jokes are 
based on contradictions as much as incongruity.
R and the fantasies and fantastic possibilities of 
a baby afford N much amusement. At 4.9 N toys with the 
idea that R should play the baby Jesus in the nativity 
play at N's nursery school.
Also, incongruities which are threaded into games
tiaat we play touch off quite hysterical laughter from 
N. One day when N is 4.9 we are playing with a cowboy
hat. N has hidden the hat frcmi me. Aileen suggests
that it might be in the freezer. I say it’ll be a frozen
hat. N laughs hysterically. Then, Aileen guesses it
might be in the mustard jar. N laughs. She then
suggests to N that it might be cooking in the oven. N
laughs. And, therefore there will be hat for dinner.
N laughs maniacally. (H.36 ^ee also 0.17)
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What is socially appropriate can also now be played 
with. At 4.11 N is in school. We have to go to school 
one evening to see his book in which his work is. Oh 
yes, we say, but the talk suggests that we might have 
to spend the night at school.
A : But you can't spend the night at
school ... where would you sleep?
N : Laughs at this. Then, he adds:
No, you couldn't sleep. (H.37)
At this time, N often seems to repeat the punch­
line or end line of something funny. This repetition 
is very like the questions N asks about whether his 
jokes are funny. They seem part of the learning pro­
cess.
Classically, exaggeration also makes children 
laugh. Many incongruities involve exaggeration - we 
have seen that N at 3.7 decided on the
exaggerated act of breaking the sink. But pure 
numerical exaggeration rarely causes jokes. At 4.8,
I offer N fish fingers "one or two" I say. N says:
"one or ten". "Ten", I say. N: "Ten is a joke".
"39 fish fingers would be a joke". (H.38 see also K.7)
There are also incongruities that depend on 
exaggeration in a subtle way - and change. At 5.0, I 
am walking N to a party and we look at our shadows.
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yesterday he said to me: "I look like a 7 year old and 
you look like an 11 year old". The shadows did make 
him look taller then. Today, I ask him if he still 
thinks his shadow looks like a 7 year old. "No an 
8 year old". "Do I still look like an 11 year old?"
"No", he says, "a 12 year old and a 13 year old - a 21 
year old". He puts his hand to his mouth he is laughing 
so much. "You swopped from being a 13 year old to a 
21 year old without being a 14 year old. (H.39)
INTERPRETATIVE:
If that ia hia explanation of why he ia laughing ao 
muoh it ia odd. One can graap why the audden and awift 
progreaa from tN year dd to 21 year old should he funny. 
But why ia the faot that one failed to he a i4 year 
old in there, too, la it aimply a mistake on N'a part.
He was aware that the transition from 13 to 21 was ao 
exaggeratedly awift as to he funny. Re began to try 
and account for it.
At 5.0, N mixes and elaborates the notion of man as 
machine - which Bergson said was the prime cause of 
laughter. We are driving witli a neighbour, Hilda in 
her car. I will not let N put the half chewed apple on 
the dashboard because it might spoil the motor of the car, 
Hilda says it* a odd tliat he should say motor car rather
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than car. Her eleven year old daughter adds: "And 
you should say motor bus and motor lorry". (H.40)
And N adds: " Motor motor cycle". He laughs.
He then adds: "What if people had a motor?" Laugh.
"Or if you just had a person walking a steering wheel. 
Wouldn't it be funny if you had people driving upside 
down in a car or steering wheel on the roof of a car?"
(H.41)
Conventional experiments cannot test if laugh at 
self comes before laugh at objects if the studies 
usually use, as they do, stimuli the psychologists 
select - and these tend to be objects.
At 5.3, N produces one of hia first truly good 
repartees. He says he is going to say soimthing funny. 
"What's the rain? The rain is God spitting". At 5.4 
there are still odd remarks which an adult would find 
bizarre rather than funny. N says: "Isn't it funny 
if you had a whole lot of snakes and they were all sleep­
ing in a tent?" And he laughs. (H.42)
When N is 5.5 R plays with a pepper pot and "peppers” 
his cake. N can hardly contain himself. (H.43)
Two days later, on the front door step, R calls 
N a buff. Buff was R's first word and seemed to apply 
to anything that moved. N laughs: "Do I go on wheels then?" 
(H.44)
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At 5.6 too, N can mix different sorts of incon­
gruity. He can make it into a ceremony that is 
ridiculous. He wants to have jelly for breakfast. In 
order to indulge him, Aileen agrees. N brings the 
jelly ceremonially out of the fridge and declaims:
"This is ham - delicious ham". (H.45)
At 5.6 N walks to school. He sees a sign that
says "Space to let". He laughs derisively. "Space
can't be let". (H.46)
At 5.9 when N is well into producing jokes which,
as we shall see, have a good deal of the formal
structure necessary for adult jokes, he can still come 
out with - and find funny - very simple incongruities.
We are in a train and N makes up the story of a man 
who walked on his head and walked everywhere upside 
down. It is a case of very simple inversion. (H. 47)
At 5.10 we have already seen the dunmy game in 
the bath between N, A and R makes N laugh. Incongruities 
of role remain important. (K.48)
When N is 5.10, I was making a series of films 
about mental health in which I talked to memy people 
who had psychiatric histories. N knew something of what 
I was doing and asked me one evening about them. I 
tried to explain something about the problems there 
were in getting people to say yes to being filmed. N 
smiled: "Are they so mad they say yes when they mean 
no?" (H.49)
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At 5.11, we have seen that when R first spoke 
of the Flying Cucumber, it was N who then developed 
it by saying that "tonight, instead of MASH and the 
Flying Dutchman, we present the Flying Cucumber.
This woman is in love with the image of a cucumber".
(H.50)
N can use the fact that he can produce incongruities 
and mistakes in P to show off. At 2.3 R says seriously 
he wants mustard with his cereal- Loftily, N replies;
"I prefer my mustard with yoghurt" and laughs. (H.Sl)
By 6.3 N can produce quite sophisticated in­
congruities that reflect a knowledge both of the real 
world and of some very basic realities. Take this 
dialogue:-
N : v4hy don't we get a caib today?
He ; Because cabs cost money.
N ; Why don't we buy money?
I4e : You don't buy money, you earn it.
N % (Laughs) Why don't you use money to
buy money?
I repeat you have to earn to live. N says, with 
a tight grim "You could buy nothing without money". 
Nothing is available for no cash. He laughs at that 
and adds: "Sut nothing wouldn't be vary useful". (H.52)
I have written something of the incongruity where 
a person takes a role that is wrong. We will see later
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that N, at a certain p<&nt, enjoys the idea of
swopping roles. By 6.0, he also has the gemis of enough
social awareness, to laugh at certain social things.
For example at 5.10, Adele and Aileen are at dinner
and put on /^ery upper class English accents as they
talk about their Martinis. N ia completely hysterical
over their voices. He tries to make R laugh by
making funny noises at him like "Wagga wagga". At
these, R laughs. But Aileen and Adele's snooty accents 
make no impression on R. (H.53)
Manners are also a source of amusement. Ob# 
evening, I ask N to get a drink of water (N is 6.3).
He brings it and sits down opposite me. I say: "Thauik 
you". He says I should have said please as I forgot 
to say that when I asked. I should say "Please Thauik 
you". I say: "Please". Ha says: "Thank you". I 
say: "You're welcome". N laughs and adds "I'm pleased 
you#re pleased". (H.54)
THEORETICAL SUMMARY:
There appears to be a development in the kinds 
of incongruity that each child can laugh at and can 
create. The pattern suggests that the first kinds of 
incongruity are to do with the roles that the child 
and those about him play. Games that involve the
1^1
swopping of identities - in which N plays me or in 
which N imitates being a baby - are a constant source 
of amusement. The suggestion that the first incongruity 
a child reacts to should be an incongruity of role - 
Mumny with Dummy, Mummy crawling or brother at the 
typewriter - should, perhaps, not be that surprising. 
Certainly, ity own children had more experience of 
proper social expectations - i.e. adults usually 
walk, babies have dummies - than of concepts that 
were more intellectual. McGhee (1975) tested young 
children with jokes which involved seeing cars upside 
down or dogs carrying cars, jokes which necessarily 
involve experience of dogs aind cars. He assumed that 
3 year olds would find such jokes incongruous. 
Observations of R, certainly, suggest that earlier 
perception of incongruities are more social and less 
abstract.
Having argued that the first incongruities a 
child reacts to are social ones - solely in R's case 
and in terras of tlie Sroufe and Wunsch (1972) - the 
data also suggests that the first incongruities R 
creates are conceptual ones. The flying cucumber 
(8.18) is the first example of that. It would be foolish 
to read too much into one observation but this does 
suggest a potentially interesting - and experimentally 
testable - distinction. Do infants first react to 
social impropriety, to knowing "something is odd"
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without having sufficient social skills to initiate 
such games? Only when N is 3.6 does he have the skill 
or ability to demand to play games in which I act the 
baby and he acts the parents. Before that, adults 
have to start them off.
The pattern by which N and R develop their 
reactions to incongruities and the pattern by which 
they create their own incongruities may actually dif­
fer. Observing incongruities also makes it important 
too.
It is important to distinguish laughter vdian 
expectations are violated from laughter due to denial 
and contradiction which, we shall see, is an important 
form of laughter. It will be argued that when children 
come to meike jokes these are the two basic patterns 
that they have isolated as being funny. This has 
happened by 2.6 in R. And, from the cognitive point 
of view, these are two of the key elements to all 
adult jokes. What is still lacking is the cognitive 
sense and sometimes emotional pleasure in resolution 
as when you work a pun out. And, as will be seen, 
these cognitive patterns will also emerge in far more 
emotionally-laden jokes.
rhymes a n d pu ns (I)
INTRODUCTION
There seems to be a connection between funny
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rhymes and noises. The first seems to corae with 
stringing two rhyming noises together as in "3ooPoo". 
From this, there are roughly three stages. First, 
is the reaction to other people's funny rhyming noises. 
This precedes the age at which the child can put to­
gether his own npises that make him laugh. There 
is than a stage at which there are two kinds of funny 
rhymes. One is the substitution of a single word - 
for exan^les Bes for Kes. The other - often involves 
not just the substitution but also the alteration of 
the sense often by contradicting it.
As with the other things, it is worth starting 
with R. We have already seen R's reaction to noises and 
sounds. Some of these involved the elaboration of 
noises and noises set within the context of a game.
OBSERVATIONS t
At 1.10, I try the first pun on R. R has 
mastered the use of "buy" and "bye". But he doesn't 
seem at all amused by my attempts to muddle them or 
to say: "We're going byebye to buy something". It 
fails lamentably. Again at 1.11, I tr^'' to juxtapose 
very similar sounding words in this case, "feet fit ... 
your feet fit" ... But, again, he seems not to under­
stand the procedure at all. (I.l)
R first begins to produce plays on sounds around
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2.3 and tlie context is lavatorial. At 2.3 R is sing 
in g Happy Birthday one morning auid changes it into 
Happy Aaah* - with a laugh. He does this two days runn­
ing and, on both occasions, elicits both a look of 
shock and laughter from N who says; "He's yelling 
Aaah just like that". N laughs at this - but, it is, 
in fact, quite a while since he was obsessed by 
dirty jokes himself, (1.2)
At 2.3 R is deeply committed to Batman, Superman 
and other super-heroes who are the stuff of his daily 
games. The first time that he uses one of their holy 
names to laugh is at 2.3 when he laughs as he invents 
7iaah-man - a character not usually in the Batman 
family. (1.3)
Also at 2.3, R begins to elaborate. He is sing­
ing Batman Batman as we push him along in his push 
chair. He changes this to Batman Batman and then to 
Fatman Fatiran. As he sings Fatman Fatman, he points 
a finger at me and laughs. <1 not un rotund).
(1.4)
By 2.5, R enjoys a mixture of rhymes in «hich 
real cmd nonsense words are mixed. R laughs hysteri­
cally as Aileen who is lying by him says: "Piggy Wiggy 
Siggy Ziggy". The next day, R is lying on the bed by
His grunt noise on forcing a bowel movement,
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me. He is trying to get my attention and says some­
thing I don’t understand. He adds: "Gak*. Ho smiles. 
Then, he says: "Gok**. And laughs. To test Aileen’s 
idea, I say "Gock Sock". R laughs hugely. Then I 
say "Sick Gick". R laughs enormously acrain. R then 
says: "Piggy" which I take to be a request to repeat 
the Piggy Wiggy sequence. I do so. R laughs a great 
deal. Then, abruptly, he sayss "Go away". There is 
no obvious reason for this. (1.5)
Also at 2.5, R begins to enjoy these kinds of 
ela)>oration. One evening I say to him CATWOMAN and 
we go through a whole list of animals who have WOMAN 
added. He does not laugh till about the sixth 
"animal-Man-Woman"* who is RABBITWOMAN. At this, he 
laughs. (1.6)
At 2.6, R repeats twice N*s joke about "What did the 
rake say to the Koe? Hi-hoe". N got the joke from 
a baby-sitter. R repeats it aft^r N tells it twice. 
(1.7)
At the same age, R has been influenced by N to 
listen to the records. He has become especially fond 
of Abba’s hit, "Money, ^k)ney, Money, It’s a Rich Man’s 
World". He gives a rendering of this and then changes 
it to, "HoneyÎ* Honey! Honey! It’s a Rich Man’s World".
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He laughs at this - as does his friend Joim who is 
exactly the same age as him. R knows Winnie-the-Pooh 
wall and is aware of the letter’s craving for honey.
(1.8)
There is then about a month in which R produces 
almost none of these linguistic manipulations. Then 
at 2.6, ne bursts into three different rhymes in one 
day, apart from repetitions of the Batman/Fatman 
theme. First, he tells me with a laugh tiiat I am an 
Inga-Onga. I am sure the words mean something quite 
definite to him. But when he laughs I tell him I don’t 
understand. Later that day, he is hiding inside Aileen’s 
anorak and, occasionally, his head peeps out. He does 
not laugh each time his head peeps out. Sometimes, 
he says "Boo". At one point, Aileen says it will be 
soon time to have a bath. R says he doesn’t want a 
shampoo. A minute or so later, he says "Shampoo-Boo". 
(1.9 See Peek-abo)
"Eue Fuc" - he finds hilaricaaly funny. He 
repeats it at least three times. (I.10)
At 2.5, R still elaborates on the Aaah-man theme.
For he now sings Aaah-man Aaah-man, Dummy-man, Duromy- 
man and Hatroan. He laughs continuously as he produces 
these variations on Batman. (I.11)
N did not, of course, have the advantage of playing
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with an older brother. When I began to observe him, 
he was past the point of tliese first original "funny" 
rhymes.
At 3.10, I try to teach him about puns. We 
were reading a book about rivers and I made up "The 
ships go up to the "frocks" instead of "docks". N 
does not laugh at all though I was not sure he knew 
what frocks were. I then add that; "The brains unload 
tiie cargo". I get no response till I explain that it 
is cranes, not brains, tliat do the unloading. Then 
N does laugh. (1.12)
He has his revenge tlie next day when we read a 
book about RAIN. K© are looking at a picture in which 
a hat keeps someone dry. N says: "The cat keeps ine 
dry". I say I "No". N adds: "Do you laugh when I 
say that the cat keeps me dry. la it f u n n y (1.13)
INTEPPRETATIVE:
8e 33&m8 to ha'os applied the p'ûi .ciiple he learmt 
yesterday - to my disadvantage.
But this is a rather isolated example at 3,10.
It is just after 4.6 that, with N, there comes to my notes 
many rhyres and puns.
The first nota I have of rhyming is at 3.6. N 
is drawing. I ask him if he likes scribbles and bibbles
.88
which seem to be what he is drawing. He replies - 
but there is no note of a laugh - after a minute:
"I don't like scribbles and bibbles and kibbles and 
timmels. Go to bed, timmels". (1.14)
It is around 4.7 that N begins to pour out a 
veritable stream of rhymes and would be puns.
At 4.8, N who has seen plenty of Egyptian mummies 
in the Richard Scarry books has the following dia­
logue with Aileen:
N ; You're my favourite mummy.
A : Thanks but I'm your only mummy.
N : No, I meant you're my favourite
mummies in a case.
A : What's that.
N : It's a joke. (1.15^ * see also K.8)
A few days later, N is singing London Bridge is 
Falling Down. But, after a few repetitions of this,
he changes "bridge" so that the song becomes "London
Ham" is Falling Down and then "London Pig" is Falling 
Down. (1.16)
At 4.9, N can produce reasonably incongruous 
plays on words. We see a bus. N has learned that 
L. T. is London Transport. N has a little laugh and 
says "London Transpit!" I tell him to eat up the 
last piece of meat. He says with a laugh: "Will you 
eat the glass piece of meat?" (1.17)
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Often, this obsessive rhyming and substitution - 
which are two quite distinct phenomena - are part of 
being naughty. N seems to know that this will annoy 
roe and his nK)ther. A good example at 4.11, is when 
I tell N to do something "right now". "White now", 
he giggles - and, of course, annoys me even more.
With it, there can come a mania for repetition. N at 
4.8. I am lifting R out of his high chair. Mes "I'm 
getting you out of your chair". N sings and substitutes 
Bang for chair four times. A pause than N laughs.
Often, there are pauses before the laugh. (1.18)
INTERPRETATIVE:
It aeema to me that the pause ia to oheok both that 
the 0oke ia funny and that it will annoy you.
At 5.0 N ia still very much into these rhyming 
and punning games. One weekend, he even calls Sunday 
Punday - and laughs, though of course, he doesn't 
realise that he has mauiagad to make a pun on a pun.
With punning goes tricking. He has one rhyme that he 
loves which goes : "I tricked you/I bricked you". (1.19)
He often also laughs as he repeats a rhyme that 
he has made up which goes* "A dog went for a jog in 
the fog". I ask N what he finds funny in that. He 
says it sounds funny and it's not what you expect it 
to be - i.e. dogs don't go for jogs in fogs. (1.20)
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The collection of sounds that are meant to be 
funny doesn't always work. Dr. Seuss* Sleep Book 
aims at, at least, a laugh a page. Only two names get 
a laugh - The Hinkle Horn Honking Club and Hoop Soup 
Snoop Group. Shorter collections like the Herk 
Heimers don't elicit laughter though I try hard to 
make them sound funny.
In the next week, N continues to make up these 
rhymes. Walking down the street he laughs and he 
makes bus go with pus and letterbox go with Letter­
box. The rhymes do not always make him laugh. (1.21)
Two months later at 5.3, N is still very much into
rhymes. In the kitchen, N says: ®I just want a drink
of bilk”, which is milk. Ha then goes through every 
possible rhyme for milk like kilk, dilk or silk.
When he hits a real word like silk - whose meaming he 
knows - it does not seem to lead to any greater 
laughter. (1.22)
At 5.3, we get London Bridge becoming London ham 
again. N begins to alter the lyrics of songs that he 
has heard. He now applies the simple principle of 
contradiction in order to make up something funny.
So, he retains the rhyme of the original lyric - and
the rhyme is part of the pleasure he gets out of this -
but he butchers the sense. Snow White is the first 
victim. Ha tells me he made up two funny things.
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One is a rhyme that aptly mocks? for the song
wishing" he says "I'm washing". The second 
is to substitute for "Someday my Prince will come".,.
"Some day my dinner will come". He does not laugh 
as he recalls these two bon mots. Sometimes, N can 
produce a pun he doesn't realise. N listens to 
Aileen and I talk of Pentecost and what it means.
"Rent a Ghost", N says, but he is not sure whether to 
laugh. (1.23)
By 5.5 when N is still very much into these 
rhymes - producing Yes, Beg, Kes - he also begins to 
play a language gan^ in which he has a language all 
of his own. When he mpeaks this language it sounds 
very much like nonsense with a French accent - and a 
few real words of French that N knows. But he resists 
any suggestion that it is French or anything like 
French. "It is my own language", he insists.^;£2^5j^
By 6.0, N often enjoys putting on a French accent. (1.2 4) 
INTERPRETATIVE:
Perhape the rhyming ie a way of affirming mastery of 
the language by using distortion although R was pre-
V
duoing distortions of the language long before he was 
a master of it.
By 5.5, too, N is capable of seizing on the 
oddest things as an opportunity for making puns. We 
are talking about returning from Turkey and N is explain­
ing he didn't like Turkish milk. He wants a drink of
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English milk and says : “Nœ / I'm drinking Turkey” - 
he's aware of the play on words and laughs. (1.25)
We are at the railway station. N reads off 
Plumstead which becomes Purostead. He reads off 
Preston Road which becomes Present Road. The puns 
are a little more accurate. We have Adele staying 
with us and she talks of her boyfriend. N says: "Boy­
friend ... Toyfriend ..." and laughs. (I.25a)
By 5.7, N is still happily making puns. We watch 
MASH one evening. The next day he tells roe "You 
like watching MASHED potatoes". (1.26)
At the same age, N begins to judge adult puns with
a certain severity, or perhaps, to have an inkling of 
when adult jokes fail miserably. We are at lunch and
N says I laid the table for 6. Why, when there are
only five of us. I can't now remember the reason. I
then say that it's because Mr. Winebottle is there and
Aileen says it's because Mr. Candle may be coining.
After a while, I say: "It was a joke". N, after a
pause, responds: "I don't think it was very funny".
I say: "You may have a point there". N excitedly makes
y
a rocket shape in the air with his hands. He says:
"You mean a very sharp point". And he laughs. (1.27)
N can bring these word plays into situations 
in which he has been hurt physically at least. At 5.8 
he bangs his toe and wails. After a while he grins 
that it is not too bad. He adds, with a laugh, that it
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was: "a banger sausage. That's something we say 
at school". (1.28 ses also P. 6)
At 5.9, N can also separate words Into their 
abstract constituents. He looks at the written word 
"What" and says it looks like W and HAT and he laughs. 
(1.29)
N continues to use his language sense both to be 
naughty and also to express his superiority over R and 
the fact that he can understand R. We are at ny 
mother's and N takes great delight in telling her what 
R's words are and mean. He smirks as he ^explains 
that Mik means Milk for example. With a low laugh,
N tells his grandmother: "I know his language". (1.30)
Another pun :
N : "I'm not going to put on my
news/shoes". (1.31)
At 5.9, too, N sees me reading the Sunday paper.
We have a friend called Diana Page. He laughs* "You're 
rea ding the Diana Pages". (1.32)
Quite often, now, N hears jokes on television amd 
repeats them.
N starts at 5.10 to make up lyrics to improve Cat 
Stevens' songs. Most of the lyric changes are sinç»le 
opposition so: I have to go becomes I have to stay and
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a song called It's Saturday Night becomes It's Sunday 
Night. (1.33)
For about five weeks, this becomes something of 
a mania. N also produces his own rhymes which make 
him laugh like:
yty name is Jack/I'm going to have a crack/
And am coining back/To give you a smack. (1.34)
At 6.0, N is still very likely to come out with 
one of these. At breakfast one day he says: “I don't 
want toast, I want boast". (1.35)
N can make puns in order to express naughtiness or 
hostility. At 6.1, I tell R that he is a drag. N 
says: "Then why don't you drag him along" and laughs.
N can also involve parents. At breakfast, N says:
"A mummy ache is much worse than a tummy ache". (1.36)
Again at 6.3, we compliment N on being mature and 
not whining. I add that whining is horrible. "But", 
laughs N, "not red whining”. Because red w(h)ine is 
nice. (1,37)
THEORETICAL SUMMARY:
The emphasis children put on rhyming from 2.0 
onwards in Rh case seems to fulfil a number of functions. 
It offers R a way of testing out and mastering botli 
his linguistic and phonetic skills. Secondly, the 
pleasure that adults continue to get in well-turned
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rhymes in poetry and, even, musicals, suggests that 
there continues to be pleasure in both hearing and 
producing rhymes. Only two year olds don't have the 
discrimination of musical audiences or readers of 
heroic couplets. Freud would probatSiy talk in terms 
of pleasure from linguistic economy. Since we know 
that adults have mastered the language, one cannot put 
down their pleasure in rhymes to pleasure in mastering 
soxnetiiing. 3ut children obviously derive pleasure both 
from (i) the act of rhyming itself and (ii) the chance 
it gives them to expand their feel of the language.
But this analysis leaves out two other factors 
evident in both N and R. Rhyires often involve the 
simple cognitive trick of contradiction - I'm washing 
for I'm wishing - and they also come into the children's 
naughtiness. If the child in rhyming is testing out his 
mastery of the language, it sounds plausible at least 
to suggest that he is also using rhyming to test out 
his strength in the relationship with his parents. This 
does sound a little glib but the connexion between 
rhyming and naughtiness in N, certainly, seems very 
marked. ^
CONTRADICTIONS (J)
INTRODUCTION :
Wa have seen that much of what passed as incongruity
1>6
depends on denial, on the child contradicting a 
situation, an event or a person. These contradictions 
are not logical contradictions but personal ones.
They seem to stem at first from just saying NO - 
usually when being asked to do something by a parent 
or when Aileen and I asked something which was just 
"No-ed". Again, the pattern seems to be that this 
first emerges in relation to a person rather than a 
thing.
OBSERVATIONS :
Often this contradiction is associated with being 
nau^ty. At 1.4 R is drinking water out of my bath 
in a yellow boat. I say "No". He laughs - and it 
seems a naughty laugh. R enjoys it. R bangs the 
coffee table up and down while I say "No". R enjoys 
each NO. He continues to bang the table and, also, 
he laughs. At 1.7, R takes a drink of someone's 
Tizer and I tell him; "It's not yours". That makes 
him laugh. (J.l see also N.2)
At this stage R can react to a NO that comes 
from me. He is not capable, however, at originating 
his own contradictions. (J.3)
By 2,2, however, R can laugh as he contradicts. 
Aileen tells R not to be silly. He laughs and says 
"I'm not silly." His laugh conveys a certain defiance
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and, in the next month, this kind of laughter is 
quite frequent. A week later, R stands up on the 
table and smiles as he says; "I'm not silly". (J.3)
By 2.3 R continues to assert himself. Aileen is 
telling him nicely he was wrong about something. R 
says: "I'm not wrong" and laughs. This contradiction 
seams not to involve any naughtiness. At 2.4, R again 
asserts himself by contradiction. R comes into our 
bed and, for some reason, Aileen tells him that he 
is something like a machine. R smiles: "I am not". 
(J.4)
Again by 2.5, R can Incorporate this laugh at 
the saying of "No" into wider games. He and N are 
playing at being each other's mummies - a game of 
which more later. N refuses to say something R asks 
him to say. Each time that N says NO, they both 
laugh. (J.5)
There are between 2.5 and 2.6, many dialogues 
that centre on contradictions. We discuss something:
Me : yes, it is.
R s No, it isn't. (He laughs)
Me : Yes, it is.
R : No, it isn't. (He laughs)
A week later an almost identical dialogue teJces place. 
(J.6)
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By the time I began to observe N, he was quite 
used to contradicting. At 3.7, we play with a ferry 
boat. It turns into a war game. N has a pencil which 
he tries to stick into the funnel. I act the voice of 
the boat and say "No" and try to wriggle the boat by 
turning it away. On each "No" - and these are straight­
forward No's - N laughs. (J.7)
At 4.8, N can use contradiction to get away with
brattiness. I tell N to have some blackcurrant drink
as it's full of Vitamin C. He wants freezing milk. N: 
"It's not full of Vitamin C but of Vitamin K (N laughs). 
It's not full of Vitamin C (N laughs). It's full of 
Vitauain G". Notice how phonetically closer to C -
Me : It's full of Vitamin P
N : Laughs (J.8)
THEORETICAL SUMMARY;
Observations outlined in this section suggest that 
contradicting - amd especially contradicting a paxrent - 
is often an occasion for laughter. This involves botli 
the child asserting himself and, arguably, a certain 
incongruity. Section ^ examines observations of
laughter when the child is being naughty and, par­
ticularly, the social tactic by which the child seems to 
learn that he may well get away with naughtiness if he 
laughs or, better yet, produces a lau^. The observations 
in this section also suggest, perhaps, that it is not so 
easy to disentangle the cognitive and emotional aspects
of laughing at contradictions.
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JOKES (K)
INTRODUCTION :
In looking at incongruity and rhymes and puns, 
we Si - the beginnings of the sort of playing that is 
essential to the development of laughter. The child 
has to learn skills of these kinds of games before he 
can create his own jokes.
Most research has concentrated on giving jokes 
to children and seeing how they will respond. It has 
been argued that it is only after seven that the child 
can appreciate certain jokes. My own observations 
incline me to argue that, from a much earlier age, 
children can take in conplex jokes and laugh and under­
stand them. But, secondly, that there is an intriguing 
and formal process - by which a child learns to make
jokes. The foundations for this have been laid in (i)
perceiving incongruities and (ii) creating his own 
incongruities and (iii) elaborating these and, also, 
tile similar process with rhymes and puns. In looking 
at rhymes and puns, we saw that sinple substitution of 
opposites - for "I'm leaving”, N says "I'm staying".
The earliest jokes veem to involve contradiction which 
begins usually in a personal context in which the child 
asserts himself well before 2 (in R). So the elements
crucial for making a joke are already present.
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It seems worthwhile to tease out the formal, 
cognitive structures that a child has to master to 
make a joke - and attempt to distinguish these from the 
content of jokes. Often tlie jokes tiiat a cilld makes 
involve aggressive and obscene ideas. But round 4.6 
these begin to be structured and the child is conscious 
of a joke as something he is trying to make or form he 
is trying to achieve and which he wants approved. It 
is a learning process in which the child tests what is 
a joke both by testing certain cognitive structures and 
by seeking adult approval. The child often pauses 
after having cracked a joke, waits to see if there is 
a laugh amd asks: "Was that a good joke?” The repe­
tition of punchlines I have pointed out could well be 
a part of this process. The child has to expect the 
punchline to get the structure of the sort of thing 
that makes up the punchline of a joke well into his 
head.
OBSERVATIONS ;
At 2.5 R produces what appear to be his first 
deliberate jokes. He says: "I'm going to tall you a 
joke. CATMAN". He laughs and comes round tlie side 
of the bed. It's an interesting joke because CATWOMAN 
is a character in BATMAN - i.e. it is a joke based on 
opposition. CATMAN is an opposite of CATWOMAN. (K.l)
At 3.7, the idea of a joke in itself exists for 
N. He laughs as he tells me: "I a  baby lion. I'm 
a lion making jokes". But it goes no further. (K.2)
N is perfectly capable of creating funny sit­
uations based on elaborate incongruities that involve 
both aggression and obscenity.
Here are two examples from N at 3.7.
N : We can put our feet in the potty.
(Laughs). We can put mud on our feet.
(Laughs). We can put lamps on our
tummies (laughs) and have breakfast in 
the sink. (Laughs).
A t And have lunch in the bath tub.
N 5 And have lunch in the potty (laughs).
And have our feet in the potty (laughs). 
And break down our home (laughs). And 
break down our sink (laughs). (K.3)
INTERPRETATIVE:
B aan produce not just strings of incongruities that
could have made a silent movie but also sequences of
disgusting food and unlikely food. The notion of the 
joke, however^ is still missing and B makes no attempt 
to create fokee as adults understand them.
At 4.4, N is capable of making a nasty crack using 
exaggeration. We are eating and R ia eating a lot.
N remarks: "R is eating so much he could eat a wall".
And N laughs. (K.4)
At 4.7, N begins to memorise and repeat jokes that 
he has heard on T.V. These jokes now make up an impor­
tant part of the learning process. N says he liked 
this joke on T.V. "Why do people wear glasses in 
their sleep? So that they can recognise people they 
see in their dreams". N declares this to be funny.
(K.5)
At 4.7, the idea of telling a joke comes upon N.
His first jokes depend on contradiction and exaggeration.
The first one is as follows: N says % “Stephen went out
for a walk - but he didn't. That's a joke". He is a
little disappointed by the fact that I don’t laugh very
much. We shall see that these kinds of jokes pro­
liferate. (K.6)
The next day, I offer N fish fingers for dinner 
and ask him if he wants one or two. Ns "One, I think”.
Me: "O.k.” "One or ten". Me: "Ten”. N; "Ten is
a joke. Thirty nine fish fingers would be a joke".
He laughs, well aware of the exaggeration. (K.7 ge@ also H.38)
Neither of these are, in any sense, acceptable 
"adult" jokes. At 4.8 - and when he is dealing with 
conVOluting a relationship - N produces a better joke
2^3
which is really a pun. This is in which he tells 
Aileen she is his favourite mummies-in-a-case.
(K.8 sea also 1.15)
N continues this month to experiment with 
denial as the basis of the joke. The following dia­
logue is also at 4.8.
N 2 Do you want to hear a joke? R had
a banana to eat. (Pause) That's
funny.
Me s Why?
N : Because he didn't. (K.9)
He is also beginning to toy with the idea that 
a confusion of identities is funny. The next day, 
he says: "BBC is a programme. Isn't that a joke?”
(K. 10)
Two weeks later, N experiments with a joke that 
is incongruous but, again, there is lack of the punch­
line, of any resolution acceptable in adult terms. At 
breakfast, N says he is going to tell a joke. "What
would happen if R went to see a pop star naked?" He
■/
then waits for a laugh. I add that that isn't a joke 
and ask what would happen if R went to see a pop star 
naked. But instead of attempting a punchline (of any 
sort) N insists on the initial incongruity and per- 
servares. He asks: "No what would happen if R went to 
see a pop star and got on stage naked?" (K.ll)
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INTERPRETATIVE:
N repeats the initial incongruity hut does not seem 
to have any other strategy for making the vision of 
the naked R into a joke. He does not seem to realise 
that merely repeating the image will not make a joke 
of it. Oddly^ however^ a cartoonist might he able to 
take the image of the baby and pop star and turn it 
into a good visual joke. Verballyit doesn^t work. 
But N cannot yet do anything but repeat that first 
incongruity he produced,
OBSERVATIONS :
Two weeks later, a similar unresolved joke that 
makes fun of R, too, appears. N says: "Listen to 
this joke ... R was sitting up on a motor cycle".
This pattern of joke slightly predates N's mania for 
altering lyrics on records. (K.12)
INTERPRETATIVE:
With observation K, 22, the motor cycle, there is not 
even an attempt of the resolution. Examining such 
early attempts^ to make jokes does suggest that the 
child has to learn the structure of a joke. But it 
is a diffuse learning, N does not seem to go through 
a clear-cut learning stage in which he grows out of 
one kind of joke and into another. His mania for 
altering lyrics on records co-exists with enjoying 
other forms of laughter.
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OBSERVATIONSi
By 5.6, N can explain certain jokes though he 
does not find them funny. I repeat to N the joke which 
has been elevated to such a pride of place in 
humour research by McGhee. The joke is that a man 
orders a cake and the girl in the cake shop asks him 
whether he wants it cut into four or six pieces. The 
man replies that he wants the cake cut in four; he
couldn't possibly consume six pieces. N is, at first,
bemused by the joke. But when Aileen to explain
it to him, he says before anyone tells him that four, or
six pieces, would be the same. But he does not find 
this funny. (K.13)
Also at 5.6, I try the moron joke about the 
serial or cereal on N. He laughs but, contra 
Wolfenstein, I see no evidence of jokes about this 
moron appearing or that there is a sudden abundamce 
of riddles. There are soire but not a flood. (K.14)
At 5.8, N is confident enough to declare other 
people's jokes to be bad. We have already seen that 
he found little that was funny in the Mr. Winebottle 
or Mr. candle episode. A friend of ours, Doug, tells 
N a joke riddle:
Doug ; Is the half moon or the full ntoon
lighter?
N j The half moon.
Doug : No, the full moon is lighter.
N : I know what you mean - you mean lighter
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like that.
N then points to a light and adds that it is not 
a very good joke. (K.15)
By 5.9 N can make appropriate "cracks" based on 
social observation. We are trapped in the rain close 
to Buckingham Palace and try desperately to hail a 
cab. H says: "Why don't we get a horse from Bucking- 
haun Palace?" No one laughs at this and, after a 
longish pause, N complains: "You hurt my feelings.
You didn't laugh at ny joke". Round 5.9, he begins 
again to be interested in jokes. This time, his interest 
consists a lot of repeating jokes that he has heard 
on television or found inscribed on ice lolly sticks. 
(K.16)
At 5.9, N has also been learning jokes from 
Helen next door. N laughs at the following:
N; "What time is it when you go to tlie dentist?"
Aileen shrugs. N: "Two thirty. Tooth hurty". He 
repeats this and clearly thinks us stupid for not get­
ting it. He now repeats the joke so that we can make 
out more clearly "tooth hurty" - and N laughs. Two 
months later, N asks me the joke again. (K.17)
At 5.10, N can make nice physical jokes. As 
Aileen and I lie in bed, N says : "I^ve come to give 
you a hand." And he sticks his hand out for the 
taking, N laughs and says: "It's ray kind of joke.
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(A pause) Was it a good joke?". (K.18)
By 6.0 N is both capable of producing jokes as 
simple as he was at 4.6, and also, of expanding them. 
One day at 5.11, I recorded the following dialogues.
The first was in the afternoon after N had been to see 
a Donald Duck film.
lëe : Did you enjoy that film?
N : What film? (He laughs)
There is a pause after which he laughs again 
and says:
"They threw Goofy out of the window". (K.19)
These are jokes that are, still, perfectly simple 
and young. N is also still into his most basic changes 
of lyric.
That same day, N and I are passing a shop that is 
called Portwin's Last Stand. N laughs and says that 
the shop is really called Portwin's First Stand. He 
adds that this is a "double joke" as Portwin's Last 
Stand was itself meant as a joke. (K.20)
INTERPRETATIVE:
It eesms to me that that exchange has in it the seeds 
of much intellectual humour including the ability to 
be detached. It is this ability to mix such a level of 
jokes that is intriguing for we do not soa a shedding 
of earlier kinds of humour as N ia able to grasp more 
sophisticated ones, Ue can laugh both at the trendy
Ï08
Bophistry of Vortwin*8 Last Stand and at simply 
throwing Goofy out of the window.
The performance of jokes also matters to N.
And he seems to perform these jokes in order to get 
them right. At 6.2, one morning and evening, N 
insists on going through a number of jokes. These 
include ;
N t What kind of a pie flies? A magpie.
N 2 What did the high chair sa^ to the low
chair? Hi - chair.
N ; What kind of a tree is like a hand?
The first two jokes fox me. But I know the third 
one and am about to reply. N gets in quickly be^Sro 
I can with the answer "A palm tree". Ha laughs even 
more as he explains that he got in ao quickly because 
he was afraid that I might get it. It matters that 
he should deliver the punchline. (K.21)
THEORETICAL SUMMARY:
Over the next weeks, we have a number of other very 
artificial jokes and joke riddles that N repeats. They 
come from school or from T.V. He is very obsessed with 
them at tii^ ies. Wolfenstein speaks of the obsession 
with such riddles - and much in the literature stresses 
it too. But with N, it seems to be something that he 
passes til rough quickly though he does repeat again the 
High Chair joke. At 6.4, riddles are quite rare.
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The evidence from the children's early attempts-f 
to make jokes seems to be tending in a number of directions 
First, it is clear that children like to make jokes 
and begin to produce a lot of "Joke" material from the 
age of 4.6 in N's case. R has produced so far two 
jokes - both recorded. Both are imitations. The 
CATI4AN jokes must come from my telling him about all 
the Animal-Woman hybrids like RA3BIT-W0MAN : the Rake/Hoe 
joke is a direct repetition of N's joke. The joke 
material that N produces appears to suggest that by
4.6, the main cognitive form of jokes has already been 
established. In order to have a\-$0#e, you need either 
to produce something incongruous or something that is 
a denial or contradiction. è!any adult jokes are based 
on contradictions but, usually, they are more subtle.
N has mastered the concept but is far from mastering 
the execution of it in jokes like what if R drove a 
motor cycle. Also missing at this stage is any ability 
on N's part to produce resolutions to jokes. At 4.8 
in the Dr. K run chew joke, there is good evidence that 
he fails to get resolutions? by 5.5 with the W. C. Fields 
pineapple juice joke, he certainly can grasp a resolution 
but he is still unable to producs one.
The evidence also suggests that even tendentious 
jokes are set early with distortions not unlike incon­
gruity. Singing Happy Aaah is, after all, incongruous 
in two ways - both in terms of the happiness of excrement 
and as a distortion of Happy Birthday. Finally, the
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evidence here suggests that children do learn to make 
jokes, do play around with the basic structures jokes 
require by playing around with contradictions such as 
K.20, the Portwin’s First Stand joke. N and R also 
appear to seek approval for their jokes and largely, 
for the reason of checking whether what has been pro­
duced fits the category of a good joke. N asks if it is 
a good joke (K.18) , complains at getting a poor response 
(K.16) and actually queries whether tha t really is a 
joke  IK.10). These are only some examples.
Telling a joke well is recognised by T4 as a 
performance it is worth succeeding at (K.21). He absorbs 
new jokes from television and ra-tells them and wants, 
it seems, to get his performance right. 3y 5.0, he 
seems to realise that there are advantages to being 
able to tell a joke. People laugh? people give attention 
and there is that problematic product, fun.
OBSCBNE JOKES (L)
INTRODUCTION j
The classical Freudian view is that children begin 
to develop obscene jokes at the time when there is 
something naughty in the idea of peeing and shit. As 
tiia child begins to be toilet trained, he realises that 
it is forbidden to indulge in excrement. It causes
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tension. So the child finds that the very saying 
of the forbidden words makes him laugh because they 
allow repressed energy to escape. Such is tlie force 
of the repression and such is the lack of cognitive 
complexity in the child that he needs to do no more 
than yell "Poo poo" or "Wee wee" to fall about laughing. 
A less Freudian view would be that, as the child is 
mastering these toilet skills, he laughs more at them.
The evidence from R is more complex. He was very 
easily toilet trained and produced few cf his own 
dirty jokes until he was 2 by which time he was very 
rarely wet even at night. The dirty jokes that he 
produced, however, alrea dy had a certain veneer of 
distortion. While R was being trained, however,
N did produce a certain airount of toilet jokes but N 
was by then extremely well trained himself.
OBSERVATIONS ;
At 13 months, we are at Vincent Court. R is 
naked and giggling. In the next six months, R is 
exposed to a good deal of obscene jokes as N is pro­
foundly into lavatorial humour. This does not have 
any effact on R even though we begin to toilet train 
him. (L. 1)
At 19 months, R say a he needs to pee. I get 
his potty. R has boots on and, because of the boots,
I don’t get his trousers down far enough so he pees
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out of the potty. N laughs and begins to abandon 
his dinner because he is so amused. R picks up the 
potty. N laughs again. R so far is not laughing 
though nor is he upset. R begins to put his feet in 
the puddle of pee and N encourages him by saying 
"Draw in it". R does so which, again, makes N 
laugh. (L.2 see also M.7)
Also at 1.11, R laughs at himself being messy.
He is not usually messy. A number of times he dipped 
his hands in the yoghurt amd yelled "Uggie" - his word 
for nasty. He did this six or seven times. But he 
took very little time to climb down from this excite­
ment and complain that his hands were Uggie. (L.3)
The first instance of R making a dirty jokec is 
at 2.0 when he lies on the living room floor and pees 
upwards and laughs. By this time, it is very rare 
for R to wet himself. (1.4)
INTERPRETATIVE:
During this period of being to it et-trained, R does 
not produce much obscene laughter. From 18 months 
to 24 months, R often doins in N*s ^'obscene" laughter 
but he does not either initiate it or laugh at 
obscenities without N, He follows N^s laughter, 
Mdreover, it is far from clear that when R laughs 
with N on these occasions that he does so because 
he finds the lavatory humour funny. It may be much 
more that he does not want to be left out.
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By 2. Z, however, H is beginning to produce his own 
dirty Jokes, Interestingly, these are structured 
on cognitive jokes. Contrary to the Freudian idea 
that the child is content to simply say the forbidden 
w ords, R already incorporates them into something 
absurd. It is not an adult dirty joke but, still, 
he distorts it into something that is recognieahly 
more than simply uttering the forbidden words.
At 2.3, R is singing "Happy Birthday” for no par­
ticular reason except perhaps that it was his mother's 
birthday a few days back. He suddenly changes the 
lyric from "Happy Birthday" to "Happy Aaah". He 
laughs as he does it. He repeats the same exercise 
on tha next day. N who has by now finished this 
phase laughs and says, his face a study in hypo­
critical shock: "He*3 yelling it like th&t!” Then 
N also laughs. (1.5)
A month later, at 2.4, as R is deeply into 
BATMAN, he creates a new character who is called 
"Aaali-Man". Aaah-Man makes him laugh. In the next 
montlis, Aaah-Man often reappears. At 2 .6 R is still 
quite often singing Aaah-Man. His singing of it some­
times comes out of the games in which he acts the part 
of BATZ‘!AN or S0PERI4A>?. (1.6)
Also at 2.6, R begins to initiate gammés that are 
based on obscenity humour and to involve N in them.
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One evening, R plays a game in which he drops Aaahs all 
over the living room floor. It lasts a long time and 
n follows him, laughing as well each time that he 
drops his own Aaah. (L.7)
At 2.6, R can also incorporate a dirty element 
into a game without becoming so taken by it that it 
dominates the game. It is bath time. R is outside 
the bath and he pretends that he can see a nan in
the bath, "Him a Dada", R laughs. "I see a man ...
a Nanny Man". R laughs. (Nanny is hie name for N).
R goes on "I see a man” (he laughs). "I saw a man 
in the potty". R peers Into the potty which is at 
the side of the bath. He laughs. (L.8)
I say s You saw a man in the potty?
R says : I did.
He waves at the imagined creature in the potty and 
laughs. But then R goes cm to hit the water in the 
bath and laugh at the splashing. (L.9)
INTERPRETATIVE:
We thus Bee with R that his own creation of '^ dirty'* 
joked ie later than the actual toilet training and 
that, already, there is a mixture of cognitive and 
emotional elements, lust saying ”Aaah” does not make 
him laugh though he does sometimes say that he needs 
his potty and then laughs saying that he doesn't,
Put, in itself, the word is usually functional and 
serious. To make it funny, some distortion or elaboration 
is needed usually,
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By the time I began to observe N, dirty jokes 
were already well fixed in his repertoire of jokes.
We have already seen that at 3.6 N could begin 
with a dirty idea like can put our feet in the 
potty" and elaborate it both in unobscene ways "We 
can put lampe on our tummies" and also towards aggres­
sion for, in the end, N laughs as he says: "We can 
break down our home". (See K.3)
Disgusting meals at this time particularly am#%8# 
N - in Greece he has a lot of sand to play with which 
he makes into repulsive foods.
One evening at 3.6, N says: "I have a mosquito 
bite on my bottom" and laughed. (L. 10)
At 3.7, N finds nakedness funny. N laughs 
hilariously. I ask: "What's so funny?" Ns "You've 
got no trousers on". He is right. (1.11)
From. 3.7 to 4.8, N produces rather few dirty 
jokes. But R seems to provoke new experiments in 
obscenity humour. R's nakedness amuses N. We have 
alrea dy discussed N's "joke": If R went to see a
pop star naked". (See K.ll) The next "dirty" joke 
recorded, is also at 4.8 as N laughs when R loses his
pyjama pants and his nappy.
N also finds my anatomy funny. N and I are in
the bath together (N is 4.11) having a bubble bath.
Re turns round and tells me that he doesn't want to
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sit touching my penia and balls. Then he grins and 
says: "Why don't you put your penis and balls round 
your neck?" He laughs. (L.12)
At 4.11, bottonis are still very funny. It is 
cold and N sits on the opened out oven door. I say to 
him "Aren't you toasting your bottom?" N stands up 
and laughs; "Yum yum toasted bottom". He picks at 
his bottom and offers us, with a laugh, "a slice of 
bottom". Earlier this week Ailean said that the vary 
mention of the word "bottom” made N laugh wildly. (L. 13)
At 4.11, R's antics continue to amuse N. It 
also offers a chance for N to "regress". We are at 
my mother's, Doug is there also. H has decided to 
"fight" Doug. Each time U makes a pretend hit, he 
laughs. He also iaugns when Doug "hits" him. R 
is naked and giggling. N asks if ne can take his 
trousers off. He strips naked and giggles as he does 
30. But he does not want to stay naked too long for 
he put on a jacket which turns him into, he says.
Batman. (1414)
At roughly 5.0, we go to visit a friend of ours 
whose boy N is very close to. Michael is nearly 4% 
and he wears diapers when he goes to bed. K is con­
vulsed with laughter and says that Michael wearing a 
Rappy must be a joke. This incident had an immediate 
effect on Michael. According to his parents, Michael
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never needed to wear a nappy again. Being mocked by 
his peer succeeded where all parental blandishments 
had failed. (L.15)
At 5.2, N and I are reading an ABC book. We 
reach the entry for P. Tha book says the following 
words that start with P - policeman? painting? pink? 
pyjamas. N laughs and says he is doing pee pee on 
himself. A long burst of laughter. (L.16)
I also make N laugh when I do my exercises. N 
watches me do my leg ups and laughs: "Your penis is 
doing the exercise too". (L.17)
R continues to provide N (5.4) with occasions for 
laughing. R is sitting on his potty, saying "Buff" 
and flying a little piece of silver paper around. N 
laughs and goes on about how funny it is that R is 
"doing pooh pooh and flying around in his buff". (L.18)
N continues at 5.4 to be into this sort of humour.
I ring him from the office and he can hardly contain 
his laughter as he says that he is watching cricket and 
"pooh pooh is bowling to wee wee". That evening when 
I have a bath, N comes in and laughs as he says: "You're 
in the pooh pooh". (L.19)
INTERVnETATIVE:
N can encourage R to be a meee by telling him to draw 
in the pee pee. But thia stage aeems to lessen between 
^,0 and 6,0 perhaps because R is by now much more toilet
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trained, N is still quite capable of creating dirty 
jokes but they become rarer. Be finds them, it would 
seem, less necessary to his well-being.
At 6.0, however, N sees a spot of wet on my 
filthy blue jeans and laughs: “I peed on you'^. “No",
I say. N insists he did. "I peed on you mistakenly".
He adds a sly laugh. He then picks up a piece of blue 
paper and puts that on R*s head. "That blue spot is 
where I peed on R", N says and laughs - again slyly. 
(L.20)
N can respond also to dirty jokes on tslevisicn.
Ha watches the repeats of Monty Python quite avidly.
In one sketch, there is a man who is being interviewed 
because he has three buttocks. He is being invited 
tC take his trousers off. This convulsed N with 
laughter. (L.21)
THEORETICAL SUMMARY;
By 6.4, N rarely produces dirty jokes although R 
can now lead him as ha did, we have seen, into obscenity 
g aunes.
It is tempting to ask if tiiere is a connection 
between obscene jokes and laughter brought on by being 
disgusting. Both N and R create really disgusting sit­
uations - R by his antics with the yoghurt: N by his 
fantastic and revolting meals of vinegar, onionpoop
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and yuck» In R, obscene jokes are rou^ more frequent • 
and are found at the sar® time — as the disgust jokes.
What is clear is that very early on children do 
begin to structure these forbidden thoughts. With 
R, toi let-training was nearly complete, i.e. he needed 
no nappies at night - by the time he started to make 
obscene jokes and to find obscenity funny. The stages 
at which N produces a burst seems to have coincided 
with tlie period when R was being trained to use the 
potty. By now, there is hardly any anxiety for N in 
toilet affairs yet he still can get much occasional 
pleasure out of such obscenity.
AGGRESSION (M)
INTRODUCTION :
It has often been suggested that we laugh in 
triunç>h, a fairly aggressive act. The observations made 
so far of N 2Uid R laughing when they contradict and 
observations to come on naughtiness suggest there cam 
be an aggressive element in laughter and, perhaps, 
especially as Valentine (1942) saw an attempt to use 
laughter to get away with bad behaviour. This section 
examines laughing in sinqple aggressive situations.
OBSERVATIONS :
At 7 months, N can laugh whan R attacks him.
While they were at my mother's and lying on her rug,
N laughs when R tries to pull his hair. But, at 
that point, R does not seem to laugh. (K. 1)
At 9 months, R can get involved in games that 
are a little like chasing games. N and R come into 
our bed early in the morning and, after R*s dummy had 
landed in N*a ear, Aileen and N play a game in which 
R is a terrible monster who descends on them. R 
advances upon them. N laughs, shouts "R is coining" 
and hides. (M.2)
At 9 months, for example, N comes four times at 
him wâtîtt'à hippo soft toy. Re pushes the hippo 
against R's nojse. Each time that N does so, R laughs. 
It s^ems to be the actual push that provokes the 
laughter. Also at 9 months, R tries to pull N's nose 
and to poke his cheek with his fingers. This makes 
both of tliem laugh. (M. 3)
lUTERPRETATlVE :
Both these examptaa are not pure glee. They involve 
a mixture of aggreeeion and affection - and, it could 
be argued, they are one of the ways in which the two 
brothers team to live together.
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Also from months, R laughs when N gets hold 
of his feet and bangs them together. N gets the same 
effect by getting hold of R's arms and waving them 
straight up and down. (K. 4, see also C.4$
By 11 months, R can begin chasing or attacking 
games. N is under the table as R comes at him.
N ; Here's R storming the castle.
(N laughs) (M.5)
The descriptions of games, will show that R can 
at thia age, just before a year, join in and laugh at 
these sorts of chasing games with N. By 1.3 or 1.4, 
he ia able to play these games in an off and on way 
with a "baby friend" of his, John, who is exactly the 
same age. By the time R is 12 months, ha and N play 
tliese chasing games quite often. They make both of 
them laugh. (see C.IO) .
At 1.4, R can laugh as he aggressively starts a 
game of Peek-abo by snatching tlie New Yorker out of 
ny hand and covering (or smothering) ity face with it. 
(M.6)
By 1.7, these chasing games can be extremely 
long. N begins one evening by laughing when R pees 
outside his potty. N, then encourages R (as we have 
seen) to draw in the pee. At this point - and for no 
clear reason - the reason for laughing stops being
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uxrenental. It turns into a ciiase. N starts to 
hide from R and to call Buff. R rises from his potty 
and half gives chase. They don't go far as Aileen 
drags them back saying they must eat. R ia not interested 
in food. Afteria pause, H says: "Do you want your food 
cooked in your bath?" K laughs. So do Aileen and I.
Then R laugiiing - joining in. At once, N and R begin 
to chase each other again. The chase becomes so 
hysterical with laughter that I get them to stop and 
be silent for a moment. N keeps on teasing R during 
the chases. There are spaces of, perhaps, 30 to 45 
seconds in between outbursts of laughter. As far as 
N goes, he is clearly becoming more aroused but there 
is no sign that he finds this unpleasant. (M.7 see also L.2)
iJj this game continues N teases R about eating 
"only sweets" and about his "not having Cola". The 
chasing resumes - with both children laughing. After 
a while, Aileen (feeling perhaps that the children are 
getting over excited) decrees tiiat we ehall have a 
moment's silence. The two are still at it. Aileen 
takes R on her lap. N stands between my legs swaying, 
using my thighs as pillars. He chants and laughs inter­
mittently as he sways. Shush, says Aileen. (H. 8)
R can contain himself. N is given the job of 
timing tne minute of silence and that makes him calm 
down tiiough, twice during that minute, a little 
laughter breaks tlirough. There is no great outburst
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of laughter at the end of the minute. N hides 
behind my chair and begins to play peek-abo with R.
R laughs. N says; "I feel so much noisy and I feel 
so much like laughing". (M.9)
This whole game has lasted for about 18 minutes. 
Laughter does not exhaust itself, it seems.
Also at 1.7, R has a clear idea of mock fighting.
At this age, I saw whether me crawling made R laugh.
It did not. Being on the floor I said: "I'm a dog" -
and barked. N joins in and barks too. Then R
laughs. N says to me, as I growl at ray dog-fiercest: 
"You really scare me". There is a pause and I slowly 
rise up and say: "I am Tyrannosaurus Rex" - N is 
interested in dinosaurs and knows the fearsome 
characteristics of Tyrannosaurus that he is big and 
brutal. N laughs. He chases after me and says;
"Lower your head so we can have a Tyrannosaurus Rex 
fight". I do. We tangle. R laughs throughout this.
N says: "I won". R comes up to me, and laughing, 
gives me a smack on the bottom. (M.10)
By 1.11, R is quite happy to take the initiative 
in chasing games with N. R pinions N down on the floor 
and holds his hand close to N's mouth. N takes it 
and makes an open mouth shape so that it looks as if 
he might eat R's hand. R laughs a long, hysterical 
laugh. Then R sticks his tongue out at N - again both 
laugh. (M.11)
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In the chasing games between N and R, serious 
victory is not claimed often. But at 1.7, R and his 
friend John are contesting who should have the ball.
John wins the tussle and.utters a highish laugh as he 
does so. (M. 12)
By 1.9-> also, guns emd shooting often play a role 
in the chasing games. N points a gun, in the middle 
of a chase, at R. N says: "Gaga", as he points.
They both laugh wildly. N then strokes R with the gun 
and, suddenly, points it again at R. As he points, they 
both laugh. By 2.0 R has begun to be fascinated by 
BATMAN and, soon, the characters of that holy American 
fantasy get worked into R's chasing games. By 2.2,
R can imagine himself playing a part as he chases. He 
smiles widely as he says "Superman ... I fly", and 
runs around the living room. (M. 13 g see also G.C)
Both attacking and being attacked make R laugh 
by 2.5. Aileen is wearing a blanket which, she says, 
turns her into BATMAN. She makes lunges both at N
and at R. As she swoops, R laughs. (ML14 see also M.35)
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At 2.5, R can very clearly laugh at being threatened. 
The day after Aileen played BATMAN, I sit down and 
make threatening lunges at R. I try not to meOce them 
too physical. I say: "I'm going to get you". R laughs.
It is not rough like the horseplay with N at 3.6. Later 
R shoots me with a LEGO GUN. I shoot back in silence.
R laughs - a little stradnedly. (M. 15)
There are aome expansions of this chasing game.
R can laugh when N crawls up on him and surprises him.
They come, chasing, into my study. R yellss "You 
can't get me" and laughs. N crawls up to him. R 
makes no great effort to really evade N. R says, instead: 
"You can't get me" - and laughs. N crawls up to R*;s 
legs amd catches hold of them. They both laugh 
enormously. But then R says, seriously: "Go away".
They both tumble on to the carpet and it is at this 
point that R assumes a serious look. But, after a 
moment, R wants to re-start the game. R says to N:
"You get up and I'll look for you". The chase starts 
up again. (M.16}
R is also now able to add variations that make 
him laugh in the middle of chaises. At 2.5, R is run­
ning round the garden, laughing and being chased by N.
He goes up to Adele, grabs hold of her leg and laughing 
says: "I eat it up". (M.i7)
INTERPRETATIVE:
By 2,5, then violence is already a source of amuse­
ment to R, He seems to be able to distinguish quite 
easily between occasions for being afraid and mock 
laughter. So far, however, the games with him have 
not been very rough. These aggressive games come 
after pure chasing - but not that much later. It 
does not seem to take that long for R to begin to 
evolve them.
By the time that I began to observe N at 3.6 our 
mock fights could be much rougher.
At 3.7 I pretend that I am going to jump on N.
He laughs. He knows that I am not going to jump on him 
really but, at the moment that I stand over him, poised 
to jump, he laughs. (M. 18)
INTERPRETATIVE :
It seems as if the fear triggers the laughter though, 
of course, N knows that I am not going to attack him.
Real things that frighten him also make N laugh.
There is a jelly-fish on the beach, N is scared of 
them and laughs as he sees them. (M.19)
Fantasies of aggression can also make N laugh at
3.6. We are reading a Dr. Doolittle book in which there 
is a picture of a little girl. N says : "I am going to 
smash the girl to little bits". And he laughs. (M.20)
At 3.6 N likes to demonstrate his power over me.
I let N tickle me. I stop laughing and wriggle to try 
and give him the feeling of power over me. He laughs.
A few days later, N rubs my back, then he pats it. I 
burp loudly. N laughs: "I made you burp like that".
We repeat the performance. He laughs again and emphasises 
"I made you burp". One more time. I burp less loudly 
and he laughs less but his emphasis is still on made.
(M.21)
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At 3.11 we can play quite rough games in which 
there is actual physical contact and "fighting" as 
opposed to the mere threat of it as at 3.6. On the 
carpet, I say to N: "Oh, we'll play horse". I stretch 
out - flat. He sits facing me. Then he turns around.
I put up my knees and he laughs. He says I should put 
my knees up. N tugs at my flies and laughs. I put 
up my knees again, a little aggressively. N has an 
excited laugh. I tumble round so that N falls off me.
He is pushed towards the end of the rug and laughs.
He goes about 6 feet away and, as he moves away, the 
excited laughter dies away. (M.22)
Even when R is only 7 months, N incorporates him 
into rough games. I say to N one day that R is like 
the bison in the book about America. N "attacks" R 
and laughs. I say to N: "You don't have to charge like 
a bison on the reunpage". M laughs at that. (M.23)
At 4.4, N cem unleash surprise attacks on me which 
make him laugh hugely. Aileen is sitting on the top 
of the stairs. She asks me where N is. I am at the 
bottom of the steps and I delay a second. I climb up 
to the top of the stairs, thinking this may be a tease.
As I get there, N gets up from being crouched behind 
Aileen. He laughs hugely. (M.24)
The battle between parent and child does often provoke 
laughter. At 4.7, Aileen and N are fighting at dinner.
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Aileen is sitting dcwn. N hovers around and darts a 
finger towards her neck. Every time he does this, he 
laughs. He also lau^s when he finds Aileen punching 
back at him. (M.25)
INTERPRETATIVE:
On a number of oooaeione when N ie between 4,6 and 
4,9, he fights with R and, so makes R laugh. When 
N makes these evidently "mock* attacks, he laughs, 
if also laughs when R attacks him. These
attacks seem to be an important, even perhaps for­
mative, part of the relationship between the two boys. 
They often tike to resume chasing games.
The chases, with their moments of close physical contact 
and apparent hostility may well allow the boys to 
cement their relationship - and, also, to express 
hostility. When R is i$ months and if is 4,9, N often 
holds R by the neck which makes R laugh. When I 
tell if not to do that, R often screams ot yells.
At 4.9, N is quite capable of laughing as he teases 
R who is still less than a year old. R, sitting in 
his high chair, drops his bottle. N picks it up.
N j "I'm making him go mad with this bottle". This 
produces a very nasty hissy laugh from N. The next 
day, N laughs as he prods R with his finger. (M.26)
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Tormenting R does often amuse N, as in the fol­
lowing dialogue at 4.9%
Me : N , don * t torment him by putting your
LEGO on his head.
N laughs and laughs.
Mb ; Come on enough (N laughs). Take it
away (N laughs) Play with your LEGO 
on the table.
N : (Loudly) Babbababa (He laughs)
N then turns towards R and says "Bububububu 
Is that funny, Dubie?"
R does not laugh. I try to tickle R but there is 
no laughter. N then begins to chase me. I tell him 
not to chase roe. N laughs and becomes quite hysterical 
with laughter as he insists on chasing me. (M. 27)
Later that day, Aileen and N fight over a hat and 
a balloon - which makes them both laugh. (M.28)
INTERPRETATIVE:
AggresaiveneaB does often form a part of games that 
appear far more based on fantasy. This switching 
between seemingly different causes of laughter is 
fascinating.
By 4.11, N is able to engage in quite serious mock 
fighting with strangers. At my mother's, N decides to
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fight Doug and attacks him. Again, it is on the making 
of a hit that N laughs. He also laughs each time Doug 
makes a hit on him. It is that moment of contact that 
provokes laughter. (H.29)
Also at 4.11, there is another instance of N 
enjoying power - in this case - the power of surprise 
over me. I am washing up, N hides. I look round for 
him. Silence. Then a guffaw of triumph and N bounds 
out, laughing. "I was spying on you”, he says. Thus, 
the laugh does not come at the moment of eye contact.
It comes when N "surprises" me behind my back. (M. 30)
There are times when absurd aggression makes N 
laugh leas than one might expect. N and his friend 
Judith are playing. N has a biscuit in his mouth.
"This is a sword", he says.
N and Judith advance on me. N: "I am going to
cut you up". He saws through m/ tliigh with the biscuit 
and then, he saws through iry beard. N laughs very 
little but Judith (5.2) titters throughout. (M.31)
Much older children can also enjoy these chasing 
games. Helen who is 11 enjoys chasing both N and R.
As she chases them, Helen laughs but it is a slightly 
self-conscious laugh. She knows she is being childish. 
But both R and N laugh as she chases them. Because 
there are three of them and N is very keen to be chased
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by Helen, R often finds that he is in the wrong place 
to be chased. But he flaps his arms and giggles.
Though he is a little left out geographically, he 
laughs. (M.32)
To some extent, N acts as teacher to R even in 
the chasing games. In one chase (N 5.11, # 2.2) N 
chases R up the corridor and than is chased back.
They both laugh. N then turns the aggression on to 
himself. He announces that "I am going to beat a 
drum, beat a drum". He begins to thump his own head - 
and laughs. (M.33)
Attacks on odd parts of the body also amuse N.
At 5.11, N is pulling at Aileen*s toe and he can hardly 
restrain himself he laughs so much. Aileen grimaces.
N tries to pull off her toe again. N is giggling so 
much that when she tells him to stop, he has to run 
down the corridor. (M.34)
At 6.4, N is still amused as much as he used to 
be by pretend fitting. Aileen comes in wearing a 
blanket and pretending to be BATMAN. N stops pretend­
ing to be a baby (which he has just enjoyed doing) and 
laughs at every lunge Aileen makes towards him. At 
this age, chasing games with children of his own age 
still make N laugh. I pick N up from sdiool. J, a 
friend of his, and N chase each other to around five 
yards from the bus stop. As they run, they laugh. N
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also continues to enjoy sucii chases with R and laughs 
during tiiem. N even enjoys being attacked by R. R 
laugias as he claml'ers over N and N titters at that.
(M.35 sea also M.14)
THEORETICAL SUMMARY:
One intriguing hypothesis about aggressive laughter 
is connected witli the theory that children laugh when a 
situation that might have been threatening turns out 
to be safe. They discharge the tension built up when 
they are threatened by laughing once they know it is 
safe. Rothbart (1973) has proposed this. There is 
much evidence from observations both on N and R that 
children laugh during mock fights, that looming 
threateningly over both N and R makes thorn laugh. It • 
is far from clear, however, that there ever was any 
real fear in either of them. ?toreover, a detailed 
look at children play fighting will reveal that often 
the stimulus that appears to trigger the laughter is 
the actual movement of aggression. For instance, if 
I dart my hand out to "punch" N, it is on the darting 
he will laugh. If he is battling with roe, it is when 
he strikes, at that precise instant, the laugh comes.
The physical act that is aggressive sets the laughter 
off, rather than the realisation that what is going on 
is safe and a game. That comment begs tlie question of 
how one times the instant at which the chid realises 
there is no threat. In many cases here there never was
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a suggestion of real tlireat. Also, there are some 
instances - examples of which have been given - when 
actual aggression makes R and N laugh (H. 12)
Equally, real fear of jellyfish did make N laugh 
(M.19)
The idea that fear flows out of the child and 
that the only way to discharge the tension or energy V 
is to laugh assumes that laughter is a way of reducing 
physiological arousal. Godkewitsch, however, (1976) 
has shown that people become more aroused after they 
have had the punchline of jokes rather than less 
aroused. This is especially true of sexual jokes but 
Godkewitsch did not have a category of specifically 
aggressive jokes* Rothbart (1973) and
Rothbart and Pien (1977) have suggested that it is 
arousal jags - sudden changes in tlie level of arousal 
rather than decreases par se - that cause laughter. 
Since one could interpret N darting his hand out as 
a sympton of a sudden change in the level of arousal, 
such a theory could be modified to fit observations 
of play fighting. The important modification would 
have to be that arousal jags are synchronous with 
laughter; they don't cause it. But even thus modified, 
the arousal jag hypothesis does not seem to roe to fit 
the many situations recorded of laughter over a long 
period during which tlie child seems to be fairly highly 
aroused anyway. There is no cliange, no jag. The
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trouble Is that these are, of course, subjective judg­
ments of arousal based on the child's noisiness, 
physical state and odd introspections like N saying 
"I'm so ••• so noisy", i^owevar, Godkewitsch and 
Chapman both suggest that subjective judgements of 
arousal correlate well with physiological measures.
The theory that it is the feau: which turns out 
to be unnecessary "causes" lauc^ter seams, therefore, 
to be useful but somehow not yet right. Tickling, as
we saw, does not seem to require that the child sees
the smiling face while being "attacked" aa tickles
when I'm yawning or when I get N or R from behind
their backs without making a sound also make them 
laugh. The smiling face which in tickling has long 
been seen as the signal of safety does not have to be
seen for tlie child to laugh.
There are three aspects of aggressive laughter
that require comment. First, there is the purely
physical question of running, chasing which by them­
selves are enough usually to make a child laugh at 1.3. 
But by 2.6, such chases tend to be worked into games 
rather than being pure chases. By 4.0, such elaborations 
are more frequent. Sroufe and Wunsch (1972) found 
that chasing was the best elicitor of laughter at 12 
months. It seems to consistently continue to maintain 
an ability to make children laugh well until 6.4 at 
any rate. There is no sign of N chasing less at 7.0
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There is also an element in aggressive laeg&ter 
which helps children to cope witji fearful situations# 
There are, however, many reservations about tlm neat 
and tempting equation that says a child laughs whsn 
he realises that a threatening situation is not 
threatening. First, children do laugh when really 
afraid - the jellyfish example. Second, the laughter 
does not seem to occur at the physically right moment 
if it is the realisation that "It's safe” that triggers 
it. Third, the child often knows it's a game from 
the start so there is no genuine realisation that it 
is no threat. That is given right from tlie start.
There is a further element which research has 
not considered and, in fairness, few of my obser­
vations bear out. Still, the idea is worth venting. 
Children laugh during play fighting but they also 
sometimes laugh when they really fight - especially 
if they are winning or triumphant. Young children do 
often slip from one sort of fighting into another 
real fighting but the transition is usually clear.
In real fighting, or real equal aggression, in play 
groups I have seen laughing. The best example is with 
a group of 4.6 year olds who crash into aadi other on 
tricycles usually laughing as the crash looms. Ihey 
crashX they laugh. The laugh does not always happen.
We have seen that John laughs when he wins a real 
tussle with R at 1.7 (M.12) so this kind of non-play 
aggressive laughter exists. It is, of course, dis­
couraged.
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Finally, aggression does involve aggressing 
against someone. There would intuitively seem to be a 
connexion between the laughter when I chase you and 
laughter when I defy you or tease you. Both are 
expressions of laughter. Valentine (1942) found laughter 
while teasing at 1.4 which he thought early. !4y im­
pression of R is that it occurred earlier. By 3.6,
N was already very good at what one might call 
naughty laughter which is caused or produced not just 
by teasing but by refusing to do things, being irritat­
ing and, often, asserting oneself. It is my suggestion 
that naughty laughter is often used by the child as 
a way of developing his sense of himself and of his 
own strength - in this case at the expense of others.
NAUGHTY LAUGHTER (N)
INTRODUCTION ; 4
Valentine (1942) noted a number of instances in
which his children tried to appease their parents by
laughing. In an earlier section, J , contradictions
were discussed. It was suggested there that the child
begins round 1.2 to sometimes say "No", asserting
himself against the parent and then laughing.
This section examines "naughty” laughter which appears
to sjart with such contradictions but then widens its
scope. "Naughty" laughter fits uneasily into tiie cause
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and effect model of laughter since it is hard to argue 
that the child laughs because he is being naughty since 
one is often left with the impression that the child 
laughs knowing that this may make it easier to get 
away with bratty behaviour. Freud (1905) claimed, 
of course, that laughter allowed forbidden thoughts 
to surface ~ and to be expressed.
OBSERVATIONS ;
With R, one of his early characteristics was that 
he did not like doing things that Aileen and I tried 
to make him do. One of the first occasions when he 
laughed at this was at 12 months. Aileen is trying to 
teach R to spot where his mouth is. Aileen keeps on 
saying: "Where's your mouth?" "Where's your mouth?"
R makes no response. After a pause, he laughs. (N.l)
At 1.1, I note that R doss not seem to have a 
defiant laugh yet, By 1.4, R is drinking water out of 
my bath in a yellow boat. I say "No" once - he laughs. 
He knows he is being naughty, I make a face saying 
that he shouldn't. R laughs again. (N.2 see also J.l)
By 2.0, R can laugh very bratfcLly. He comes up 
to Adele, laughs and says: "I bit you". It seems as 
if the fact that he is laughing might make him think 
that this is an acceptable form of behaviour. (N. 3)
At 2.2, R also begins to enjoy being rude. He
/
goes into the supermarket a number of times and says:
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"I don't like that laay". The lady in question is 
often soma poor old age pensioner who looks snattered 
by this judgment. Aileen says : "That's rude". R 
realising perfectly well that it's naughty, laughs and 
repeats: "That's rude". In the evening, he once says 
with a grin: "I'm very rude". (N.4)
Also, at 2.2, R can physically do naughty things. 
He steps on my toothbrush. I tell him not to - he 
laughs. (N.5)
3y 2.5, R creates opportunities to be rude to me. 
He aisks me to say "Fooey on you-ey" (which he knows 
to be rude). When I say it, R laughs. R still laughs 
hard but insists I say it again. (N.6)
By 2.6, R can use humour to get away with naughti­
ness. In the morning, R clambers into bed with Aileen 
and me. Ribena from his bottle is dripping on to me.
I tall him to stop it. It's not funny. R laughs.
I
He says with a grin that it "is a bit funny". (N.7) 
INTERPRETA TIVE :
By the time I began to oheewe N at 3.#, he was welt 
'Oevaed in all the kinds of behaviours described in R, 
But N ia much more complicated in how he does it.
At 3.9, N knows that it is time for him to go to 
bed. "I won't", he says and laughs at me. He feels he 
is the boss. We go into his room and he deliberately
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puts on his pyjama top the wrong way round, back to 
front. He laughs a very flat laugh. Fe puts his 
trousers on and cannot do up the top trouser button.
He turns round and round like a top. He laughs again 
this flat mean lau^. "Stop it", I say. N; "It's funny". 
Me : "It's not funny". It is hard to deal with this 
kind of self-assertive laughter. (N.8)
Also, at 3.9, there is a long running battle to 
prevent N licking coins or putting them in his mouth.
I say: "You mustn't lick". About 5 seconds pass then 
N puts a coin in his mouth. As he does so, he gives 
a very long Hahahaha laugh - R has not yet produced at
2.6 this Hahahaha lau^. It is a snide laugh, almost 
a celebration of how bad he is being. I stare at N 
and don't rebuke him. "What are you doing?" he says, 
disconcerted. Ihe Hahahaha laughter dies abruptly 
as if N knew there was nothing really funny in what 
he was doing which is why there is no gradual falling 
off of the laugh. (N.9) '
At 4.5, N starts to drum witli his finger on a 
nappy pack. He laughs. He knows he is being irritat­
ing. He then goes on drumming with a fork. At bedtin»,
K does his Action Show and bounces and laughs. When­
ever it is time to wrap the Action Show up, N begins 
to laugh obstreperously. (N.10)
When R is 8 months, N begins to involve him in 
defiant action. I am bathing N and R. N is being
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obnoxious and I tnreaton to smack him unless he brushes 
his teeth. I hold R. N picks up tiie toothbrush and 
•’brushes" his t##tii but maintains the toothbrush an 
inch away from his mouth. Then, he puts the brush 
near R* s toes. "I'm going to brush his toes” , N 
laughs. I laugh too. "No, I'm going to brush his 
feet". (N.ll sea also H.4)
INTERPRETATIVE:
It ie hard to eseape the intuitive aonotuaion that N 
haa learned that if he oan make a situation funny, he 
has a better ohanoe of getting away with bratty be­
haviour,
N also likes to do evil things sometimes. Later 
this morning, N takes out two milk bottles to the 
doorstep. There are also seven bottles there. N 
lines them all up in a line in front of the door so 
that anyone coming out will trip over them. N finds 
me and says: "I've done something very funny". I ask 
him why they are funny. N: "Because someone will fall 
over them". (N.12)
Between 4.9, and 5.0, N produces a lot of bratty 
laugnter. N is making loud noises. I tell him not to 
do it. hie : "That's not clever”. N: "It is". N laughs. 
N laughs more and more as I tell him off again and then 
when Aileen tells him "You're cruising for a bruising".
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N laughs again, and says: "That's funny”. N becomes 
so annoying that begets a smack. His laughter stops 
promptly but only for about two minutes, I then coTit- 
nlain of "Rude little boys". N laughs. (N.13)
N often produces reasons for not doing as he is 
told. The justifications come with the laughter. I 
tall him to sit down and finish his food. N laughs 
and says; "You can't eat raw bacon". (N.14)
A few seconds later, N gets hold of R's bottle 
and begins to tease him by not giving it back to him.
I tell him to stop. He makes funny-sounding noises 
at me and laughs. (N.15)
There is also a running battle to persuade N not 
to eat by using his fingers. Aileen tells him: "Not 
your fingers. Dcxi't eat with your fingers". N laughs. 
(N.16)
At 5.0, N is also very concerned with "tricking".
h
Being tricked or teased is, however, something that 
worries him considerably, as we shall see. This love 
of tricking is still present at 5.2. One weekend, N 
announces five times that he has tricked me. Each time 
he says it, he laughs. ' (N.17)
At 5.4, N is also very often rasping in his laughter. 
I keep on asking him not to laugh so much one evening.
This only makes him laugh more. I tell him that "It's 
very irritating. Stop laughing like a hyena". But
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this comparison sends N into a hich oltched rasp of 
laughter that goes on and on, (N,18)
N can also laugh when R does something naughty.
At 9 months, R spills coffee into rny bath. I tell R 
off. N laughs unpleasantly. (NJ.9)
This sort of naughty laughter is also injected 
into situations with other adults. At 5.11, N and the 
rest of us are with our neighbours, the Weirs. N makes 
a bad pun. When it is time to leave, he doesn't want 
to go back hoit®. Aileen and I insist. N begins to 
whimper. Jimny says to him: "If you go, I shall
kick you out*. N laughs at Jimry and begins a mock 
fight. Giggling, N is led to the door where he col­
lects himself and says a relatively calm and polite 
goodbye. (N.20)
We have seen earlier how wielding friendly power 
over me - like believing he has made me burp (M.21) - 
makes N laugh. At 5.9, N can laugh at much less 
pleasant uses of power. Aileen wants N to give her a 
cuddle. N gives his Batman doll a cuddle and then 
begins to tease Aileen saying "This Is a cuddle" when 
all he is doing is waving his arms. N laughs. Finally, 
he does - after a minute or so - give Aileen a cuddle. 
(N.21)
At 6.1, N is also well aware of certain social 
niceties that meüce him laugh when they are broken. R
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has taken to having a taste for vermouth and sometimes 
is given a small sip of it. N gives a very knowing 
smile that nearly breaks into a laugh, "Wine", he 
says, "isn't for babies". (N.22)
N can also laugh when he seems to be getting away 
with something. Round 6.1, I catch N doing something 
wrong in the corridor. I tell him off. R hears and 
thinks that I am telling him off. N realises exactly 
tlia mistakir R is making and when R says "Sorry", N 
laughs. (N.23)
The naughtiness of other children also makes N 
laugh. We get to school and three girls come to tell 
me that another girl has taken a picture of the Queen. 
In the cloakroom, N tells Allah that three girls came 
and told me another girl was naughty. N laughs at 
this. (N.24)
Being amused by R* s naughtiness and rudeness 
continues to happen often. At 6.3, Aileen tells N 
of how she had taken R to see N's headmistress, Mrs. 
Lewis, after an assembly at school. The headmistress 
cooed at R; "Isn't he darling?" To which R replied; 
"Shut up". N laughs. Aileen added that Mrs. Lewis 
did not understand P.. Then R said; "I don't like that 
lady". Again, N laughs. (N.25)
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INTERPRETATIVE:
It do&a not aeem that he ia expressing fears about 
Wra. Lewis that he cannot himself express for N goes 
on to say quite seriously that he ia a little scared 
of Mrs, Lewis,
N can also laugh quite nastily. At 6.3, we pass 
a one-legged man in tlie street. N waits till we are 
a little beyond him an# says: "That's what I call 
having your leg chopped off". He laughs. I say that 
it's horrible. He laughs less but is still tittering 
as he says that he knows it's nasty. But he finds it 
funny and he repeats "That's what I call having your 
leg chopped off". And laughs again. (N.26)
THEORETICAL SUMMARY:
The fact that children laugh when they tease 
has been observed in children long ago. Watson (1931) 
reported observations of that: Valentine (1942) said 
that he first noticed this at 1 - 2%. Valentine adds 
that he thinks teasing laughter is due to the per­
ception of the incongruity of the superior parent 
being overcome and partly to delight at the power over 
another. It seems to me that Valentine's first reason 
may well be correct in soma situations. But it hardly 
explains why N should get so much amusement both out 
of R's naughtiness and also out of teasing R who is, 
after all, inferior. Much of the data presented suggests
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that puns and rhymes are often used in the service of 
naughtiness. Often a pun or rhyme has a hostile edge 
which raises questions about whether N and R intend 
to use humour hostilely. This is intriguing, N 
can say "I tricked you" and laugh or "I tricked you/I 
bricked you" and laugh. He does not find the sec$#d 
any funnier since both make him laugh a good deal.
There does seem to be a link between playing around 
physically (and annoying parents especially) and 
playing around linguistically. The instances occur 
too often to be dismissed as mere chance.
Valentine's second hypothesis is also, essentially, 
supported by the data. Being naughty does express 
power over anotiier. From observing R, however, it 
could be argued that this appears well before 1 - 2^.
At 9 months, R was laughing as he refused to make 
any attempts to utter the sounds his mother so clearly 
wanted him to utter That sort of refusing is
the essence of teasing. It was a pattern of behaviour 
often present between 9 and 12 months.
There are interesting differences in the ways 
that aggressive laughter and naughty laughter evolve. 
Physical aggression is discouraged by society: ÿ
suianple ^ laughing as you hit
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someone comes to be seen as a sign of disturbance, of being 
evil* Only the baddie in the movies has that evil snarling 
laugh. When the Son of Frankenstein meets the Daughter of 
Dracula we can expect a galaxy of such evil laughs as they 
kill their victims.
But the way that we deal with naughty laughter and 
teasing laughter differs. On the one hand, we are taught not 
to laugh when we discomfit someone even though we don't 
attack them physically. It is rude to laugh when you sack 
an employee; it is nasty to laugh when you refuse to cuddle 
your wife as N refused to cuddle Aileen. But teasing 
laughter in the context of a playful situation remains 
acceptable. West End comedies could not exist if couples 
who loved each other could tease each other - smd laugh, 
a device often used by Shakespeare in comedies like "Much 
Ado"• At what point children become aware of this nice, 
playful teasing as opposed to "power" teasing in which they 
wield power over each other, it is not possible to determine 
from this data. But it is aui important transition as is the 
point at which children lose the freedom or the ability to 
laugh when they try to bash each other up.
PRETENDING AND GAMES (O)
INTRODUrTION:
Pretending is an ability which makes psychologists 
rather uncomfortable. On the one hand, it is clearly a crucial 
part of development. Much of children's play consists of 
pretending. On the other hand, it is notoriously difficult
':247
to study pretending. Moreover, philosophers like I^le 
(1949) arguing for a behaviouristic and mechanistic psy­
chology have tended to downgrade the iirportance of pretending. 
I can only know that this is a pretend duck after I know 
what is a real duck, Ryle argues, and the concept of pretend­
ing is dependant on and a parasite of reality. Till I know 
what a real duck is, pretending has no meaning. And, once 
I know what a real duck is, I won't pay too much attention 
to toy or pretend ducks.
Nÿ observations in no way permit me to offer any sort 
of global theory of pretending. But they will make clear 
that by 2.6, R has a fairly wide repertoire of pretences 
which often do make him laugh. There are very obvious in­
fluences of what his fantasies are. He cam imitate and he 
can be aware of when he is being imitated. Both these sit­
uations can make him laugh. From 3.6, N often was involved 
in games in which we pretended not to be elephants or toy 
ducks were real ducks, but where we took on one another's 
roles. I acted the child: N acted the parent. Though we 
have already considered the game in which R placed the dummy 
in mother's mouth smd laughed, we have with N far more com­
plex and structured elad^orations in that gaune. And N is 
able to understand and even analyse them.
Again, the drift of my observations is that pretending 
occurs with people emd in social situations long before it 
occurs with things. R pretends that Aileen is a baby by giv­
ing her a dummy long before he pretends that a block is a 
building. There is also a certain self awareness that seems 
important.
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This kind of awareness of himself is present on 
two of the first occasions when R does something that 
makes himself laugh, when he is being the creator of his 
ov/n laughter ratner than a responder.
OBSERVATIONS :
At 7 months, R looks in the mirror with Aileen. 
Aileen is clapping her hands in an atterrpt to interest 
R. Clumsily, R begins to try and clap his own two 
hands. lie often misses though, from tir« to tin^, he 
succeeds. But he graces each attempt with a laugh. (0.1)
At 11 months, there is another game R plays which 
seems to involve a kind of self-awareness. Again, it 
is visual. R sees N use a piece of cardboard round 
which foil used to be wrapped. N uses this as a tele­
scope. R W5uits to do tiie same. If one then looks at 
R through tlie other end of the telescope, it raakes him 
laugh. (0.2)
INTERPRETATIVE:
It could he argued that seeing me or Aileen with thie 
huge bit of cardboard in front of our eyes was merely 
yet another incongruity, But R usually then prooeeda 
to put one eye to the' other end of the telescope, It 
seems he knows it is a game that involves seeing him 
in a strange way and that part of the game ia for him 
to be seen in this odd way at the end of the tube. The 
interesting difference in laughter is between when he 
fust looks down the telescope and when he looks - and 
ia looked at.
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R often repeats tliis game - and the pattern - is 
much the same. R laughs when you look at him through 
tne telescope : he laughs when he puts his eye to the 
other and and looks at you. lie laughs sometimes but 
rather less when ha just looks through the telescope.
(0.3)
R can also appreciate other parts of games - 
even if he is only on the fringes of them. At 10 months,
R laughs as he sees Aileen and N play ball by rolling 
it to each other quite gently. There is no sadden 
change or alteration of arousal here. Also by 1.3, R 
clearly appreciates complicated imitations. N and R 
watch Laurel and Hardy on T.V, N often imitates Hardy 
by puffing himself out and saying, sternly "A fine 
mess you've got me into". N then nods as Hardy does.
The whole routine makes R laugh. (0.4)
INTERPRETATIVE:
The literature on imitation ie ourrentZy oontr^overeial
and complex with some believing that infante of a few
weeks oan imitate aotione suah as poking out the tongue,
Thie ie hardly the place to evaluate the controversy.
But, in the light of euoh claims, it may he regarded ae not
too controversial to suggest that R at S€ can imitate
gestures - and know he is doing so. Arm gestures euoh as
waving are most easily imitated.
At 1.10 R can perceive this and finds it funny.
I take R shopping, no is complaining and waving his
aniis la the process ~ a sort of agitated flapping. I
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face him and begin to imltata the way that he is flap­
ping. R laughs. He realises I an Imitating him. (0.5)
At 1.10 and 1.11, R is obsessed by BATMAN. He 
often laughs when he just yells BATMAN and it is one of 
the few laughs that seem to be one of pure excitement 
or glee. (0.5a)
INTERPRETATIVE:
Blit, it ie not pure glee that Spencer ($360) diaouesed 
for R ia, in some way, acting out BATMAN, The fan­
tasy fuels hie laughter. At t,iO, R says BATMAN or 
SUPERMAN but he does not seem aware of the fact that 
he is acting, pretending to he, BATMAN (if indeed that 
ia what he ie doing).
By 2.0, hov;aver, R has learned to act out tiie 
characters in the BATMAN myth. He laughs as he says:
”I fly". He claims that he is Superman or Aquaman or 
other heroes. He often rushes around the room which 
is his form of flying. Over the next f^months, this 
is a very frequent form of play. This basic sequence 
of flying and pretending to be Superman, say, is often 
woven into games of greater complexity and, at times, 
violence. (0.6)
The swopping of identity which is evident in the 
Dummy Jeune occurs in a game that R at 2.5 plays with 
N. They are playing at being each other's mummies.
It amuses them both very much. N smiles. R says:
"I give you a kiss” - a properly maternal act. But
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R* S maternai kiss turns out to be rather fierce. He 
grips N round the neck. N says and laughs: "Strangl­
ing and kissing are a very different matter”. Sut 
tney continue the game. (0.7)
At 2.6, R has also begun to play games in which 
his gender identity is brought into question. From 
2.0, R has been ver^ »’ fond of Snow White and the Seven 
Dwarfs. At 2.5, we have just been listening to the 
record. R looks happy. I ask him if he is Cheerful 
(one of the dwarfs). "No**, says R with a smile. Is 
he Dopey? "No" smiles R. Is he Sneezy? "#o" smiles 
R. Is he Snow Whi&? "No", R now bursts out laugh­
ing. He goes on laughing as he says that Mummy - 
Aileen is, indeed, dressed in a white dress - is Snow 
White. (0.8)
At 2.6 N and R also play a game in which each of 
them is supposed to have a vagina. They cross their 
legs - N especially - and, from time to time, laugh a 
little. (0.9)
This is another instance of creating jokes that 
bring sexual identity into question.
By the time I started to observe N, ha was already
3.6 aind well versed in pretending. At 3.7 in Greece, 
we had an elderly Greek who came to do the garden. He 
tweaks N's nose and calls hi'^  life.-jlaskl. N says one 
evening: "Pretend I'm the cardener and (to »ileen) 
that you're Nicky and (to re) that you're N's mummy".
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N says; "Nikolaski" - and laughs. N repeats it: 
"Nikolaski" - again, and laughs again.
Aileen giggles in the embarrassed way that N 
giggles when the old gardener pulls his nose. N laughs 
to see it.
N then tells me to pretend that I am the gardener 
now. I put on a heavy accent imitating the old man.
I grunt, I make faces in the way that he does in order 
to try and make his Greek understood. I say "Nik- 
olaski". Each of these actions produce bellows of 
laughter from N. (0.10)
At 3.7 N can use games in which he pretends in 
order to express what he is interestedria. We play 
at dinner. I say: "Pretend you're a puppy". N:
"Ruff Ruff" and he puts on a very shaggy look. I say: 
"Now get a bone". N rushes to a cushion. He brings 
it over, laughing at his cushion-bone. N then says:
"It isn't a bone, it's a dinosaur". Dinosaurs fas­
cinate him. (0.11)
By 4.7 N can analyse the logic of some of these 
games that depend on a reversal of identities. At 
breakfast, Aileen asks what he wants to drink. N 
says: "Coffee". He doesn't mean it, for whenever he 
has sipped coffee he really dislikes it. Aileen says : 
"Yes, we're going to give N coffee, David's coffee.
In fact, N can be David. David can go to the nursery 
school and N can have coffee and go to work. David
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can have blackcurrant and nursery school. David can 
sleep in N's bed and N in David's bed".
N laughs on nearly all of the specifics of the 
reversals. But he does not laugh wildly. After a few 
instances, N declares: "In this joke, we are pretending 
that David does everything that I do and we are pre­
tending that I do everything tliat David does". (0.12)
As well as pretending to be an adult, N can pretend 
to be a baby. The curious thing is that his imitation 
of a baby is much less convincing than his adult imperson­
ations. But from when R is about 6 months, N often 
does imitate him. Round the period that R is 11 months 
and N is 4.8, there is a host of these imitations. N 
often pretends to be R and "to cry" and laughs through 
this baby crying routine of his. The key feature of 
N's imitation is the voice. N makes his voice baby­
like. He h# eàA by slurring the
sounds so that they become less distinct, by slowing 
his speech and by giving his voice a certain rhythmic 
lilt as if babies spoke in sing song. N also fixes on 
certain phrases as being the epitomy of babyhood. One 
such phrase is "Gaga". N's "performances" as a baby are 
unconvincing. If N really wanted to regress and be a 
baby, one would imagine he would do it far more 
thoroughly. It clearly is play and it makes N laugh 
often while he pretends to "cry" - though not until R 
2.0 is there any indication that he realises N is imitating 
him. (0.13)
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At 4.10, N also appreciates indtation of him 
imitating. He is very much into war-like and aggressive 
games bred from his fantasy. He plays in the garden 
at being a knight. He lunges with a twig which is his 
sword and makes ferocious faces. I imitate these faces 
by grunting and pulling even more ludicrous ones.
N laughs. (0.14)
The imitating of R goes on. At 6.0, N is still 
very keen to pretend to be a baby at times. At 6.3, 
he plays again at being the baby. N is sitting in 
Adele*s lap and giggles at the flow of baby talk he 
produces - a flow no real baby would ever produce. N 
puts his thumb in! this mouth and makes noises which 
include his old stand-by "Gaga". At a certain point,
N gets up from the rug and jumps jerkily up amd down, 
up and down, laughing as he does so. (^.15)
INTERPRETATIVE:
Be appears to be imitating the unsure movements of a 
baby,
N*s "performance" is interrupted for a while by 
Aileen who wears a cape and says that she is BATMAN. 
After a few aggressive swoops, arms outstretched, at 
both N and R - swoops which produce laughter - N resumes 
playing the baby. Finally, Aileen gets impatient and 
says: "I can only stand so much of you're being two".
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N laughs at that. It's interesting that she's taken it 
to be a performing of a two year old! (0.15a)
N stops being the baby then. But between 6.0 
and 6.3, there are often evenings at bathtimes when, 
for two or three minutes, he adopts this babyish game, 
laughing as he does it. He says he doesn't "wanna" 
brush teeth. He grabs his pyjamas out of my hand, 
twirls them and adds : "I don't wanna * jammas ". And 
laughs. (0.16)
By the time N is 4.8 it is interesting to see how 
there are quite long sequences of laughter in some 
games. One sequence I timed lasted 18minutes. In such 
sequences, all the kinds of laughter I have pointed 
out occur amd, sometimes, there are very rapid shifts 
amd combinations of different instemces of laughter.
In the two sequences I now intend to detail N was 4.8 
and R 11 months. Both sequences are recorded on audio­
tape.
The first of these sequences began as Aileen was 
trying to clieer R up. R was very tired.
Aileen (to R) : Look at N's hat.
N ; I'm a cowboy.
A (to R) : Hat, hat, hat, hat.
N bursts into laughter at her teaching of R.
A j Don't frighten him.
I then get the hat off N. N stamps and laughs.
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N (to me) : You look funny.
Me t Why does the hat make ire
look funny?
N bursts again into laughter. I cover my face 
with the hat.
Me : The hat is now my head.
Aileen takes the hat.
N ; I want it to be a cowboy hat.
N amd Aileen fight over who is to have the hat and, 
also, a balloon that is floating around the kitchen 
as it is Christmas time. Aileen and N laugh as
they tussle for the hat. N gets the hat and
hides it. Aileen suggests that the hat might be 
hidden by N in the freezer. I say: "Frozen hat".
N laughs hysterically at that.
Aileen develops this idea by suggesting that the 
hat is in the mustard jar. N laughs. Or cooking in
the oven. N laughs. Or that there will be hat for
dinner. N laughs. But for all these guesses, we still 
don't know where the hat is for N is still hiding it.
Aileen new threatens N to "cut out the crap where's 
tlie hat?" R joins in with a high pitched laugh. Aileen 
"finds" the balloon and tries to run away with it. N 
shoots her - making shooting noises as he does so - 
and laughs.
tunder the tabla) ' "V ^ide out.
N : Sit down. (He laughs).
Who gets it?
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Aileen now lets go the balloon. Something happens and 
she warns N to be caureful. He calms down at once, 
coming out of the game.
Me z Nicky just caught it.
A3 N catches the balloon, he laughs. But then, we get 
bored with the game. N collects both hat and balloon.
He swaggers like a cowboy, says "O.k. man" and laughs. 
Then, N begins to dance round R and to chase him which 
makes him laugh. (O.lT^^ee also H.36)
INTERPRETATIVE:
Thie eequenoe of a game has lasted roughly S minutes.
We have seen during it, in succession, laughter that 
seems to be brought on by the following causes**, There 
is incongruity as in the idea of "frozen hat" which ia 
elaborated into the hat being in the oven and in the 
mustard. There is laughter at something both incon­
gruous and a bit disgusting, the idea that there should 
be hat for dinner. There is a sort of peek-abo as N 
laughs when I cover my face with the hat. There ia 
aggressive laughter as Aileen and N tussle over the 
hat. This highly aroused aggressive laughter does not 
stem from but leads into the incongruous jokes about 
the frozen hat. There is no simple progress - or regress 
from conceptual Jokes to more excited laughter. After 
the Jokes about the hat, there is a small chase as N 
shoots for Aileen who hides under the table. Then,
hat oeaeea to be the origin of the laughter. The 
balloon beoomes that and N laughs both as it ie released, 
as he tries to aatoh it and when he does catch it.
Then, though Aileen and I get bored with the game and 
declare the hat game to be over, N still wants to 
laugh, A slightly similar event occurs in another game 
(0,18) where, as the game seems to be at an end, N 
manifestly wants laughter to continue. An attempt to 
interpret such a turn or "node" of events in terms 
of Barrels and Von Cranach*s (19 62) analyses of in­
tentions and actions is offered later. So 'N first 
swaggers, imitating a cowboy which was one of the 
starting points of the whole game and then he chases R, 
Often the tape of the whole sequence reveals the laughter 
as high pitched and excited but it is far from consis­
tently so,
A longer game took place some days later. It
■i .....
started with our having two balloons left over from a 
Christmas party. The game began with pretending to pop 
the balloons. Both N and R (11 months) laughed at the 
sound of the "pop". Aileen repeated tiie popping amd N 
said: "It scares me". Having pretended to pop the 
balloon, Aileen now pretends it has really disappeared.
N laughs. He knows quite well the balloon is still 
around. There is then a pause in the development of 
the game. We talk about what happened at Christmas, 3^
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asks Aileen if she will use the balloon. Aileen uses the 
balloon to make herself look pregnant. She sprouts a giant 
belly. Aileen asks N what it looks like. Through asking 
Aileen to use the balloon, clearly a request for playing,
N has started a whole scenario.
A ; What does it look like?
W : Big.
A : It's a baby, a very little baby.
N s i  want to see what baby looks like.
= ■ ^  A 2 baby's coming out.
' # h-ughs as the balloon appears from under Aileen *s
sweater. When she sees her baby is a balloon, Aileen 
recoils in mock horror. N laughs.
Me 2 A green baby. Oh dear.
Hysterical laughter from N at this.
A : It's a blue baby ... a flying baby. (The balloon
flies.) A flying green baby.
Again, N laughs hysterically and R joins in the laughter.
A 2 Don't operate on my baby. (N laughs). You can't
operate on a balloon (N laughs).
There is then a short pause followed by N laughing again. 
Aileen then pushes the balloon. On each push, she utters "oah". 
Another push, another "oah**.
Me : It might help if you didn't beat the baby up
into the air.
N laughs twice.
A 2 This baby has to be very specially handled. Hey,
don't knock him down. Aileen says tliis to R and 
her stricture makes N laugh again. Aileen comforts
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her balloon* "Poor child"^ she says* N laughs *
N 2 Baby (N laughs) BcJ^ y*
A : Oah (N laughs) Oah (N laughs)
Again each Oah comes on a push of the balloon*
N : Baby, baby, baby, baüDy, he's a balloon baby*
(N laughs)
There is then an interlude, as it were, in which we talk 
“  "m/m
of hot water*
A 2 Kiss him*
N 2 He says he wants to have a little rest* (N
laughs)• baby* My baby* He started to scream*
(N laughs)* Didn't he, my baby? (N laughs)*
This time, N's laugh is very like a screaun he is so 
excited* The balloon is now flying around* N tries to catch
it* R waves his arms at it* There is a pitch of excitement*
A 2 I think he's a flying green hedgehog*
N repeats this assertion* Aileen then repeats it* N laughs
N 2 No, nice b a b y ....... I caught it*
A 2 Oah * * *
N 2 Let's do the beginning again*
Now that the balloon is caught, it is time to have a
replay* Interestingly, R's laughter now becomes more marked 
and more individual. Up to here, he has very much laughed in 
the footsteps of N or, simply, as the balloon was being Phased. 
Now, R laughs as N says let's do it again*
N 2 (to Aileen) Can I see what your baby looks like?
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On the birth of the balloon, R laughs hugely.
A I It's about to come out. N laughs.
Me j It's dropped on the floor.
N laughs four times in a very excited burst.
N X It’s a balloon baday.
Me : Maybe it's name is Jupiter.
N : Saturn. (N likes Saturn) Noah of Noah and the Ark.
At this point, Aileen appears to have a second balloon 
concealed as a baby in her sweater. It appears.
A X TwinsI
N laughs.
N X Can I see your twins?
Both N and R laugh as the second of the balloons appears.
N X Let's call them Saturn and Jupiter ... oohoh .. 
Saturn bursts.
Me : Someone sat on Saturn.
N X (repeating) Sat on Saturn.
A X Saturn burst, (chasing) Mars. Mars ..
N X I hope Mars doesn't die for a long time.
A : Easy come, easy go with these balloons.
N X Mars doesn't scream and he wants to have a sleep.
A X Which planet do you come from?
N X Saturn.
A X Oh you have a blue nose.
N X No. (N laughs) They have red necks.
A 2 No, that's from Saturn.
Aileen attributes to the Satum-dwellers green belly 
buttons and purple teeth. This gets no laughter. N adds
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that they have silver chins• Aileen gives gold ears• None 
of these evoke a laugh.
N : Yes and Dubi fare booms (which is incomprehen­
sible but seems to be a dig at R). All we do in Saturn is 
walk around in our Saturn trains.
There is now some talk of trains, sleeping in trains, not 
having houses, living in trains and staying on the same strains 
None of this yields auiy laughs,
N 2 I'm in my Saturn train, sleeping. I can see
things the wrong way round. (To Aileen) Come 
on my train. You can go into space.
Aileen is now pretending to be on Saturn. She says: 
"Look at all these trains ... how very peculiar".
Aileen now shows a number of implements from the kitchen
to N. Each implement is given a wrong use.
A : That's to make soup with. (N laughs)
N 2 He sits in a toy train. (?)
A 2 Why is Saturn so full of trains? (N laughs)
N explains that tlie houses were too big so they took 
to trains.
N 2 Let'8 go back shall we?
A 2 Can I sit on the cactus? (N laughs) Funny
cactus, it's attacking me ... (N laughs)
N 2 It's a stroking cactus.
At this point, the tape ran out and, also, the game 
wound down.
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THEORETICAL SUMMARY:
Again, in this long sequence, one sees a veritable 
jumble of reasons for laughter. On three occasions, it 
is N who starts the game off. He asks Aileen to "use" 
the balloon. He asks for the replay of the birth of 
the balloon. He says he wants to leave Saturn. If 
N had not asked Aileen to repeat the birth, the game 
would have petered out then as she was quite bored 
with it really.
The most frequent sort of laughter in this sequence 
is laughter at chasing the flying balloon. This is made 
funnier by the incongruity that the balloon is meant to 
be a baby. A baby as a balloon is incongruous and so 
is a flying baby who, to cap it all, is green. Here, 
surely is a multitude of incongruities. Again, there 
is soirœ elaboration for, at one point, the flying baby 
becomes a flying hedgehog. The incongruousness of 
the balloon as baby is exploited by N who it needs 
a rest, by Aileen who says it needs special handling - 
a double joke as it were - and by N who kisses it.
The actual birth of the baby is also very funny.
But this particular highlight is crowned when, on the 
second birth, the balloon drops to the floor. This is 
both incongruous and nasty. One should not drop 
babies on the floor, let alone bounce them. The 
second balloon, the second twin, is also very funny.
What happens after the bursting of Saturn is, also.
Interesting. Though the children are now very 
aroused, N reacts to the pun that I make by repeating 
it. "Sat on Saturn", he echoes. Then, the nature of 
the game changes very quickly from one that depends on 
physical activity to a very odd fantasy about life on 
Saturn, planet of the trains. All the initial incon­
gruities thrown up by Aileen get little laughter.
And, though N produces many incongruities about life 
in the trains, again, he does not laugh much at them 
though he is motivated as he goes on producing more 
and more oddities.
The return to laughter is marked by something 
very single - Aileen using the "wrong" implement for 
soup. Then, there are renewed laughs as Aileen asks 
N why Saturn is so full of trains. Now, he laughs
i
at this question. Then, N laughs as Aileen sits on 
an aggressive cactus. Many of the events on Saturn 
are fantastic, incongruous and - even - have a resolution 
of sorts since N explains why they live on trains and 
the consequences. But little of this, though enjoyed 
by N, evokes his laughter.
At the time when the observations were made, I 
was not familiar with the arguments concerning goal- 
directed action (Harre and Von Cranach 1982). It 
seems possible to interpret Nicholas* restarting of 
the game as expressing an intention to get more 
laughter. He achieves his end affter he has called for
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the re-birth of the balloon-baby. But than the 
intention does not seem to peter out — Nicholas keeps 
throwing up more incongruities about Saturn - yet 
laughter dies away. Nicholas only laughs again at an 
unexpected action of Aileen's, using the wrong imple­
ment for soup. Aileen intended this to provoke laughter 
but N*s reaction is not one over which he has owtrol.
He "can't help laughing". The more traditional view 
sees all laughter as responsive. This switch in N 
may be at a critical point between the two kinds of 
laughter.
The other thing to note is that R does laugh 
often Initially with N, and, on the birth of the bal­
loon the second time round, his own laughing is more 
confident. He doesn't wait for N's laughter. But 
the tape reveals little of what he did throughout the 
Saturn episode.
It is this moving through different kinds of 
laughter in one burst which meikes it very elusive.
At 2.2 R, and 6.0 N, they play games together 
which last a long time. The year before, such games 
seem to have needed either me or Aileen to be there.
These observations suggest that the technically 
most rigorous observations on laughter may well miss 
an important kind of laughter - that which comes and 
goes during the course of long games frequently pun-
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ctuated by laughs. The transcrlpted account of these 
games shows also how intermingled laughter can become 
with intellectual incongruity, fantasy, emotional 
laughter, with laughing at loud noises and balloons 
playing peek-abo all emerging. The capacity to play 
such games seems to be built up as the child develops 
a number of "laughter skills", soi% comic, some imagin­
ative. Certainly, the evidence presented here suggests 
that by the age of 2.6, at the latest, R is quite
able to "act" out being other people amd to make him­
self laugh hugely in the process. If laughter is 
involved, as I have suggested, in playing with roles 
emd the sense of one's own identity, the early develop­
ment of these skills is worth noting.
JOKES AGAINST ONESELF (P)
INTRODUCTION:
In adult humour, mistakes often make us laugh. Freud 
devoted much of his Psychopatholocfv of Everyday Life to 
mistakes people make by accident. Such errors are often 
funny. Also, when people deliberately set out to make a mis­
take by way of parody or just for a laugh, it is often highly 
effective. In the sections both on puns and on incongruities, 
we saw a few instances when N laughed at mistakes but these 
were very rare.
In this section, I have recorded observations of a 
slightly different sort. They tend to be instances when N 
amd, lately, R have either laughed at a mistake they made or 
exaggerated it to the point that it is a parody. I shall also 
show instances of when laughter is not at all pleasant for N 
because he thinks it is being used against him, to highlight 
his own mistakes. There are not that many exan^les of such 
humour but it seems to me an inportant form of humour because 
the ability to laugh at one's mistakes, to see through oneself 
may be an in^rtant and specifically humaui characteristic.
Some higher apes may also laugh, especially when they play.
But not even the most advanced ape has yet (to my knowledge) 
laughed at himself or produced a joke in which he makes fun
of himself.
OBSERVATIONS :
At 2.5, R sees N go up the stairs and slip down a stair 
once. R follows N up the stairs and pretends to slip on 
each stair. He really does make himself slip down a stair but 
he is well in control of himself. He lauc^s as he slips down
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each stair. He does this about eight times, laughing at 
each slip. N encourages from the top of the stairs. (P.l)
playgroups and nursery schools I have often observed 
children at around 4 begin to laugh at physically clumsy 
moves they hatsa made. In one group I observed, there was a 
girl who was especially liable to say "Whoops, I made fell 
over". Upon which, she laughed. With N, I record few 
instances of this in the home but some do occur when we are 
playing football. At 5.0, N tries to kick a ball and falls 
over. He laughs at himself for falling over. (P*2)
More typical around 5.0 is N's nervousness of other 
children laughing at him. I have already recorded the force 
of N's own sarcasm with his friend who at nearly 5 still wore 
nappies at night. I%r%rained the ehild overnight where his
parents were trying everything from bribes to threats. But 
at 5.3, N is nervous of other children laughing at him. He 
is bothered by this if he does not have his school cap or the 
right socks. Once, he does not want me to take in a hand towel 
to school as this will make the other children laugh at him.
a
Actual sarcasm also upsets N at 5.3 though he is beginn­
ing to be able to wield it himself quite sharply. At 5.3, 
we tell him not to stand on the Hoover as he ought to know 
better than stand on such a delicate piece of equipment,
N: "I wish there wasn't such a word as sarcastic because then 
you couldn't be sarcastic about the Hoover and I thought it 
was true". N's use of sarcastic is not quite correct since 
it was he who was the butt of sarcasm, not the Hoover but he 
^els it right. A week later, I tell him not to eat his
2ÔS
breakfast like a pig* N ; "I wish you'd stop being sarcastic".
A little while later N tells me to stop doing something quite 
ordinary that I was doing. I complain about this. "I was 
only being sarcastic", he says. I say: "Touche". It was 
nearly appropriate. (p.4)
At 5.5, N is quite able to recognise jokes made against 
him by me or Aileen as being jokes but he does not enjoy them. 
Upset, Aileen is lying in bed. She has promised to go and 
look at a picture N has drawn on his wall. She does not 
want to budge from bed. I tell N that, instead of forcing 
A to go to his room, "You should bring the wall in here".
N : (stem) That's not funny, David.
A : Yes it is.
But N will not concede the point. He very much wants 
A to see his picture. (P*5)
By 5.9, N is beginning to be less defensive and he can 
also, from time to time, use humour in order to cope with 
some of the more minor disasters of his life. He wails, 
a little melodramatically, that he has banged his toe. I 
say: "I'm sorry". N grins: "It's not too bad". He adds:
"It was a banger, a sausage, that's something we say at 
school". He laughs on banger. (P.6 see also 1.2%)
Also N can laugh at rude remarks about himself. We are 
travelling through France and N makes a stupid remark. A 
says, none too nicely: "You left your brain behind in Toulouse". 
N lauqhs at that. (P.7)
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At 6.0 N can get close to a more serious joke 
against hiraself* Aileen tells me, one evening;
"You’re always complaining", n comments ; "who is 
always complaining?" He laughs. He means Aileen.
The next day in the bath I tell him not to complain 
so much. N grins and says: "You should tell a certain
R who complains even more than I do". At least, there
is an acknowledgement here by N that he does complain 
a lot. (P. 8)
INTERPRETATIVE ;
Again, M ueee a ewop of identities to produce humour.
In saying: is oomptaining so much?** ft is turning
Aiteen*s remark about my complaining into a complaint 
by her: she is complaining that I complain too much, 
ft*s laugh is not one at hie own expense but at here.
The next day, however, he can at least partially
laugh at his own complaining,
N still laughs at hi# own physical mistakes.
At 6.2, we are playing football again. N runs up for 
a long complicated kick, ends up sliding over the ball 
and getting all tangled up. He lau^is at his mistake.
At 6.3, the same thing occurs. Only this tin^, N 
deliberately sets up a kick to fail at. He skips 
over the ball when he does finally run to it. He laughs. 
Then he does it all over again and falls over the ball - 
and laughs. All quite deliberate. (P.9)
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ProiTt 5.5, îl also makes some jokes that seem to 
reflect a little anxiety about school. On returning 
for one term he says wouldn't it be funny if all the 
top boys were in Mrs. Hare's class, the kindergarten.
He laughs. (P.10)
At 5.11, N makes a number of jokes about going to 
school. He grins as he tells me that if he forgets 
to bring his cap, his teacher, Mrs. Lewis, says she 
is going to shoot him. But she is only teasing.
(P. 11)
In the next chapter, on laughter in a playgroup, 
more instances will be offered of such self-critical 
laughter* It may well be that it is more frequent in 
groups where the child is under some pressure, if not 
to conform,at least to seem in control of himself, his 
body and his destiny.
Early on, Frank1 (1971) was quoted to suggest that 
tlie human ability to laugh at ourselves is a supreme 
human achievement. These few observations suggest 
that it is something to which children can come very 
young.
CONCLUSIONS!
What emerges from these observations points towards 
conplexities rather than towards elegant solutions that 
will enable us to say that there are two, three or seven 
basic causes of laughter. Why children laugh is a
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question to which there is no simple, and may never be
any exhaustive, answer. There is also tiie perplexing 
fact that sometimes diildren fail to laugh at precisely 
the same stimuli that a day or a week before have made 
them laugh, observations on N and R show this can 
be a product of mood, of who they are with or of how 
they appear to perceive a situation. A variety of 
factors, other than ttie sacred stimuli, matter.
It seems plausible to argue that there are a number 
of different stages that the evolution of laughter goes 
through in the child. This evolution is, moreover, a 
bizarre fonr^  of evolution. The 16 year old who has 
evolved from tlie 3 year old no longer tiiinks like the 
three year old. Unless something is wrong with him, 
that way of thinking is no longer acœssible to him.
3ut, it will bo argued, laughing is different. At
6.4 N can and, sometimes, does laugh at many of the 
tilings that amused R at 11 months. Moreover, an analysis 
of adult laughter will show that very often they laugh
at exactly the same sort of stimuli that children will
&
laugh at. Often, in plays and films there is
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a scene in which the hero and heroine run after each other 
laughing. They are chasing and lau<^ing just as R and John 
at 1.3. In other words, we can still quite easily have 
access to the process that enables us to find tnings funny 
we found funny as children. In our development of laughter 
we gain the ability to laugh at new things and to understand 
new angles on old jokes but, as we gain these new capacities, 
we seem not to lose the ability to laugh at many of the 
things that made us laugh as young children. There are 
exceptions to this. The main exception seems to be aggres­
sive laughter. We arc taught not to fight and that it is 
even more wrong to laugh at little Joe after we have hit 
him. But there are still, of course, those anti-social 
desperadoes who guffaw as they do their worst.
But it should be noted that in the many observations 
of children and adults laughing while they fought, the adults 
laughed too. In the special context of lauding when pre­
tending to fight with a small child. I, Aileen,her sister 
AdeXe and Doug have all retained the eüDility to laugh. It 
amuses us to play fight, too. Here, surely, there is more 
trouble for the simple equation that claims we laugh when 
we realise that the thing we feared is really saf e. N might 
just be frightened I could really turn on him and harm him
but how could I fear that he (let alone R) might turn on me.
At the most paranoid, it can produce no fear.
We do, however, develop our ability to laugh and to
create laughter. At 6.0, N has a good mastery of many ways
of making people laugh, of making himself laugh and, also.
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a good understanding of what he finds funny and what he 
doesn't. By what stages has he had to pass to get here?
At the very outset there is some disagreement between 
the reasons for the first laugh. Valentine claims that it 
was a sensation of being well fed that led to the first laugh. 
Sroufe and Wunsch (1972) claim that it is tactile stimulation 
by the mother - from tickling or bouncing the child up and 
down or making loud noises - which leads to the first laugh.
There is no clear resolution that can be offered here. R 
laughed when well fed auid happy zmd also in response to 
being bounced and tickled. What is clear, however, between 
both the proponents of the well fed laugh and the stimulated 
laugh is the first laughter is to do with a physical stimulus 
to which the child responds. Some of the physical stimuli 
that produce laughter under 6 months go on in adult life to 
produce different though usually strong responses. Kissing 
the toes and kissing behind the ears, for exanple, become 
frankly erotic rather than risible. Bouncing energetically 
up and down on people's knees disappears from most of our 
behavoral repertoires. But tickling remains tickling. Many 
adults laugh helplessly when tickled. And since I have 
suggested that successful tickling does not depend on the 
child seeing a smiling face, we have here a direct physical 
stimulus which produces lau^ter very early and goes on to 
produce it through life. (Some gerontologist will, I hope, 
now publish a study on how close to death people lau^ when 
tickled).
From this stage of laughter due to high stimulation given by an adult
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there next seems to come a stage when the child laughs 
because an adult laughs at him. It will be remembered 
that Valentine first noted this at 10 weeks in one 
child and 11 weeks in another. Observers who are not 
parents tend to miss this since they cannot tease the 
laugh out of the child. In R, such laughter often 
occurred from 14 and 15 weeks on. This is purely res­
ponsive laughter. While writing this, I went into the 
kitchen and laughed at N for no reason. He gave me a 
little laugh back. But, of course, this is unusual.
Such pure "responsive" laughter is still capable of 
eliciting a laugh at 6.4. Also, many adults know per­
fectly well that they will laugh much more if others 
are laughing. Cemned laughter exists to con us into 
laughing simply because others are laughing.
An interesting feature of responsive laughter, 
laughter that is "caused" in tlie child, is the way that 
it is woven in with other kinds of laughter. From 7 
months on, R laughs in situations where he sees him­
self - like trying to clap hands in front of the mirror 
(0.1) or where he is aware of being seen as in the 
telescope game (0.2). My interpretation is speculative, 
of course. But as R begins to get a sense of his own 
stable identity, he can tease himself and a familiar 
audience by maiking his head, or other parts of his body, 
appear and disappear. So popping in and out of a blanket 
or popping on or off a screen are ways in which the 
child mayTb® playing not just a joke but a game in­
volving his own identity. The power of the laughs 
suggests more than a joke is occuring.
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Certainly, R and N both laughed when making biiamsalveo 
appear and disappear on the monitor at home. %
A comparable process may occur when R at 2.6, begins to 
laugh at jokes that involve his own sexual identity.
Thera is no neat label to pin to such occasions of 
laughter. Self-aware laughter is, perhaps, the best 
available. Before it seems that these claims made here 
and earlier in section (O) seem far-fetched, it is 
worth recalling perhaps that work on linguistic develop­
ment of the child by Wells (1981) and otliers also 
suggests a high degree of self-awareness. Wells dis­
cusses the language learning of children aged from 10 
months upwards and, on the basis of lengthy analyses of 
conversations oetween child and parent, he arguedx 
"A decade ago the idea that a child so young could 
be capable of successfully participating in social 
interaction would have seemed highly implausible.
According to the Piagetian account of development, the
child at tills age is still almost entirely egocentric
in perspective, and his cognitive schemas are restricted
to those arising from his sensori-motor interaction
with the physical world. To take part in, and learn
from, social interaction, on the other hand, requires
the child to have developed quite sophisticated communication
skills and this, in turn, implies the development of
cognitive schemas about himself and others and about
the ways in which people and objects can be related in
an intersub je ctive field of attention. (Sheilds 1978).
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He must, for example, have some understanding that the 
world he experienced is similarly experienced by other 
people, and that his communications, like theirs, will 
be interpreted as expressing intentions with regard to 
this shared world* Sophisticated though such skills may 
appear to be for the child just beginning to use single 
"words" that this is indeed the case is suggested by a 
number of lines of research which have focused on the 
infant's earliest le a m  in a and the context in which it 
takes place”.
Wells' analyses lead him to the conclusion that 
the one year old child has sufficient sense of his own 
identity to engage in such conversations.
The very tentative analyses I have offered of some games 
like peek-eÜDO and of variations on it involving tapes 
and videos, suggest that the child may well be playing 
with his own identity when he appears and disappears.
Ha learns not only that his mother can come and go but 
that he can come and go - for her. By watching himself 
on a monitor coming and going, the child can control 
the appearance and disappearance of his body. The in­
cidents at the Institute of Education, when the children 
became literally helpless with laughter when they saw 
themselves flash on screen, again suggest that some­
thing oddly powerful is occuring - related either to the 
child's sense of his own identity or less grandly, to 
his sense of his role. It is hard to be that clear 
about what is a murky, metaphysical area but the power 
of the laughter in such situations was very striking - 
and merits further exploration, at least.
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Together with this first self-awareness, R seems 
to laugh at incongruities of role. If his mother takes 
on the role of the baby by having a dummy in her mouth, 
he laughs. At first, R needs Aileen to also make a 
noise though he smiles at the sight of the dummy in her 
mouth. Later, no noise is necessary. These conservations 
on the ô m m y  game fit in well with Sroufe and waters’ 
observation that the children from 10 months on laughed 
when their mothers crawled in the month when tiiey had first 
learned to crawl themselves.
This evidence suggests that incongruity is not 
built up out of the ciiild’s experience of things so 
much as out of his experience with persons and their 
roles. Moreover, the games in which children play at 
being adults, 6 year olds play at being babies which 
all seem elaborations or variations on the basic theme 
of role-swopping continue to make N laugh. They con­
tinue to make adults laugh in certain situations. These 
are all ways in which we can play around with our roles 
as, possibly, ways of testing our Identity. In the 
child, such gaunea seem to be used principally to con­
firm who he is: in the adult, such imaginative larking 
can be used to break down who he is, to offer him or 
her the possibility of new selves or roles, to use a 
less metaphysical term. If we are social beings, then 
it should not be surprising that trying out different 
roles should be part of growing up. Laughter seems much 
involved here.
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The observations offered here woutA suggest that 
by 1.3 the child can have a perfectly qood concept of 
what incongruity is when applied to people in his en­
vironment. This is later transferred to things. Some­
times things can wake people appear very incongruous.
For example, children always laugh when they hear thear­
se Ives on a tape recorder and always want to hear them­
selves again. Bergson might have argued, had there been 
tape recorders in his day, that this surely proved tha t 
when man is reduced to the mechanical he becmaes comic. 
There la another example argument. The children are 
playing here with tlie appearance and disappearance of 
themselves and enjoying being in two places at once - 
in themselves and on tape.
This argument against Bergson is not to say that 
children never find it funny to be like machines. Play­
ing robots often causes laughter in playgroups. N 
once laughed at the idea that he went on wheels. But 
this is far from being the or a primary form of laughter.
There is one other difficult form of early laughter 
to encapsulate. This is laughter at peek-abo which occurs 
from 6 months on certainly. We have seen that R not 
only played peek-abo with people but with objects and 
that N, at 6.4, can still enjoy playing peek-abo. Peek- 
abo has some of the characteristics of both "self aware" 
laughter in that the child is playing with appearance 
and disappearance of his mother, his father, himself and.
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in some games with objects. Peek-abo u s u a l l y ' Z  
leads to the sort of laughter that sounds very like laughter 
due to tickling or high stimulation laughter. There is also 
always a defined point when the child laughs, the moment when 
the mother's face appears.
At 1.3, it is clear that the child ceases just to respond 
to laughing in situations that others have set up. He seta 
out to create his own reasons for laughing. He sets out also 
to make others laugh. This implies that even so young the 
child is capable of intending to laugh and, perhaps, to maüce 
others laugh. Also from 1.3, the child seems able to interact, 
at least for short spells, with other children round that age 
who also want to laugh. The child acts as a creator as well 
as a reactor - a very young agent.
An awareness that the incongruity of things may be funny 
appeared later tlian 1.3 in R. The next stage seems to be the 
development of the idea that saying "No", that denial and con­
tradiction, are funny. It is not clear why this should be 
funny but it is worth noting that the first formal jokes 
that N made are based on proposing that both A and not-A are 
the case, to put it formally. This is not incongruous ; it is 
impossible. At 2.0 to 2.5, R shows the first glimmerings of 
finding such nay-saying funny, such contradictions tending, 
again, to occur in the context of the child's relationship to 
parents. He refuses to say "Hat" when Aileen keeps saying 
"Hat" to him, and he laughs. He then laughs when he says "No" 
or "No" is said to him.
Together with this grasp of both incongruity and denial
there comes round 2.0, the beclnnings of really playing around
both with sounds and with ideas. R's Flying Cucumber must
be one of tlie longest running vegetable gags ever. R begins 
to create and to ask for new rhymes. By 3.6, N la doing both
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of these things very extensiv ely and they seem to precede, 
particularly, his first attempts to make jokes.
In trying to tease out the origins of the cognitive 
distortions the child makes and responds to before beqinnina to 
try and make a joke : it is also intriguing to see in R 
that his first dirty jokes already incorporate some dis­
tortions - it is Happy Birthday that becomes Happy Aaah or 
Batman who becomes Aaah-Man. It is not enough just to trot 
out the forbidden obscenities in order to laugh. There has 
to be more.
It could be argued - emd my evidence here is very much 
R supported in places by Valentine and Sroufe and Waters - 
that between 2 months and 6 months, the prime reason for 
laughing is either purely physical or purely responsive.
Between 6 months emd 1.3, the child begins to grasp some 
sufficient notion of himself that toying with the.role’ ’ 
he has can be funny. If that is controversial, surely the 
observations on crawling and the dummy games make it plain 
that the first incongruities the child perceives and laughs 
at are incongruities in which someone else is playing him. 
Equally at this age, there is a fascination with games that 
involve appearance and disappearance like peek-abo. It is 
arguable that such games appeal to the child precisely 
because they permit him to toy with himself, his own stability 
as well as the stable existence of his parents, brothers (R 
plays peek-abo with N) and of objects.
Prom 1.3 to 2.6, there is a shift in which the emphasis
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is on developing the idea of incongruity so that it applies 
to things and of grasping the concept of denial and con­
tradiction. These are the logical forms that underlie 
almost all adult jokes. And while the child is mastering 
this sort of very minimal logic (and, odder, that it is 
funny) he also seems to be coming to grips with the idea of 
pretending. By 2.6, R completely pretends to be BATMAN, 
SUPERMAN, MARINE BOY, THE PINK PANTHER and plenty of other 
characters. His characterisations are a trifle similar 
but they convince him and they convince most of the children 
he plays with.
Many of the games that R plays from 2.0 to 2,6 are 
ways of mastering these skills. From 3.6 to 6,4, N dis­
plays a concern for games that are not too dissimilar but 
they are more precise. N tries, as we ha\^ seen, to make 
jokes. His jokes are primitive and lack resolutions though 
by 4.6, he is capable of grasping some resolutions as in 
his perception of the fact that the joke about W. C. Fields* 
pineapple juice that was really gin is that W. C. Fields, 
disguising his booze as fruit juice, has no right to moan 
when he finds real pineapple juice in his pineapple juice.
By 6.0 N is capable of resolutions on a verbal level as in 
his comment on Aileen con^laining I was complaining and of 
seeing a double joke as in his remark on Per twin * s First 
Stand.
This ability to see resolutions is no way present round 
2.6. But, otherwise, R shows in a very embryonic form most
2A3
of the skills N used in his humour round 4.6. what:t clear 
is that between 2.6 and 4.6 there is a period in which there 
is an enormous amount of learning of humour. R is already 
elaborating concepts like his flying cucunber, playing about 
with rhymes which he insists we develop for him. He is 
beginning to grasp the idea of pretending not to just be 
Batman bit'.of being N*s mummy.
It has often been noticed that children love repetition.
N often asked for emd still asks for punch-lines to be repeated. 
He repeats them himself. N often looks for and waits for 
adult approval of a joke. He is recorded as asking is that 
funny? It seems he is testing out what is a joke. His 
actions are not unlike those of a person who is learning a 
skill. The skill has some set rules (like the cognitive 
ones I've tried to sketch) but much of it depends on practis­
ing the imagination.
The curious thing is that while such sophisticated 
intellectual happenings are happening, N at 3.6, still laughs 
if I loom over him and play-fight with him. So does R, in 
a less aggressive way, at 2.6. I have hinted at some connexion 
between aggressive laughter and naughty or teasing laughter 
which first appears in R at 1.2 and of which N is a past 
master at 3.6. Cefctainly, this form of laughter seems to 
be only a little connected with all the other kinds.
It has been argued that we laugh when we aggress because 
it is a way of expressing our mastery over people. An attempt
m '
been inafe ■ to link this with laughing at incongruities because 
by laughing we thus express our mastery over things. It seems 
to me much more plausible to link both aggression and "dirty" 
laughter as instances in which we use laughter both in order 
to come to grips with certain vetoes and, also, as a way of 
commenting upon them. P. and N parody fighting: R sometimes 
parodies toileting. In the case of "dirty" jokes, from the 
start, he seems to require them to have a conceptual embroider­
ing. He trots out Happy Aaah to the tune of Happy Birthday. 
Aggression in its raw form, as long as he is winning, however, 
can make R laugh. And winning a verbal tussle by having the 
last insulting word by which ve stun our rival into silence 
often provokes laughter in the adult. It does so in N at
6.4 when he has had that experience.
In other words, one has to set aside aggression and dirty 
laughing as being different from other kinds of laughing, even 
though jokes may involve features common to other laughs.
And, indeed, aggressive games may involve the kind of highly 
aroused physical stimulation that is successful in getting 
babies to laugh.
The other distinct form of laughter that begins to 
evolve round 6.0 is the ability to laugh at his own mistakes. 
Laughing at one's own physical mistakes is something that 
children often do from - certainly - 4.0 onwards. Usually,
" this is a very self-conscious form of laughter. With N, he 
does not find it difficult to laugh at his own physical mistakes 
and we have seen that at 2.5 R produces his first deliberate
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mistake in order to laugh. But it is learning to laugh at 
more inç>ortant errors than falling over a football which N 
finds difficult and is struggling towards.
There are too few instances here recorded to do more 
than speculate on how this kind of laughter originates. It 
seems likely that tlie first mistakes of his own a child will 
laugh at are instances of physical clumsiness. The child may 
tiian deliberately produce mistakes, parodying the correct 
way of doing it as R did with climbing stairs. In playgroups, 
round 4.0, many children seem to be verbally self-conscious 
and «ay "Oops" and then point out that tiicy've made a mistake 
which is something they laugh at. The intriguing transition 
is from this ability to laugh at physical errors to tiie ability 
to laugh at different sorts of mistakes, to laugh when one 
sees oneself in a detached way as, if you like, others see 
us. In saying son®tiling like "Oops, watcli me, I made a mis­
take", the child is able to compare his performance of kicking 
a football against a good performance of that act. But there 
is in N at 6.0, the start of an ability to laugh at himself 
on slightly more serious matters though it is slight. It 
seems probable that school where N is nervous that other# 
will laugh at him also teaches hiir the kinds of situation# 
in which others will see him as ridiculous. Ha does not laugh 
at himself when he makes mistakes othars would laugh at him 
for. Rather, it seems to be a process that might have helped
make n aware of limitations.
Thfe is an important and useful form of humour aa the 
ability to laugh at oneself can help one cope, often enough.
with problems. At N*s stage, such self-critical laughter 
is slight and would not be present in any major crisis, I 
predict. But one can see some signs of it.
Finally, these Invo case histories will, it is hoped, 
have done something to show how laughter occurs and is used 
in the family. In the making and moulding of relationships 
between me and N, me and R, Aileen and the children and between 
the children themselves, laughter plays an important part.
One is tempted to say that the famdly that laughs together 
lasts together. At least, it has fun. And tlie observations 
will have made clear the importance of relationships to people 
in the development of laughter.
Watson (1931), the supposedly grim father of behaviourism, 
recommended ways of training parents so that their children 
laughed more and cried less. Watson believed that you might 
be able to find an optimum level of so many laughs a day which 
indicated good adjustment. Without taking matters to such 
infinite precision, many of the observations recorded here did, 
among other things, allow those involved to enjoy being to­
gether. That was both a motive in some cases for people 
doing what they did and also an effect of the mutual laughter. 
Laughter helps to form bonds. But it would be wrong to go 
on to argue that this is the only purpose of laughter. We 
have already seen that N laughs alone when watching T.V. or 
reading a book.
From all this the essential complexity of laughter
emerges, I have tried to analyse roughly certain stages 
in the way that it develops. Beyond 6.4, there are, no 
doubt, further interesting developments to look at. I 
have tried to suggest that detailed observations of the 
kind T have done make some hypotheses about laughter seem 
a little too simple. Laughter comes from many reasons and 
achieves a number of ends. The most interesting aspect 
of the data is perhaps the intermingling of the cognitive 
and emotional uses of laughter. I have tried to sketch 
out a number of instances where laughing together is an 
important aspect of the growing bond between N and R. It 
also seems plain that, in the case of these two children 
and these two parents, laughing at each other and with 
each other was emotionally important, very much part of 
family life. Incongruity that led to laughter would not 
only foe a "cognitive" event but also an affective one.
The literature on children's laughter and humour hardly 
seems to mention this point. There, wo hardly ever laugh 
for fun or pleasure, a triumph of scientism. And yet the 
emotional bonds and pleasure the child gets out of laughter 
seem plain. This pleasure may also explain an oddity.
The data suggest that children's ability to laugh develops 
in ways that parallels their cognitive process but, despite 
that, children do not - vlose access to younger ways of 
laughing. Why should they h A g  on to ÿkéss^  Why should 
adults bother with such childish games if it weren't that 
laughing with others reminds us of one of our nicest early 
experiences?
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Laughter is not easy to evoke in the laboratory and 
this, it has been argued, pushed research into the realms 
of humour which isnere accessible to experimental manipulation. 
Having observed the laughter of ny own children, it seemed 
important to extend observations to other children too.
Between 1977 and 1980, I observed a series of playgroups in 
the course of their normal activities. Some of these 
observations were solo; others were with another observer.
The methods attempted in these observations will be detailed 
later. I also analysed the occasions of laughter on a long 
videotape of classroom life made for the ILEA Television 
Service. Finally, I brought the children from one playgroup 
into a studio amd filmed them. Sadly, the tapes of these 
three sessions were accidentally lost. Notes on the tapes 
do, however, remain.
The majority of the observations were made on the children 
of one playgroup in Greenwich. The children who attended 
were from very middle class families. By 1980, fees were 
£75 a term. The playgroup is run on Montessori lines. It 
only functions in the mornings. Children come between 9.00 a.m. 
and 9.15 a.m. and stay until 12.30. The group takes children 
from just before the age of three till they reach school age.
The oldest child was 4.11. In addition to the "real" members 
of the group, there was also a baby there since his mother, 
Julie, helped run the group.
The playgroup was created by an ex-headmistress.
Miss Sayer, who divides the three hours into time for play­
ing, time for working and two periods when the children are 
read stories. Unless the weather is bad, play times are out­
side in a small courtyard.
The space which the class has available indoors is one
very large room in which there are tables at which the
children sit. The tables are arranged in fours. There is 
also a toy corner, a library corner and a Wendy House. From 
9.30 to about 10.30, the children sit at tables and "work" 
on various puzzles, jigsaws, drawings and other games. The 
older children are encouraged to trace letters and numbers 
and to learn how to write their names. Miss Sayer and her 
two assistants circulate and spend time with each group of
children. The children have the freedom to decide what they
work on but they must work on something. The "work" periods 
are distinct from the "play" periods. For example, the 
Wendy House is a "play" space and does not get used until 
towards the end of work time. During the story period, for­
mality rules. The children sit in a ring, have milk and 
biscuits and listen to a story. Sometimes, a child tells a 
story and sometimes the children sing. There is also a 
prayer said usually. The children are expected to participate 
they hand the milk and biscuits round and count the group - 
and to concentrate on the business in hand.
Outdoors, there is a small courtyard which is full of 
equipment. There is a climbing frame in the middle, a number 
of old prams, a small slide, a see-saw, a tramipoline, many 
tricycles. It will be argued that the confined nature of 
this space affects the laughter that the children produce.
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During the course of these observations, the size of 
the group varied. The smallest size of group was 14 - 
7 boys, 7 girls and the largest was 21 - 11 boys and 10 
girls. The average across all observations was 17.4.
The method of observing was basic. With a notebook and 
a biro, I sat on the fringe of the group and recorded every 
instance of laughter I saw and heard. Before beginning for­
mal observations, I had done a dry run to let the children 
get used to me. It is likely that some occasions of laughter 
were missed, and in some cases, I heard laughter but by tlie 
time I turned to observe it, it was impossible to see what 
the situation which provoked the laughter might be. These 
instances are recorded as queries.
Any attempt to observe groups in such a way must lay
the observer open to criticism on the grounds that his
attention must be selective. He will see what he wants to
see, miss what he wants to miss and attribute the causes
that will fit his ideas. There is no way of rebutting
these possibilities other than to point to the great variety
of laughter whicli was recorded. Secondly, after the first
five of these observations, a second observer was brought in.
The temptation was, of course, to create a check list of
laughs as Groch (1974) had done and match our two checklists.
Instead of doing this which actually robs the observations
of much of their detail and richness, it was decided to get 
both observers to record what they saw. Normal measures of
inter-rater reliability are not very helpful here because, in
effect, the "raw" observations were of relatively detailed
behaviour which was being logged as it happened. The way in
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which the observations are recorded also reflects the 
observers. On the next pages are two detailed examples of
the different observations of the same events. I want to
argue that it is plausible to accept that both observers
witnessed the same events.
PLAYSCHOOL
W A 'j ïW
Inside
Outside
'Ta B Les
VlBhioy
H omSE*
,   , , .
ro-y (Cjpso f>vADJ| , c-'*
4 -i
PR A M f An O T H i c ^ a e SA\
SBe
SAW
! i I
i I ÎAW IA_i
m
DAY : December 4 1978
TIME : 9.47
#
Observer One
Fifi holds a small elephant wooden block on top of 
a pencil. Concentration. It drops off. She laughs. She 
repeats the process. The elephant is flung behind her.
Much laughter as she turns to pick it up. She puts the 
elephant block on a pencil a third time. It drops off 
again. This time, there is no laughter.
Jannine swings a thread of beads. She concentrates.
Hugo is standing on a chair and has built a pagoda of
animal blocks. He topples two off. Jannine is distracted
from the beads and laughs. A moment of tension - it seems -
round the pagoda. Then, they both shake the table, building 
up suspense. They both laugh. Jannine returns to swinging 
her beads. Hugo rearranges the blocks. Jannine hits them 
down and they both laugh. Then, Hugo builds the block up 
again and he hits them down. Jannine laughs.
Charlotte waves a Panda Bear at Giles who hits it.
They both laugh.
Observer T^ /o
Fifi tries to balance a wooden block on a stick and
laughs as it falls off to the floor. She spins it round
as the block balances on the stick by rotating the stick 
and laughs as the block flies off. After she's picked it up, 
she drops it again and laughs.
Hugo laughs, piles up a tower of bricks and laughs 
when the top two fall off.
Hugo balances plastic shapes on top of one another, 
humming a tune. He then laughs, looks up and Giles laughs.
Hugo picks up bricks which Jannine knocks down by swing­
ing her hand and they both laugh.
Charlotte shows her teddy/panda to Giles who bangs it 
on the head. They both laugh.
There are here clear contradictions between the observers. 
One sees a stick, the other a pencil. One sees a complicated 
interplay between Hugo and Jannine where the other just records 
that both Hugo and Jannine laugh after Jannine knocks the 
blocks off. But it should also be clear that, for all these, 
differences, the observers both record laughter occurring 
after Fifi drops the wooden block/elephant and both record 
laughter when Hugo's bricks topple and both record laughter 
when Charlotte's panda is banged by Giles. In other words, 
there is much similarity between the two observations - enough 
to indicate that at particular slices of time, both observers 
were seeing laughter in response to the same stimuli.
A second sat of observations is now offered for com­
parison. It is now near the end of the first session of work 
time - around 10.15. A group of children have been allowed 
into the Wendy House.
Observer One
Ben and Matthew laugh noisily as they climb in the
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corner of the house on the furniture. They giggle together 
as they squeeze into the comer. There ware squeals of 
delight and laughter as they climbed towards the radiator 
and pipe in the comer. They began to call it a boat.
Ben laughed repeatedly clinging to Matthew. The latter fell 
over in the corner and laughed loudly. He then said; "Shall 
I show you what I did?" He went back to the comer, each 
time he stumbled or lost his balamce, there ware squeals of 
laughter. He repeatedly climbed in the comer. He was now 
calling it a house and the comer was his playground.
"We've got a playground in our house, you know", said 
Matthew. They play and scramble in the comer. "You have 
to tumble and now I tumble", said Ben. Each one tries to 
climb and falls. Shrieks are heard as they tumble noisily.
Observer Two
Ben; "I'm on a climbing frame". He says this as he 
scrambles on to the bench and holds on to the wooden clothes 
pegs. Big laugh.
"You get on where I got on. You can get two people 
there", Ben laughs and Matthew laughs. They go on and Ben
greÜ3s the pipe. Both fall, a little giggly* Ben stays on
the bench by the pegs and says; "Matthew, quick, get on our
own boat, boat, quick get on our boat". There is much laughter
Matthew clatmbers up. Ben grabs Matthew and laughs. "Quick,
quick, stay in our car", he laughs and falls off and giggles.
Matthew; "Shall I show you what I did?" He says that twice,
laughs. "Stand up in our car".
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Ben swings on the pegs, laughs, wild giggles.
Matthew: "Shall we go and live in our new home". Louisa
and Camilla lose interest. Matthew climbs down from pegs;
"This could be our house". Ben: "This is our new houser ^ *2
here's the playground". Ben falls off and laughs. "This is
the trickiest bit", he clarobers back on the bench. They 
lean against .... Ben; "Now you have to tumble". Wild
laughter as they try to fall and, then, climb up. "Now you
get on". Ben laughs before he falls off the bench and after.
Matthew; "I can do that". Ben: "It's better when two people
are up". Matthew puts his legs up on the pegs. Wild laughter.
Louisa leaves. "Ben be careful". Ben; "I'm falling". He
laughs as he does so.
Again, though there are contradictions between the two 
accounts and though the second account is more detailed, 
it seems clear that both these observations record a long 
game in which the children scrambled off and on the bench, 
laughing as they tumbled. The game had a nice elaboration 
so that the bench they fell off was in turn, a boat, a car, 
a house, a playground. Matthew and Ben were quite deliberate 
in making themselves laugh as when one of them offered to 
show the other what he had done which was so funny - a clear 
invitation to the laugh.
The value of the joint naturalistic observation technique 
is that, while preserving the data in its detail and richness, 
it provided some check on ny own rampant prejudices. Tliere 
is no satisfactory way of making any detailed statistical 
account of inter-observer reliability in such a situation
really* First, there were a number of times during joint
observations when one observer was looking one way and the
other looking in a different direction in the room. Both
observers were gambling on what situation was likely to
provoke laughter. The rewards of gambling right were rich
because one could trace in some detail tiie evolution of a
situation which had led to laughter. But the risk was
that what one observer might see, the other might miss.
Second, when it seems clear that the same situation was
being witnessed by both observers, there were contradictions
between the accounts. Laughter is often the product of
complex situations so that any check of inter-observer 
reliability has to be ver^rough.
On the following page, I offer the following figures 
which seem to me to have a salient value.
First, the total number of laughs per session (i) when 
observing solo, (ii) when observing with another person and 
(iii) the other observer's count of laughs. It will be seen 
that there is not that much difference. No magic should 
attach to these figures. I have counted up incidents of 
laughter rather than each laugh. That means that if one 
child laughs twice when dropping a block and then dropping 
it again, that makes for two incidents. If on the other 
hand, three children laugh when one and the same block is 
dropped that is still just one incident of laughter. The 
reason for that was that, often, there were children on 
the outside of a game who chuckled or laughed a little at 
what they saw. Given our resources - and aims - it seemed 
better to try "and unravel the situations which provoked
laughter. It should also be noted that Session 3 of my 
solo observations produced far more laughter. This session 
lasted 20 minutes longer than others because parents were 
late turning up. During the 20 minutes, one very laughter- 
provoking game was played by the «lide and there were a 
number of see-saw laughs too.
INCIDENTS OF LAUGHTER
SOLO OBSERVATIONS
1. 64
2. 77
3. 126
4. 69
JOINT OBSERVATIONS
Self Other OJ
1. 91 93
2. 61 43
3. 57 50
4. 50 66
81 62
Finally, it should be noted that none of the observers 
claimed to see a radically different kind of laughter or 
failed to spot some instance of the other kinds of laughter 
seen by other observers. Purely intuitively, it was not 
usually very difficult to guess what had led to a particular 
burst of laughter. Given the figures for occasions of
laughter seen by both observers, given the fact that 
this investigation is trying to describe various forms 
of laughter and given the plausibility of the accounts 
offered, it seems reasonable to pool the observations 
of laughter in the playgroup in an attempt to analyse 
them properly.
As in the sections on my own children, the following 
pages distinguish between observations and interpretations 
with interpretations being set in italics. Each section 
on a particular kind of laughter has an introduction, 
observations laced with interpretative statements and 
a theoretical summary. The observations have been
divided - again - with letters to denote each particular
kind of laughter. Nevertheless, there are instances 
of laughter here not found in the home and instances found 
in the home not found in the playground. The letters 
for a particular kind of laughter are the same as in 
the observations of my own children.
These sections are;
1. Noises auid Recognition (B)
2. Affectionate Laughter (G)
3. Falling (AA)
4. Mistakes (Z)
5. Baby (BB)
6. Incongruities (H)
7. Outside Equipment which is itself divided into;- 
See-saw (S)
Tricycle and Chases (T)
Climbing Frame (U)
Slide (V)
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Other Outdoor Activities (w)
8. On the Borders (X)
9. Book Comer (Y)
10. Naughty Laughter (N)
11. Aggressive Laughter (M)
12. Pretending and Gaines including 
Spaces to Imagine (O)
In his own early account of laughter, Spencer (1860) 
argued that laughter was the result of a bubbling over of 
energy, giggling glee. This allowed the motor system to 
discharge excess energy. For him, there seemed to be no 
particular cause for much of the laughter of children.
There were a number of instances recorded of children skip­
ping or hopping or running with glee. Groch (1974) argued 
that 7% of laughter was due to this.
Outside, James jumped up and down and laughed but 
then decided to pick up a broom and sweep the courtyard. 
Inside, Caroline skips and laughs a little as she does so. 
Karen follows her but does not laugh. Another day, Karen 
jumps up and down and laughs for no apparent reason. There 
certainly are occasions when there is a lot of physical 
action involved in the activity wlwi provokes laughter 
such as when the children jump off the bench or when they 
wave a shampoo hose at each other but, in such cases, it 
has taken more than the pure energy of movement to produce 
laughter. The instances in which there seemed to be 
laughter as a result of only energetic movement, bouncing
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up and dcTATn seemed no more than 29 out of 990 - a \rery 
small nuirfoer. It might be argued that one reason why 
Groch (1974) found more of thlsglee-type of laughter was 
precisely a result of her checklist methodology. That 
offered no other possible classification for some out­
bursts which in a naturalistic description could be 
accounted for more precisely.
An interesting variation of glee laughter often 
accompanied j imping up and down on the small trampoline 
outside. The trampoline tended to be used by the girls 
or the younger children. Usually, laughter occurred not 
when one child in isolation jumped up and down on the 
trampoline but when two children did so. James once 
clapped as Karen jumped up and down on the trampoline.
Emma laughed. Later in that sam#; day, Emma |^^pwas 
again bouncing on the trampoline, making a noise and 
laughing. Emma seems very fond of the trampoline; her 
solitary laughter as she bounces is one of the few 
instances of that on the trampoline. It is curious that, 
children will laugh alone when they jump up and down on 
their feet but, on the trampoline, specially designed 
for j imping up and down, they tend only to laugh when 
another child is watching.
Though the kind of glee laughter Spencer described
was rare without some trigger or apparent cause, there
were some "inexplicable" outbursts.
NOISES AND RECOGNITION (B)
Intuitively, the laughter that seems closest to this 
unprovoked glee is laughter that is triggered by noise. In
302
iry observations of my own children, I argued there were 
many cases when N and R made a noise deliberately and 
then laughed. The saxr® pattern could be found in the 
playgroup.
Jamie bangP the diamond shapes on the table and
laugh^^ (B.14). Gabriel drops two metal shapes on
the table which clang loudly; he laughs. (B.15).
Other times, the noise can be less rough. Nathan
jiggles a large coloured shape and sings a tune as he
does so, laughing. (B.16). Gabriel bangs the wall
hard with his hand, makes an exaggerated sound and laughs.
(3.3^ 7). A few moments later, he runs into the Wendy
House and bangs the walls and tables with his hand,
laughing as he does so. (B.18). Jamie sits at a table
making whiny noises to himself and chuckling. (B.19)
Outside, Angus makes whirring noises like a robot and 
grins as he does so. (B.20)
Often,in the book corner, the children imitate 
animal noises and laugh riotously as they do so ~ an 
area which I will examine further under the heading of 
fantasies. I4iss Sayer and her assistants do their best 
to keep the class playgroup moderately quiet while they 
are inside. Outside, tiie children scream as they run 
around and crash.
INTERPRETATIVS:
It ia notiaeable that many of the aationa ahiah go with 
laughter outaide - like oraahing the trioyolea or going 
on the aee-aaw - are aeaompanied by egetatio aqueala.
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A88um%ng that one of the funotione of taughtep may 
t>noZude both oveat'vng and di,8Qhavg%ng avoueaX — a 
hypothee'ie that eeeme plaueibte — it %8 inteveeting 
that the 'ieve'i of not-ee produced in oon^unotion with 
laughter ta high.
AFFECTIONATE LAUGHTER (G)
Instances of affectionate laughter were rare though 
there were instances when thechildren cuddled each 
other and laughed as Daniel and Jamie did in the book 
corner. Fifi kissed Karen and both girls laughed. (G.8) 
Another time, Rupert says; "We love you" to Fifi who 
laughs. (G.9) Physical contact that was affectionate 
but not cuddly made the children laugh a few times.
Karen chuckles and Charlotte when they lift^up their 
elbows and touch them against each other. Karen chuckles 
and Charlotte grins. (G.IO) Another instance : Daniel 
and Reuben are looking at a picture of a cowboy. Daniel 
says the cowboy in the picture is going "to shoot away" 
and he tickles Reuben's cheek. Reuben laughs. (G.ll) 
Reuben and Daniel then touch each other's noses. Reuben 
laughs and Daniel chuckles, (G.12) In the Wendy House, 
at a different time, Jamie and Daniel find that Hugo 
is tickling their faces by waving a feather duster. All 
three laugh. They then proceed to wave the duster out 
of the Wendy House. (G.13) Finally, two girls - 
Charlotte and Henrietta - wave their fingers menacingly 
in front of each other's faces and make clawing noises. 
They laugh as they do so. It is very intimate aggresdon 
between them. (G.14)
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In the playgroup, there were also many instances 
of recognition laughter. For exaitple, a child would 
peep round the door of the Wendy House, be seen and 
both laugh himself and get a laugh. (G.^)
Emma laughs when she sees Oliver through the gap 
in the Book Corner "wall" from across the room. They 
stick out their tongues to each other and both laugh. 
(G.ll). Son® times, the teachers deliberately pretend 
not to recognise something as a tease. Toby sticks a 
magnet under a piece of metal, showing Julie the top 
only. Then, he inverts it to show the magnet.  ^Julie 
exclaims: "Oh" and Toby laughs. (G.^)
Sometimes, objects can provoke the same reaction. 
When it is close to Christmas, the children are clearly 
excited by the Christmas decorations hanging all over 
the room. On a number of occasions, they point at them, 
add licking noises like "Ooaah" and laugh. (GJ-7^ ). 
Magazines occasicaially gave the children a laugh.
Once, Emma points out to Fifi and Karen a picture in the 
magazine and laughs. Fifi: "We've got one of those" 
and she laughs. (GJLë) *
■Vif?
THEORETICAL SUMMARY:
The playgroup throws up both noisy laughter and 
recognition lauÿiter very much in the manner of the 
home observations. What is perhaps most interesting about 
this laughter is that it is usually mild and isolated.
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Few noises - ^ 2.^  make the diildren go wild with laughter. 
The change in stimulation which has bean proposed as 
the cause of laughter does not seen, by itself, to make 
for very- powerful lüwghter. It is there and can often 
happen but it has none of tiie driving power of other 
forma of laughter.
FALLING (AA)
INTRODUCTim :
Those with the stamina to remember some of the 
jokes in the introduction may recall Wolfenstein's com­
plex interpretation of the joke drawing of the big hat.
The big hat was the penis rendered symbolically impotent 
due especially to the drawing of big ears. In the play­
group, phallic symbols ware less far-fetcned. In fact, 
it could be argued that much of the equipment the children 
used was a Freudian's dream. There were plastic snakes 
that could be extended and, sometimes, the little boys 
waved them at each other. There were all the blocks 
the children used to build towers, towers of such toppl­
ing size. The exa»<ple used earlier of Hugo building a 
pagoda which he and Jannine then knocked down to huge 
laughter was often repeated.
OBSERVATIONS ;
Another observation records Karen telling Fifi to 
make a taller building, "a taller one - out of the Lego
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blocks". Daniel says to Fifi; "it's going to be a 
big building and he laughs, Fifi launhs excitedly as 
it grows bigger and she comments on its size. It falls 
as she tries to place another brick on and the bricks 
clatter to the floor. She laughs and bends to pick 
them up. After that, Fifi starts to rebuild the tower.
She announces that the tower will reach the ceiling.
She climbs on to a chair to be better able to build it 
higher. On the chair she lau^s and she laughs slightly 
mora quietly when the tower falls over. But she still 
builds it up again, clambering from her ciiair to pick 
up the pieces and then getting back on to the chair, 
to fix them up again. (AA.1)
A few minutes later, Fifi* "It won't stand up.
You have to hold it up". She laughs, then it falls, 
she laughs. A few minutes later Henrietta and Charlotte 
are building a tower with lego pieces. Tiiey concentrate 
very hard and count tiie blocks aloud. "One, two, three," 
both observers noticed Henrietta and Charlotte at tiie 
same game. To Indicate the reliability of these joint 
observations here are separate versions of the game;
Observer One
Henrietta and Charlotte are building a tower with lego 
pieces. Tiiey concentrate very hard and count the blocks 
aloud. "One, two, three, four, five ... " They get to 
number 18, they scream and smile and laugh. Then the 
tower collapses. Henrietta holds one brick up. Charlotte 
laughs. Charlotte holds one brick up. Henrietta laughs. 
They begin to rebuild it. And laugh again. (AA.2)
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Observer Two
Henrietta and Charlotte play with the small plastic 
bricks. Henrietta laughs. They count together the 
number of bricks in the tower and when Uie last one has 
been counted, they smile broadly. Henrietta holds the 
tower in her hands and says: "Look h w  big it is". It 
collapses and both laugh loudly. Henrietta laughs again 
as the length of bricks she is holding breaks up.
They build up a tower again but it collapses once more 
and both laugh as it falls to the floor.
Juli e t h e  assistant) says they've got one piece of 
tower upside down. They look at the tower, realise it 
and laugh. (AA.2A)
It is wortli noting that the pattern here continues. 
A few minutes later the same game is being played by 
Henrietta and Charlotte. Henrietta says: "Let's build 
a super rocket". Charlotte says % "Let's build one for 
me and one for you". They set to building up again. 
(AA.3)
lETERPRSTATIVE:
It aeeniB to me that there is a relatively simple way 
to account for the persistence of laughter in this atf- 
uation. In building up the tower^ the children exhibit 
skill and mastery^ They also know - or at least have 
had experience - of the building up being followed by 
the bricks either falling down of their own accord or 
being knocked by them. There ia destructiveness in the
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e’i'tuat'von hut tt •ta not unexpected. There are aZao 
similar situations in which the ohildren laugh, both when 
they make, and when they break, structures.
There is a long snake which can be made using 
different coloured blocks, Jamie interferes with tlio 
snake, "All different colours" and laughs. A few
minutes later, Matthew breaks up tlie snake blocks and 
laughs. Arrry then breaks up the second half of the 
snake and laughs, Matthew grabs back some of these 
blocks for his end of the snake and laughs. Matthew 
noTf comes close to me as he finishes that end of the 
snake. 1 touch the end of the snake with my toe. Both 
Z4atthew and Amy laugn. Then, Hiss Sayer arrives and 
breaks up the snake to move it to another part of the 
room. When she breaks up the snake, there is no 
laughter. (AA.4)
It is interesting to compare the reaction of the 
children when things fall to when they fall themselves. 
Usually, when the children fall in the playgroup, they 
are falling deliberately in the way that Ben and 
Matthew did when scrambling over their bench-boat-car- 
house. (AA. 5)
Caroline on the trampoline falls on to her bottom 
a bit roughly and says ; “Hahaha. I laughed 'cos I did 
something funny. Anr^'watch". And, for the benefit 
of Amy, she acts out again what she did. (AA.6)
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On tne bencJi, Matthew does the same thing when, 
having fallen off, he tells Ben that ha will show him 
what he just did that was funny - fall off. (AA. 7)
JaiTde laughs o n œ  when he falls off the chair and, 
again, when Nathan falls off the dialr. (AA.8)
There are also instances when the children del­
iberately set out to make mistakes and then laugh at 
the mistakes they have made. Henrietta and Charlotte 
laugh as tliey put tlie piece of a jigsaw in the wrong 
place. Sara and Jamie are playing with an elastic 
bracelet whan Sam sayss ”Soraetimas you can do it the 
wrong way up". He demonstrates the mistake to Jamie 
and they lau^. (AA.9)
THBOPETICAb SUMMARY:
The frequency of laughter at objects falling is 
such that it needs some explanation. Bergson (1911) in 
Le Rira said that the reason we laughed at a man falling 
on a banana peel was the contrast between the dignity 
of the man - let him wear a bowler and a pin-striped suit 
and the humiliation of falling down - preferably on an 
ample behind. But while Bergson may explain the sit­
uation in which the bowler-hatted bourgeois is banana- 
skinned and netrayed, his version does not cope too well 
with the playgroup where it is almost a ritual. (At 
home, such laughter at falling objects is rare, and not 
part of a ritual). Control rather than contrast may be 
the clue.
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It is paradoxically, easier to get to grips 
witTi why children may laugh when they fall than 
whan objects fall. Falling can be dangerous. When 
Ben and Matthew clamber up and down the bench by the 
clothes pegs, they are mimicking situations in which 
there could be real danger. They fantasise that tliQ 
bench is a boat and a car which they fall off - both
m .--
. _
possibly lethal. In the courtyard outside, the children 
often also squeal with laughter on the see-saw and, 
occasionally, on the trajmpoline. Both these pieces involve 
sensations of falling, m e n  Caroline falls on the traiapoline, 
she also laughs at her own mistake in falling and yells 
"Amy watdi" while she replays - this tine under her full 
control - the business of falling. Matthev offers also to 
replay his fall off the bench for Ben. In these situations, 
the children seem to ba acting out in a controlled or safe 
way something which could be genuinely frightening. Often, 
young as they are, the children seem to be quite conscious 
of doing so. It seems clear that laughter is involved in 
these performances of actions of "controlled terror”. To 
say that, however, is not to specify either what causes 
the laughter, or what its function is. It seems plausible 
to argue that one of its functions is to act as a signal 
both to the ^uglier and to any audience he might have that 
what is happening is actually under control. In offering 
to replay something which was risky and funny and laughing 
during it, Matthew seems clearly to be offering up the 
laughter as a signal of safety. Given that, it is surely 
worth pointing two parallels. First, our use of language 
tells us that we both shriek and scream with fear as well 
as with laughter. In a bad horror film, it's sometimes not 
possible to disentangle the two. Secondly, these falling 
games the children play bear a canny resemblance to the games 
adults played with them when they were younger. In my 
observations of N and R, I often describe how tiiey laughed 
when being thrown up and down and caught. Now older, these
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children cam contrive their own safe falls.
As for the extent that laughter is a signal, that 
can only be part of the explanation. In many of these 
outbursts of laughter, the laughter is extended only to be 
a signal that this is not a real performance, only to denote 
the fact that the performance we are seeing is not truly 
death-defying. Yet observations both in this group and 
with N and R suggest that ten, during such outbursts of 
laughter close to, or involving fear, the laughs are long, 
giggly and very extended. There is teo much of them for 
them to be only signals. That leaves the tricky problem 
of deciding what else the cause and function of the 
laughter in such situations is. ,
Paradoxically, it is easier to account for laughter 
when one falls than when one sees objects fall. It is 
clear from the frequent repetition of the gaune when towers 
are built amd bashed down that this game is liked by the 
children. They could build different structures with the 
bricks; they do not have to knock them down. Freudians 
would probably point to fear of the phallus in these 
destructive performances. When the tower falls, it is yet 
again the mighty or the bourgeois or the phallus falling 
on the banana skin. Power is being mocked; laughter is 
subversive; to destroy is freeing. But the children are 
building amd destroying. The entire action can be seen 
as proof - to the child by the child - that he can take 
control of, and mould, his environment. In some of the 
descriptions given, two children built the tower and it
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might be said that the laughter was also a signal between 
them. But Jamie, for instance, laughed alone while toppling 
the tower and, before Hugo played with Jannine, Hugo laughed 
alone. What seems to be essential to the situation is that 
the events are predictable. From the time the child begins 
to build up the tower, he or she knows what will happen in 
the end. I never saw a session at which a tower had been 
left untoppled even thou^ Fifi once was so bored that she 
did not laugh when she bashed her tower down for the fourth 
time that day. But the predictability is paramount. The 
child piles block on top of Hock. Often there is some feel­
ing of when the tower is getting so tall as to become 
unstable. In other cases, of course, the child decides it 
is time to knock it down. Some amalyses of laughter argue 
that surprise is a key cause. Here, there is no surprise.
And there is often anticipatory giggling before the final 
movement to bring the tower down comes. Hugo and Jannine 
rocked the tower.
But to suggest that control is involved does not 
actually clarify either the cause or the function of the 
laughter. Does the child laugh because it is exercising 
control over the situation? In the context of falling one­
self, it is easier to see that the laughter might be a border­
line behaviour between fear and mastery over the fear? But 
unless one accepts deep symbolism and makes the towers stand 
for phalluses or high-rise blocks (or why not both?) it 
seems far-fetched to claim that in watching these bits of Lego 
fall the child is enjoying some more profound triumph. Moreover,
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as we shall see in dealing with fantasy games, the 
children can invest toys and masks with all kinds of 
evident fantasy meanings. So why should they not be 
literal about the Lego bricks? Charlotte and Henrietta 
once referred to them as "super rockets" but otherwise, 
the children call them towers or bricks or buildings 
and invest them - in words at least - with no vaster 
significance.
In other words, it is not easy to argue that the 
reasons that make children laugh when they fall, or 
pretend to fall, are the same as make the children 
laugh when they make toys fall over. Yet this last kind 
of laughter is frequent. The children often set up 
situations in which it is guaranteed. IÉ; is also 
the kind of ritual performance - the children do each 
day - that observations of N and R in the house found 
few of. Part of the reason lies, of course, in the 
very structure of the group. Given the same sort of 
toys to play with each day and given that the children 
had to do something with the blocks, why not this? It 
could be argued that such observations, as well as 
many others in tiiis chapter, hint at the fact that much 
laughter in the classroom may be stereotyped. The 
children can do wilier things but do not usually do 
so.
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MISTAKES (2)
In the group, mistakes provoked two kinds of
laue^ter. There were straightforward cases when
children laughed because another one of them had made
a mistake. Daniel, for instance, points to Jamie that
Jamie is wearing a tabard the wrong wav round. (Z.l see also 
M.4S)
Daniel laughs: Jairio initially does not. Oliver
cornss lato tlia room wearing a hat. Angus sees Oliver 
with a hac on and sayss "It's not outside so he shouldn't 
he wearing a hat*. (2.2)
Outside, Jo jo falls over a tricycle ; Tom laughs.
(2.3).
Jamie laughs as Nathan fits together the jigsaw 
puzzle of a person wrongly. (2.4).
Angus laughs at Giles because Giles keeps on mak­
ing mistakes as he tries to recite Humpty Dumpty. (2.$3
There are occasions when tne children bump into 
each other by mistake and both of them laugh. Oliver 
and Emma bump into each other in tlie centre of the room 
and both laugh. (2.6)
Another time, outside, Matthew crashes into Oliver, 
Even though Oliver is the victim, he laughs. (2.7)
INTERPRETATIVE: f
Ab wb Bhalt 860 in looking at earns of the patterne of 
play outside, one of the best devieea for provoking 
laughter are the chases and crashes on tricycles which
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the children engineer. But ahen the children bump into 
each other by accident, the laughter eeeme to help 
defuse the situation,
The children can also aoroetiir.Qs laugh when they 
ara stumped. Gabriel, for example, finds it impossible 
to unstick a nuitber of magnets and, even when he sj&akes 
them, they won't coma apart. As this happens, as he 
shakes them, he laughs. (2.8)
He also laughs as he tells Oliver tii«t some tiling 
will not slide under tne magnets. (ZL9)
A few minutas later, still coping with the un­
sticking magnets, Gabriel waves them and asks Julie;
"Do you think this is a man?" Julie says it has no 
head. Gabriel laughs as he holds the toy up. (2.10)
Another time, Gabriel makes a mistake fitting a 
puzzle together, says to Toby: "That's not right".
Toby says: "No". They both laugh. (Z.ll)
Fifi lau^s when a falling tower hits her. (2.12)
BABY (BB)
The role of the baby in the room is interesting. 
Sometimes, he laughs as when one of the assistants towers 
over him but, usually, he watches in his harness or play­
pen. Some of the diildren occasionally wander over to­
wards him and use the moment to imitate the baby. Daniel
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imitaUiu toe baby's cry and cakes a furmy face as he
ÙOtiS  S O .  ( B â . l )
When Julie comas to cuddle the crying baby, Daniel 
wanders back to the garage. Another time, Oliver smiles 
at tirie baby who is dropping bricks on the floor.
Oliver w.^lks over to the baby, picks up his blocks, 
says: "What are you doing with that?" looking closely 
into the baby's face and, then, laughing, (BB.2)
One of the funny points about that is that Oliver 
sounds just like the teachers usually do. Karen laughs 
as she watches Julie tell off the baby for having 
reached out and taken soim of the paper that Karen had 
cut. (BB.3)
Anotlier time, Julie is holding the baby as she 
helps Reuben with the stick counting toy. The baby 
takes out a stick that Reuben has just put in and 
counted. Reuben laughs. Julie tells the baby off and 
Reuben laughs again. (BB.4)
After a few minutas the baby grabs Reuben's finger, 
waggles it and then puts it in the space in the toy 
marked no.5. Reuben laughs: "He did this", he says.
(BB.5)
The baby can be naughty and the children see his 
naughtiness as funny. His smallness gives them, of 
course, tlie chance to act big. Karen once wanders over
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to the baby and smiles: «I really mean it, baby". Her 
tone, so like Oliver's, has just that adult stridency. 
(BB.6)
Not all interactions with the baby have this 
pattern. Once, Daniel just plays with hto and laughs 
v/hen Jannine comes over to watch. Rebecca and Emma 
bring toys over to the baby and smile as they do so.
They approach with heavy, exaggerated steps. Karen 
approaches also and laughs as she gets close to the 
baby. (BB.7)
THEORLTICAL SUMMARY;
In the main, when the children bring the baby into 
their games it is to mock his babyhood and glory in 
their relative maturity. Pointing to the baby's mis­
takes is a soaWte of laughter. Once, outside, Sam 
and Caroline have the following exchange:
Caroline: "My baby said Tickle. Tick$»". She laughs. 
Sam laughs and replies: mother said to baby '»v*here's
your poo*?"
These exairples of how mistakes provoke the children 
to laugh suggest again the power of laughter. It seems 
to punctuate behaviour whose function is to prove that 
the child is not out of control of the situation.
INCONGRUITIES (H)
INTRODUCTim :
Many texts on laughter point to incongruity as a
319
fundamantal cause of laughter without explaining why 
it should be. Bergson's analysis of the contrast between 
the pompous bourgeois and his condition after slipping 
on the banana skin describes an occasion of laughter 
but without explaining why the response to such con­
trast should be laughter.
In the observations of iry own children, I pointed 
cut many instances of incongruities and attempted to 
map the development of ever more complex incongruities. 
One of the points to emerge was tne way in which in­
congruities were threaded into various fantasy games 
that the children played. Similar instances occurred 
in the playground and, as with ny own children, it was 
interesting to see how often the children tnenfflelves 
created their own incongruities and elaborated them in 
their fantasies. In tnis section, I outline a series 
of fairly simple incongruities since I feel it is im­
portant to try and give a flavour of the more complicated 
games the children played both outside and in the Wendy 
House.
OBSERVATIONS :
In the playground, Damian sits in an upturned car
and drives it by pushing the rods that hold the wheels.
He makes odd noises out he does not actually laugh. 
Caroline notices Damian and comments: "He's sitting odd". 
But she, too, does not laugh. Laughter only arrives 
when Sam turns up having finished playing a game in which 
he swopped nats and uegins to fignt Dainian. ^am pulls
at the wheels and laughs, Damian does not laugh.
Certainly, not every incongruity produces laughter.
(H.55)
One interesting toy in the group is an inflated 
plastic skeleton. This does produce considerable laughter, 
Jojo drops it into the cart and laughs. Later, inside, 
Angus puts the skeleton on top of a soft toy, a donkey. 
Carol and Fifi laugh at that sight and laugh again when 
the skeleton falls off the donkey. They know what the 
skeleton doll represents but what meaning it has for 
them is impossible to say, (H, 56, see also W.l)
There are a number of occasions when the children 
turn objects into something unexpected and incongruous 
and this makes them laugh. Jojo uses little plastic 
squares to make himself sunglasses, wears them and 
laughs. (H.57)
In the games that are played in the Wendy House 
incongruities often surface. The children, for instance, 
alternate between using a stethoscope like a doctor would. 
They use it on the body seriously and alternate with 
blowing down the stethoscope. The latter often makes 
them laugh quite irrespective of what point in a game 
it occurs. Hats, too, are excellent starting points for 
incongruities. Reuben, in the middle of playing Batman 
in the Wendy House, puts a vegetable basket on his head 
and says: "Hello" several times and laughs. He then 
doffs a pot and says: "There's my hat" and laughs. He
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then tcüces off the pot and puts yet another basket on 
his head and says: "Here's my hat” and laughs again.
It is not clear what Batman has been up to during this 
display of unlikely millinery. There can be an aggressive 
element to this hatting game. Hugo puts a box on Giles* 
head. Such incongruities are weaved into long geuoes 
in which many different kinds of things make the children 
laugh. (H.58)
One of the best examples of the children being 
inventively incongruous comes from Toby. One morning 
Toby has been playing a long time with magnets and des­
cribing their sticking together as magic. He then makes 
a puppet out of the magnets. He is proud of his creation 
because he walks around the room showing children and 
teachers his magnet-puppet. He laughs as he displays 
it and laughs when he sits back down at the table. He 
then traipses off to the book corner but returns after 
two or three minutes to his table and magnets. He now 
makes a clown out of the magnets, shows it to Julie and 
explains which bit of the body each magnet is. He smiles 
broadly as he does this and ccxitinues chiuckling as he 
goes on fiddling with the r*agnets. Toby then admires 
Nathan's picture man who is made up out of three cards 
and 1 ^ 0 % .  He then shews Julie his own magnet-clown 
and says: "He only has one leg because someone chopped 
the other off". He laughs. (H.59 ,^ also 0.47)
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Verbal incongruities are rarer. I looked in the 
Noise section at simple punning cuid words that were 
deliberately jumbled. But the playgroup also produced 
the odd infantile bon mot. (And, usually, the children 
knew when they had said something witty). Caroline 
notices that her cake is squashed at break time and 
says: "Father Christmas sat on my cake". She lau«^s. 
(H.60)
Drinking his very ordinary milk, Angus declares:
"I thought that this was a milkshake", and laughs. (H.61)
Daniel describes a picture in a book as "a fish 
in the air" and laughs, an idea that he seems to find 
very funny. (H.62)
Matthew points out to Miss Sayer that, in the book 
she is reading, "the fish is in a push chair" and he 
laughs. (H.63)
When they are reading the Night Kitchen by Maurice 
Sendak - a book which manages to produce much naughty 
laughter - Tom laughs at the idea tliat roof tops should 
be kitchen implements. (H.64) (In the story, there 
are lots of kitchen implements on the roof tops and 
Nickie travels across a skyline of colanders, frying 
pans, saucepans and kettles). This incongruity, however, 
produces less laughter than the statement that Nickie 
"is a poo".
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THEORETICAL SUMMARY;
A final interesting game that the children play 
which includes incongruity is that of running cars up 
and down each otlier. I look at this game in detail 
under the heading of aggression because it seems to me 
that it is, essentially, an aggressive game made more 
permissible under this funny guise. Very early on, 
then, certainly by 3.6 children in this playgroup can 
use incongruity as a means of being acceptably hostile, 
ifhen they run cars over each otlier, they are usually 
very rude as well as noisy to each other.
There is another whole class of laughter which is 
incongruous but also comes in most in long games. When 
the children mime and pretend to be doing things - like 
peering tea out of a teapot but no tea comes, of course, 
since there is none and they know there is none - part 
of the laughter must be linked with incongruity. After
all, pretending any action involves a split between what
V
you are actually doing and what those actions are 
standing for and pretending to be. But it seems more 
interesting to analyse these pretences in the context 
of long gaunes.
Isolated incongruities, therefore, make the 
children laugh and they often go out of their way to 
make them. The most interesting feature of these in­
congruities was that they often were part of games in 
which there were mamy different kinds of laughter. In 
otiier words, once the children were laughing, they 
often found many different kinds of situations funny.
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OUTSIDE EQUIPMENT : THE SEE SAW (S)
Before school proper - between 9.00 and 9.20 - 
the children play outside in a small courtyard. They 
return there around 11 o'clock and, then again, after 
12.15 if their parents are late to pick them up. The 
courtyard is small and crammed with equipment. I have 
described the laughter observed close to particular 
pieces of equipment since some of the equipment was 
quite distinctive in what games it provoked and inspired.
The see-saw was very effective in making the
children laugh. At the start of the day, the children
are in the courtyard. Two boys, Angus and Robert, see­
saw and laugh. (S.l) A few minutes later, Angus has 
a different partner on the see-saw, Jojo. Jojo laughs 
only slowly and makes a sound rather like "ugh u#i".
Soon, Angus gets off the see-saw. (S.2) A child 
does not have to have either a partner or swift 
movements up and down the see-saw in order to laugh, 
though laughter is more frequent given either of these 
two. Jojo stays on the see-saw by himself rocking him­
self gently. He laughs at Robert and saysi "It's good 
isn't it?" Robert fails to pay him any attention at 
first. (S. 3)
The first time Angus leaves the see-saw, he swings
under the bar of the see-saw and laughs as he does so.
(S.4)
Robert now is on tlie see-saw and stays on it.
He see-saws and joggles his body but he does not laugh 
at his movement. (S.5)
After one story period, Miss Sayer sends out the 
girls to play alone. Charlotte makes for the see-saw.
She laughs. (S.6) She is joined by Amy and, as they 
awing up and down, they laugh a great deal. (S. 7)
In the final outdoor session, there is once a 
refinement to see-sawing. It is the girls again.
Caroline II and Sophie start out just by see sawing amd 
laughing as they do so. Then Sophie puts her arms out 
each tiir« she is down. She laughs. Caroline II puts 
her arms out - stretched horizontally - each time she 
reaches the top. Each of the girls laughs as she 
carries out this movement which is, of course, a little 
risky as they're not holding on. It's boisterous.
They carry on with this pattern for about ten see-saws. 
Caroline II adds "Aaah" and laughs. Suddenly there are 
four see-saws without any laughter. (S.8) Then, for no 
clear reason, the two girls start to laugh again. Within 
thirty seconds, however, Caroline II gets off the see­
saw. Sophie stays on the see-saw and is joined by 
another girl, Karen. This time, as they see-saw the 
build up to laughter is slow. Sophie does not at once 
continue the pattern of putting her arms out. But 
soon Sophie says: "Look I'm swinging like a little bird". 
She puts her arms out again letting go. It is not as 
risky as with Cardine II. There is intermittent laughter, 
Sophie calls to Caroline II "Look ..." (S.9)
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There is no clear response from Caroline II.
Things on the see-saw calm down. Sophie and Karen 
see-saw on. Soon, however, Karen Is distracted by 
playing in the barrel. That ends their episode on 
the see-saw. Later, Sophie goes back to the see-saw 
and yells "Umpty-Dumpty-Thumpty" as she moves and 
laughs. (S.10)
It is also clear tiiat there is no necessity to 
laugh just because she is on the see-saw. The last 
couple to be on the see-saw are Caroline and Any who 
sing "See Saw Marjorie Daw" as they go up and down.
They do not laugh. They stop suddenly. (S. 11)
THEORETICAL SUMt^ARY;
The kind of laughter on the see-saw ranges from 
quite gentle laughter to very high pitched excited 
laughter. This does tend to accompany the more force­
ful risky manoeuvres. But it seems clear that children 
can experience the same kind of physical stimulus with­
out laughing or that it may just make them laugh gently. 
The see saw is a good test, perhaps, of arousal. it 
might be interesting to coup are the personalities of 
children who choose to use the see-saw often as against 
those who prefer apparently quieter activities like the 
sandbox.
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tricycles and chases (T)
INTRODUCTION ; - . ?  ^ "
The main activity in the outdoor space was riding on 
tricycles. Thia was soinething that the boys did far xaore 
often than the girls. I only noted one time when a girl 
was on a tricycle and in the period when the girls played 
alone outdoors, only one girl made for the tricycles.
In the confined space there were three ways to ride - 
people could ride in a comer or they could chase after 
one another or they could manoeuvre the tricycles so that 
theyoarashed into each other head on. The latter nearly 
always caused loud laughter and, judging purely by my 
ear, laughter that was louder than when they crashed from 
behind. This is a somewhat limited hypothesis that could, 
of course, be experimentally tested.
The second period of outdoor play with tlie tricycles 
is less boisterous. Charlotte gets hold of one of the 
pedal cars and puts Angus and Robert on the back. They 
laugh as she pedals carrying this load. She twists the 
steering wheel round and round and laughs as she does so.
A few moments pass and then the car is reversed into Giles 
who is by the dustbins. As dustbins and car meet, Robert 
and Angus laugh. Charlotte now gets out of the car. Two 
minutes or so pass and then Robert is driving the car witli 
Angus on the bonnet. Slowly, Robert pedals the car so that 
it will crash into the wall. On the quite slow deliberate 
crash, both boys laugh. They repeat the principle of the 
thing by then aiming, again, slowly, to crash into the horse 
Again both laug^. (T.l)
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Sam on the tricycle crashes head on into Duncan.
Both boys laugh. Sean then repeats it with Jojo.
Sam laughs on the crash. There is no such reaction from 
Jojo who rides away and crashes into Angus and Robert - 
the slow car crashers of a minute ago. Robert is not 
amused by the crash, however, and smacks Jojo. (T.2)
Sam meanwhile continues crashing round the play 
space on his tricycle. He crashes his tricycle into a 
barrel and laughs. He then finds Jojo again and cr##es 
head on to him. Sam laughs on the crash. But Jojo 
doesn't laugh. Instead he tries to crash into the 
bench on which Caroline is sitting. Jojo laughs as 
he starts to hit her. Caroline says: "No". Jojo stops 
qguickly. Sam adds his contribution by saying: "Jojo 
is a witch". Caroline at once laughs and screams:
"Ooooha witch". But it does not develop into a game.
(T.3)
Oliver laughs as he is being chased. Clearly, 
victims of crashes can also laugh. Jojo falls over his 
tricycle. Tom laughs. Jojo does not. (T.4)
THEORETICAL SUMf^ARY:
Nothing very creative happens out of the tricycle 
chases. They seem a way of getting rid of pent-up 
energy from "working" indoors. Some children - especially 
the younger ones — do cycle without muc^ ^  the action, 
melodramas or laughter of the others. There is very
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little actual fighting in the play space and the boys 
who tend to monopolise the tricycles are usually the 
bigger, and it seems, more aggressive ones. Such
‘.4-
aggreasive crashes ace the ones which appear to 
fluctuate most — sometimes causing laughter, sometimes 
not, sometimes leading to anger. They differ from the 
kind of joint decision to achieve a crash which seems 
nearly always to lead to laughter as in the slow crash 
of Robert and Angus into the horse.
The one situation which seems always to provoke
laughter is a slow and deliberate crash from head on -
a kind of pas de deux - that the children engage in.
There is an appropriate building up of suspense and it
would seem quite clear that the children know what they
are doing and know that there will be laughter in the
end. To deduce intentions to laugh is not hard. In
similar situations indoors, the children sometimes said
that they would do that again because it was funny.
Deliberately hitting something slowly led to laughter
more predictably than crashing hard and accidentally
into something, or someone. It could be argued that 
such observations tally, at least, with the argument
that laughter is part of a situation in which something
that could be risky is performed under some sort of con*
trol.
THE CLIMBING FRAME (U)
Generally, the climbing frame produces much less
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laughter than the other pieces of equipment even though 
the children use it a great deal.
After his first play on the see-saw, Angus climbs 
to the top of the frame and sings "I'm in the King of 
the Castle". The accent is triumphant but there is no 
laughter. (U. 1)
In the period when the girls go out alone, all the 
girls make for the climbing frame. One has to hitch 
up her skirt to manage to get on it. The girls climb 
high and fast. (Ü.2) But even being very high does not 
seem to produce much laughter. When the boys come out,
Sam climbs to the top of the frame and laughs aggressively 
at Damian down below. Sam is King of the Castle.
Damian laughs back - not at all aggressively. (Ü. 3)
As far as laughter goes, the best part of the frame 
is the swing on which they can swing. In the next period 
of play, Sam shakes himself on this swing. Caroline 
laughs. (Ü.4) Carolina now gets on the frame herself 
and Sam, still on the swinging part, makes horrible 
sounding noises. Caroline laughs at the noises and 
adds in her matronly way; "I'll smack your bottom".
They both laugh at this idea. But nothing develops out 
of it. (Ü.5)
Tom at the top of the frame fiddles witli the swing­
ing part and Jojo who is on the swinging part laughs.
(U.6)
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The swing in tne frame can produce its own 
crashes* Amy on the swing in the frame bangs into 
Caroline. She laughs. (U.7)
THEORETICAL SUMMARY;
Apart from the swinging part, the climbing frame 
seems - in general - to lead to displays of triumph when 
the children reach the top rather than to displays of 
laughter. There is very little competition, however, 
for getting to the top - no battling for space. Also, 
no humorous games seem to develop on the frame.
THE SLIDE (V)
INTRODUCTION ;
In this session, the most interesting kinds of 
laughter seemed to centre around games that centred 
around the slide.
In the first session of play round 9.15 no one used 
the slide. The girls did not use it when they went into 
the play-space alone.
OBSERVATIONS ;
In tlie second play period, Sam began to use the 
slide after some time chasing on the tricycles. Sara 
and Jeff are going up the slide in different ways.
Jeff is doing it the proper way; Sam is climbing up 
by walking up the actual slide. When they see each other,
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San laughs. Sam slides down backwards. Jeff slides 
down the slide and then runs at it from the front and 
laughs as he starts to climb it. This develops so that 
both boys take turns at running at the slide, getting 
to the top and sliding down. What makes them laugh is 
running at and running up the slide - in other words 
not using the slide as it is supposed to he used,
(V.l)
They do not have the time to go back up the slide 
as this game took place near the end of the play time. 
Miss Sayer defuses Sam's excitement by getting him 
to be the driver of a train, in which the other boys 
meike up the carriage and Sam's hands become the lever 
of the engine. Sam laughs at being a lever. (V.2)
In the final period of play, Sam goes back on
to the slide after Caroline has threatened to smack his
bottom on the climbing frame. (U.5) Sam again goes
up the wrong way - running up the sliding down part -
to see Alice. As they see each other they both laugh.
Then they both slide down by both of them walking 
backwards down the slide. Alice runs round the back of
the slide and climbs up conventionally so that she
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and Sairi will, again, meet. As they meet on the slide both 
laugh. Alice now runs straight at the slide running up.
So does Sam. The game of running up it amuses them very 
much. (V. 3)
Some 30 seconds later Sam and Alice are still playing 
on the dLide. Sam runs up the slide again to meet Alice who, 
this time, has climbed up. Sam pulls Alice down the slide. 
They both laugh. They tlien go through the same routine 
again so that Alice is pulled again. Again, this makes 
them laugh. Then, more quietly, Alice climbs up the ladder 
and slides down in the ordinary way. 30 seconds later,
Alice and Sam are still sliding down the slide. Caroline II 
joins Alice but, tlien, Alice wanders off towards the climbing 
frame. 10 seconds pass emd Caroline goes back to a tricycle. 
Sam runs at the slide by himself but does not laugh. Then, 
Sam goes off in pursuit of Alice so they can resume their 
game. Alice runs to the top of the slide and Sam pulls her 
down the slide. Alice goes off again. Sam is at the top
of the slide. Matthew coiæs to the bottom of the slide In
his tricycle. Sam talcas no notice of Matthew till Matthew 
puts nn arm out across the slide. Sam laughs and tries to
manoeuvre his way over the arm. Sam gets off the slide now
tliough Alice hovers. The game is now elaborated. Sam finds 
a funny hat. Any laughs at him. Sam begins to climb up 
the slide in it. Alice also finds a hat - which is too big - 
puts it on andlaughs. Sam laughs too. Alice now blinds 
herself by pulling the hat down over her eyes. She follows 
Sam with her arms stretched outi- and laughs. Aggressively,
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Sam comes at her. They laugh as they pursue each other. 
Alice now drops out of the game. Sam returns to the slide 
and climbs up it making robot like noises. Caroline 
laughs at him. (V.4)
INTERPRETATIVE:
It is Interesting that, at a certain point, Sam was 
unsatisfied with the game as it was and felt he had to 
elaborate it by using hats, as if he needed to create 
an extra stimulus to go on laughing»
Sam returns to the slide some minutes later. Sam 
slides down aind laughs. He runs over to the see-saw 
and puts his hat on Caroline. He laughs. ( V . 5 )
Two minutes later, Sophie slides down in between 
Tom's legs. Sophie laughs. Jojo tries to kick as he 
slides down. N o laughter. (V.6) Then Tom slides 
down backwards - laughing as he does so. ( V . 7 )  Again, 
not using the slide really as it should be used seems 
to provoke laughter. Sam wanders off and is soon 
( crashing on a tricycle.
THEORETICAL SUMMARY;
children here evolved a particular game for 
abusing the rules of the slide and laughed as they did 
it. Conventional sliding never provokes much laughter 
and never the kind of laughter that this game provoked.
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o t h e r o u t d o o r activities (W)
There were, of course, other instances of laughter 
outside in the playspace.
At the first playtime, Jojo has a plastic skeleton 
and drops it on to one of the carts and laughs. Inside, 
the skeleton is often a figure of fun. (W.l see also H.56)
James jumps on his own feet up and down in a quirky 
way* He laughs as he jumps. A few moments pass and then 
he picks up a broom and starts sweeping. He does not 
laugh now. (W.2) Karen laughs as she jumps off the 
climbing frame. (W. 3)
When the boys play outside all by themselves.
Miss Sayer makes them line up as a train. Sam and Oliver 
laugh at this; the other boys do not. (W. 4)
The children hide inside the barrel. Angus laughs 
as he pushes Robert who is inside the barrel. Robert 
and Giles push the barrel and laugh. (W.5)
When looking at the games inside, we shall see 
that small spaces often seem good at evoking laughter.
ON THE BORDERS (X)
INTRODUCTION :
The section on Peek-abo (E) partly examined the 
idea that children laugh as they see themselves - and 
others - appear and disappear. It has also been often 
said tliat we laugh nervously when entering a room as a 
sign of appeasement. Lastly, it has been suggested
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laughter is a borderline behaviour, it happens when a 
person could erupt into one of two different states. If 
we teeter between fear and fright, we can laugh. This 
links laughter to approach/avoidance situations. With­
out accepting either of these ideas totally, it did 
seem interesting to chart exanples of what happened when 
children were at the borders of a physical space.
The room gave two obvious physical spaces - the
Book Corner and the Wendy House - that children could
hover about, dart in and dart out of. Often, there was 
much laughter when a child entered or left.
OBSERVATIONS ;
Angus spent a good three minutes appearing, and 
disappearing, round the book comer to much laughter 
from himself and from those inside. (X. 1) Hugo leaps 
round the comer of the book comer and barks. He 
laughs. Flfi and Emma, his audience, also laugh. (X.2) 
Hugh and Nathan stick dusters out of the gap between 
slats of the Wendy House - and laugh. It is a game 
they go on playing for some minutes and carry on laugh­
ing. (X.3) Gabriel and Reuben enter the Wendy House
by the door and say: "Hello", upon which all the children 
inside start laughing. (X.4) Nathan leaves the Wendy 
House, turns round, looks through the door and chuckles. 
(X.5) Emma laughs when she sees Oliver through the gap
in the book corner "wall" from across tlie room. They
stick their tongues out at each other and laugh. (X.6)
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objects appearing through gaps can also cause 
laughter. Hugo stands near the door of the Wendy House 
and laughs as an object - part of the hose - comes 
through the letterbox. The hose pokes his leg; Hugo 
laughs more as he backs away. (X.7) Charlotte and 
Henrietta run round the Wendy House, open the door and 
Charlotte sayss "Oooh a monster". And laughs. (X.8) 
Henrietta says: "I shut the door". And lau^s. (X.9) 
Sometimes, however, for no clear reason, there is no 
laughter. Damian and Sam, for example, open and close 
the Wendy House a number of tiroes without laughing. 
(X.IO)
INTERPRETATIVE:
Nevertheteas, it waa notioeahle that the oHld-pen 
laughed more often on the bordera of theae artifioial 
apacea - eapeaiatly the Wendy House and the Book Comer 
than they did when they entered or left the room for 
real» Obaervera of the situation were careful to pay 
attention to the momenta when children entered and, 
eapeeiatty, when they returned from the courtyard and 
from the toilets acroea the courtyard»
One child, Jamie, often laughs when he returns 
but he is the only one. Cki a number of occasions,
Jamie comes in from the yard, peeps round the door and 
laughs, before stepping across the room to rejoin the 
group. By the entrance to the schoolroom proper, there 
was also much less laughter. (X. 11)
3J3
The Wendy House and the Book Corner, were of course, 
spaces placed in the room by the adults and well-defined 
physically. The children sometimes made their own 
private spaces and violation of these did lead to 
laughter. A few times, children dived under tables.
Once, Hugo drops his beads. Charlotte laughs; Hugo 
picks up his beads. (X.12) Charlotte actually ^ets
down on the floor underneath the table. Henrietta ,K
joins her and starts to stamp her feet underneath the 
table. Charlotte stamps too. Both girls tell Hugo to 
watch them and they laugh. (X.13) Another time,
Gabriel dives under the table in the Book Comer and Toby 
laughs at that. (X.14)
X S T S ^R E T A T IV E  :
In the observations of my own children, I gave a number 
of examples of quite intimate laughter which had to do 
with playing variations on peek-abo, It seems*'-^kity 
that the games with appearing round the Wendy Rouse and 
Book Corner walls are similar but they have a much less 
intense and private quality. In the section on surprises, 
I noted two instances of fairly close surprise games 
between Jannine and Henrietta and Reuben and Jamie but 
there was only one long game of peek-abo observed com­
parable to the ones described in the observations of 
my own children,
Dominic has a plate and he puts it in front of 
his face. He slowly uncovers his face and says, to
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Bens "I'll gat you". Dominic laughs but not Ban. 
Dominic then asks Bens "Ware you scared?" Ben doesn't 
answer. Ben is working at a puzzle with numbers and 
wants the plat# which Dominic has.
Dominic : "Close your eyes, Ben"
Ben does so. Dominic now arranges the
the puzzle so as to be in an unlinear
Dominic s "What comes before 2?"
Ben : "Three"
Dominic : "No"
Ben : "Is it onetf
Dominic : "What goes after 2?"
Ben 1 "Six"
Dominic : "No, four"
He yells the word ” four". The yell is a signal 
for Ban to open his eyes. Dominic waves his arms up 
and down, says: "I thought I was dancing". And laughs. 
Ben does not reply. They play with the numbers some 
more. Then, Ben tells Dominic to close his eyes. 
Dominic (peering through eyes closed) says; "I can see 
the numbers. I saw them". And he utters a triunç>hant 
laugh. (X.15)
About fifteen minutes later, Julie (the teacher) 
shows Dominic how to make a cut out of a mask. Dominic 
at once is seized by the idea and cuts out a mask for 
himself. He masks himself, sings, takes off the mask
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and laughs, Ben, sitting opposite and the audience 
for this performance, fails to laugh. Dominic then 
turns the mask into a slit of paper a little like a 
very narrow paper aeroplane. He laughs at this but 
Ben does not and says : "Stop it". Dominic then nicks 
a pencil from Ben. Ben: "Bring it back". But Dominic 
laughs, leaves the table and puts on an act of taking 
long and odd steps. Dominic now leaves Ben alone for 
a few minutes. (X.16)
After a few minutes, Dominic is back at the table 
sitting opposite Ben. Dominic leans over, opens his 
mouth to a laughing position and says : "I want to 
crunch nty teeth at you". (X. 17/see also N.40)
Ben replies: "Out out out". And laughs.
Dominic : "This is an aeroplane". The paper 
is another cut out mask.
Ben : "Throw it to me".
Dominic throws the mask across. "Whee" , he says.
The flying mask hits Ben. Neither boy laughs.
Ben says : "Dominic, Dominic". Dominic says : "Sorry Ben" 
Then Ben picks up the mask-aeroplane: "I can lift it 
up, fly". Dominic stops paying attention to Ben at 
this moment and thumps Thea. Thea laughs: "Dominic 
kissed me and I kissed him". She purses up her lips 
and laughs again. The action makes Ben stand up, go 
over to Dominic and dance round him. Ben looks at
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Dominic's picture and inquires; "Did you paint a 
burglar?" Ben and Dominic laugh, then the two of 
them laugh and kiss each other. Then, Dominic wanders 
off. It is the end of a very long and intimate series 
of games for that day. Some minutes later, Ben is in­
volved in the game with Matthew which takes place round 
the bench they fall off. Dominic does not take part 
in that game. (X. 18)
THEORETICAL SUMMARY;
There are, then, many instances of the children 
laughing as they enter (and more rarely as they leave) 
particular spaces. The games they play in the group 
seem, actually, very simple versions of peek-abo com­
pared to the games I observed ity own children playing 
at home. Partly that was because in the group, the 
children were usually playing with each other and did 
not have a meddlesome "creative” adult to add refine­
ments. The game between Ben and Dominic with its 
patterns of aggression, sneakiness, triumph and affection 
was rare because all that showed through. I am not 
claiming that the children in the playgroup did not 
have complex relationships with each other but, rather, 
that the laughter in their games did not usually play 
a major part in exploring these relationships.
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the bo ok c o r n e r (?)
INTRODUCTION ;
Like the Wendy House, the Book Comer is a separate 
space set apart from the rest of the room. The children 
are not usually allowed to go there at the very start of 
the day. Only after about an hour do they wander into it.
Often, they are not supervised and are left free to go 
through any book they wamt. The Book Comer has a number 
of screens around it so that, as well as reading, it 
encourages games in which the children peep round the screen, 
get themselves noticed and then disappear behind the screen 
again. During the observations, there were a number of 
instances when the children developed long strands of 
laughter while in the book comer. I try now to describe
in some detail two of them.
OBSERVATIONS :
Caroline amd Sophie are reading the Night Kitchen by 
Maurice Sendak in which a boy flies over the rooftops of 
London which are full of. kitchen implements and tumbles into 
a kitchen. The book is fantastic. When the boy lemds in 
the kitchen, the children react by laughing.
Angus adds: "And we could taste his arms (laugh) and taste 
his bottom" (lau^). Caroline adds: "And taste his willy (laugh) 
Pifi adds: "And taste his legs" (laugh).
They then pretend to mix all the characters in the 
Night Kitchen in a big pot themselves and they laugh. The 
book has the phrase, "Nickie in the Night Kitchen", in it 
and the children repeat this phrase four or five times.
Caroline, Fifi and Angus laugh. They turn to the last page. 
Caroline then says: "I want to go to the end and back".
She laughs and repeats her wish. Flfi turns back to the 
beginning and starts to go through the book again. This 
time there is less laughter. These three children produced 
a very sketchy version of the actual story. But now Tom 
who is older (4.10) joins them, settles himself at the 
head of the table and offers to read the book properly. Tom 
cannot really read yet though he is on the verge of beg­
inning to. He gives a much more accurate account of what 
the book is actually saying but this more accurate account 
does not lead to spin-offs such as the one about tasting 
various bits of Nickie. Tom laughs at the point in the 
book when the roof tops are kitchen implements - a point 
noted under Incongruities. But there is much less laughter. 
When Nickie is naked, this time there is no laughter though 
when he says:
"Nickie was a poo/light as a shoe"
there is some laughter. The group laugl^  ei^ little more 
towards the end of the book. (?*2)
Many of the books involve animals and the children 
often laugh as they make auiimal noises. Emma makes a clucking 
noise as she looks at a picture of a turkey and laughs hugely. 
Karen looks at the picture and laughs too. Then Fifi shows
Emma euid Karen the picture of a lion in a book she is looking
She waves the book at them, growling as she does so.
She does it to get a laugh and Emma and Karen duly laugh.
# 4
Then, Ecmia points at another picture and says something 
that can't be heard about it. They all laugh. Fifi now 
becomes the ring-leader and makes a "shooing" noise as 
she looks at a different picture. She laughs. (Y.3)
One of the long games begins round a book that Julie 
gives Jamie, Daniel and Chaurlotte. It is about gorillas.
As soon as they open the book, Jamie goes "Bop Bop" and says 
that that sounds "like a gorilla". Daniel laughs. Jamie
adds that "A gun does, a gorilla does". Jamie points out
other animals which mêüce Bop Bag sounds. % e y  continue to 
make such animal imitation sounds. Jojo and Reuben reach 
the Book Comer. Daniel wails: "He's going to shoot those 
cowboys". Jojo lau^is at that and, with his arms, tries 
to punch Reuben who says of a picture "It's a very long 
nose, a very long nose".
Reuben adds to Jojo: "TTiat's your nose". And laughs.
"That's your nose", says Daniel - and lau^is.
"That's Mr. Nosey", says Reuben - and lauc&s.
"He's a babilla", Jamie hits the picture of the gorilla
and laughs.
Reuben now leaves the Book Comer. Jaunie and Daniel 
continue looking at the gorilla book. Jamie leans over the 
table at Daniel and laughs. Daniel makes a "gorilla-like" 
face back and laughs. A minute or so later, the two boys 
are looking at a picture of a lion. Jamie says: "I want to 
lick the lion's eyes" and laughs. Jamie then says: "We all 
begin with L" and their fingers point quickly to every item
in the book which might begin with L. These include a 
lion, a lamb, a leopard.
High pitched laughs follow, Jamie and Daniel then cuddle, 
say; "We begin with g" - presumably for Tgorilla" - and 
laugh high-pitchedly again. The two boys calm down a little 
and then;
Daniel : "Animals aren't as clever as humans".
Jamie makes no reply.
Daniel : "Didn't you know that?"
Jamie : "No", he laughs.
Daniel : "Animals aren't as clever as humans".
Daniel repeats it, says; "Funny man, gorilla man".
Jamie : "Funny man, gorilla roan".
Despite the repetition, there is no laughter.
"If you've got a dog and there's fighting, the dogs ^
don't understand what they're fighting about", says 
Daniel.
There is another pause.
"Gorillas don't have eyes", Daniel laughs putting 
animals down some more. He then points to the gorilla's 
nose: "He's funny". (Y.4)
The two boys go on reading and, some moments later, 
cuddle. About ten seconds later, Jamie and Daniel strike 
each other, laugh and Daniel laughs saying: "You can bite my 
nose off". Daniel repeats the invitation and lau^is again. 
The children calm d w n  again, turn over a few pages and 
then Daniel puts his hands up to his head and ears to shut 
up Jamie who is yelling "Fire, Fire". They are joined by 
Oliver. Daniel lau^s and says: "London's burning". Oliver
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adds: "You're stupid. I know how it goes". (Oliver means 
the song) • Oliver then mimes pouring water but does not 
laugh. Toby joins in dragging a fire engine. Gabriel runs 
up. But then Toby returns to his table in the middle of 
the room. The Book Comer is subdued suddenly and the only 
sound is of the children singing "London's Burning". Then 
Daniel and Jennie thump each other and laugh. They see me 
watching them and ask: "Are you called Don Don ..?" Before 
I can answer, they laugh and say: "He's called Don Don".
Jamie has now left the book comer.
Demie 1 and Oliver stay in the book comer, quite 
peacefully. Charlotte joins in. Jennie comes back from the 
Wendy House, puts his head tentatively round the screen, 
laughs rather as if he is playing peek-eüoo and retums to 
the book corner. Charlotte says: "He's three" amd laughs. 
Then, she says: "He's four".
In the book comer, they now huddle over a book. Daniel 
thumps Charlotte on the head. No laughter. Charlotte goes 
on reading. The book is an alphabet book. They get to the 
letter 'O'. Oliver says : "0 is for Oliver". Charlotte says: 
"0 is for Orange" amd, to Oliver, "You're an oramge"^.. She 
laughs. They resume tuming the pages of the book which 
is The Night Kitchen. They cry: "Fire, fire" and lau^.
They then start blowing out the fire making wind noises. 
Though they are very excited, there is no laughter. Daniel 
yells: "Woow, woow" and claps his hands. Charlotte laughs 
as she comments: "And he couldn't pull down his kite". In 
the book, Nickie is floating through the skyline on what
3.4.7
looks like a kite, Charlotte then closes the book, adds:
"And he's a silly boy". The children now re-open the 
gorilla book. Daniel kisses Jamie.
With the gorilla book open again, Jamie plays at being 
the gorilla. He clutches his fists, snarles fiercely and 
another child says: "You look like ray Daddy amd ray Daddy 
gargles ... gargles ...".
Daniel amd Jaunie then stop reading the gorilla book, 
stand up and take little shuffling steps. They look like 
robots. The two of them then head for the Wendy House, 
Interestingly, they are still holding on to the^gggilla^potif. 
In the Wendy House, there is also Reuben amd 01ive^?^liver 
maüces a fire sound.
"Are you a baby gorilla?", Jamie asks.
"Tea makes you stronger", says Oliver.
"They have a sick baby gorilla", says Jamie.
"I'm going to be the sister gorilla", says Daniel.
"You're going to be the baby gorilla", says Jamie.
"We're all on the same side". (Y.7)
NAUOHTY 0 )
INTRODUCTION;
There are many exampleis of aggressive and naughty 
laughter in the playgroup. In describing some of the geunes 
the children played outside, I suggested that their tricycle 
games often involved an aggressive element - smd provoked 
laughter. Inside, there is more variety of aggressive 
laughter. The same problem remains, however. It is clear
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that aggression sometimes involves laughing but the 
problems of unknotting the casual relationships remain 
vast.
OBSERVATWJS :
There are, first, a series of sneaky occasions 
when a child does something naughty and bubbles into 
laughter. These laughs are rarely high-pitched or 
excited since the child seems to want to keep the whole 
event secret. Charlotte takes another child's pencil 
and laughs. (N.27) Stephen steals a pencil out of one 
of the tables and laughs. (N.28) Gabriel pokes the 
bad>y*s back, says; "Six" and then goes off to the other 
side of the room laughing, (N.29) Another time,
Louisa very deliberately sits in Thomas' chair and 
laughs. (H.30) There are times, however, when sneaki­
ness fails to produce a laugh. Jannine and Henrietta
are playing by the garage and laughing as they make the 
toy cars crash into each other. Jannine moves away,
comes back as Henrietta's back is turned, sneaks up on
her and smacks her bottom. It appears to foe an invitation
to laugh. But Henrietta turns round seriously and says:
"No". Neither of the girls laughs. (N.31) Once the
children enjoy the prospect of hiding something from the
teacher, Julie, and they all conspire to conceal the
jigsaw: tliey put it underneath a big book and say "but
don't toll the teacher". The three of them laugh. (N.32)
INTERPRETATIVE:
One intereating impression is that there is much less 
obscene naughty laughter in the playgroup than was
observed with my own ohitdren. Perhaps the most 
interesting obscene laugh came in the group when Sam 
said he was going to ^listen to Matthew's bottom'* in 
the Wendy Souse - using a stethosoope, It is worth 
noting that the Wendy House seemed to promote naughty/ 
obscene laughter more than any other space in the room.
Far more frequent were rude laughs. The children 
said something #aughty or rude to each other - and 
then laughed. It is interesting that, in adult life, 
the only kind of analogy I can think of is when people 
fljlrt rudely with each other. Among the children, the 
rudeness was more basic. Jamie finished a picture 
before Oliver, said "I beat you" and laughed. (11.33).
In the book comer, as seen, Charlotte called Oliver 
"an orange” and laughed. Loudly. (#.34) Caroline 
saw Damian and said: "Look at that funny old Damian".
(N.35) Conspiracies between two children against a 
third led sometimes to rude things being said. Emma 
and Fifi were playing together when Emma calls: "Big 
fat Jannine". Fifi laughs. (N.36) Some minutes later, 
Emma whispers to Fifi and they both laugh. They are 
sharing a table with Giles and, then, Emma leans over 
the table and tells Giles: "We said we don't like you". 
And both girls laugh. (N.37) A few moments later,
Fifi and Emma are whispering again about not liking 
someone and they both laugh. (N.38) Another day, Fifi 
runs over to join a game at the sandbox in which Hugo 
and Rupert are being wizards. Fifi: "I'm a witch".
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Rupert says: "Hello Fifi". Fifi says: "Hello Smelly- 
boots" and laughs. (N.39) Ban and Dominic are playing 
a game with masks and %minic sayis fl want to crunch my 
teeth at you". And he laughs. (N.40 see also X. 17)
Fifi waves her scissors at Reuben. They are de­
ciding that Emma should be in a big box. "No", says 
Fifi, "'cos I like you. It should be him". She points 
at Daniel, laughs, "in a big box". She laughs again 
and returns to her cutting out. (N.41)
AGGRESSIVE LAUGHTER (M)
INTRODUCTION %
The children also often laugh when they hit each 
other, fight with sticks or swords, hit animals or 
tiireaten to perform any combination of these actions. 
There is less difference in the laughter provoked by
I
these actions than one might imagine and a really 
interesting question concerns those occasions when 
there is no laughter at all. Apart from the fact that 
they provoke no laughter, they do not appear to be very 
different. The variability of laughter continues to be 
perplexing.
OBSERVATIONS :
Threats are not uncommon in the group though few
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children seemed to continue with them for long. Emma 
and Rupert, sitting opposite each other, claw the air 
with ti^eir hands and laugh excitedly at the same time.
The clawing is quite aggressive towards each other.
Karen has a paper toy in her hand, places it close to 
Charlotte's nose, pinches the toy and says: "Pinch your 
nose Charlotte". She laughs. Charlotte's nose is not 
touched. (M. 36) A few moments later, Charlotte makes 
a pinching movement with her fingers in the face of 
one of the teachers - and laughs. (M.37)
Attacking animals is often a source of laughter.
We have seen how in the book corner, Angus hit the skeleton 
and produced much laughter. (M. 38) Another day,
Charlotte shows her Panda to Giles who bangs it on the 
head. Both laugh. (M. 39) Robert and Oliver hit the 
leaves of a bush in the courtyard amd both laugh. (M. 40) 
Jannine waves her dog at Giles who bonks it on the head. 
Both lau^ - three times. Jannine says: "Hello, hello, 
hello" and Giles bonks the dog again. (M.41) Another 
day, at the end of the group round 12.15, the children 
are waiting for their parents to pick them up. Jojo 
and Angus thump each other with furry animals. Reuben 
joins in waving his anorak and they all bonk each other 
and lauc^. (M.42)
One of the more interesting aggressive games the 
children play involves using the cars at the garage.
The children quite often put the cars on top of the
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garage, make them fall off and laugh. But one day,
Daniel and James are playing with the cars when James 
comes at Daniel with a car. Daniel laughs. Then,
James runs the car up Daniel's back. Daniel laughs.
Then Daniel runs a car up Jamas' back. Both of them 
laugh. They repeat that twice, running cars along 
each otiier's back. Then, tliey run cars all over each 
other's head. And laugh. (M.43) Jannine skips and 
laughs as she comes towards them. She skips away. The 
two boys stop running the cars all over each others 
heads amd now crash the cars into each other. There 
is no laugh when the cars just crash. (M.44) Another 
day, Hugo taps Jannine on the shoulder with a car. As 
he turns round to face the class, she also turns round 
a)id they both laugh. They repeat tîie performance im­
mediately and laugh. (M.45) Some moments later, Giles 
has joined them. Hugo tries to put a wooden box (with 
some cars still in) on Giles' head as a hat. lie laughs. 
One of the teacliers takes Hugo away, (14.46)
The notion of using the cars like this is not 
exclusive to them. Reuben and Sam place cars first on 
their own heads, then on each other's heads, making "brmin- 
brram" noises as tliey run them along. Both boys laugh. 
Reuben says: "The bus has got people in it". And he 
laughs. (M.4 7)
One of the less predictable games to emerge is the 
game of body woggle. The children often make odd move­
ments in this period. Body woggle is included under 
aggression since, during it, the children seize a number
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of opportunities for hitting and pulling at each other. 
The game begins outside the Wendy House and ends up 
inside it. It starts with Nathan telling Daniel to 
"get off that chair" and then, he adds : "Anybody woggle". 
Both of them laugh. Dainiel then tells Jamie that he's 
wearing a tabard the wrong way round. Daniel laughs 
and then laughs again, saying; "No". He shakes his 
head. Jamie beams and says: "Yea". Then he grabs hold 
of Daniel and tl*ey both laugh. (M. 48 see also Z.l)
A few moments later, Daniel is wearing a tail made 
out of a hose. He looks at the tail he's wearing and 
says; "Golliwoggla". Then he lifts up Nathan's hair 
and laughs. Daniel and Natham make for the Wendy îjouse. 
Once inside, they point to each other and laugh. Home 
other child says: "Body Woggle". They now settle to a 
game with a feather duster. (M.49) About three minutes 
later, Hugo pulls at Daniel's tail amd he - and Jaunie - 
both laugh. Daniel says: "He stole my tail" and Hugo 
laughs loudly. Nathan then bai&gs Daniel on the head 
and says: "Don't forget Mrs. Body Woggle". Jêonie,
Daniel and Nathan all laugh. A few moments later, Nathan 
repeats "Mrs. Body Woggle" amd laughs. That is the final 
appearance of the body woggle, a game which allowed a 
certain amount of pulling and hitting around a parody 
of dancing movements. (M.50)
INTERPRETATIVE:
But if alt these are inatanaea either of threatening 
or of parodies of violent behaviour in which laughing
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might help defuse and control a potentially dangerous 
situation, other instances showed that the children 
could attack and laugh. The attacks, while not vicious, 
were often share enough,
Angus and Oliver wave at each other with their arms 
and hit each other. Both laugh. (M.51) After using 
rods to make the snake (as discussed earlier), Sam and 
Damian threaten each other with the rods and drop them. 
Sam laughs. He goes on to pick the rods up with Matthew. 
The two boys turn tlicm into walking sticks or crutches 
and they bctn laugh at this transformation. Miss Sayer 
arrives and transforms them again saying: "Let's measure 
you"•. So the rods become mathematical rather than men­
acing. (M,52)
In a number of cases, the children laughed when 
they were either trying to pull things from each other 
or succeeded in pulling them. Toby tries to take a 
stick off Hugo and they both laugh. (M.53) Reuben 
tries to pull something from Jamie and laughs. (M.54) 
Even the "vanquished* can giggle. Toby pulls a hat 
off Jamie's head and Toby and Jamie both laugh. (H.55)
In the Wendy House, Giles holds a shampoo hose between 
his teeth and laughs - keeping his teeth clamped - as 
Jannine and Daniel try to pull it away from him. (M.56) 
Even frank fighting could be funny to the children.
Nathan and Hugo push and pull each other while playing 
with the garage and both laugh. (M.57) Gabriel taps 
Jamie with a stick and then brandishes it at him.
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Katheui, who is watching, laughs and Gabriel smiles 
excitedly. (M.58) îVo boys nearly laugh as they give 
each other injections with a r>encll. (M. 59)
Two instances of funny aggression occurred. Nathan 
covered Jamie's face with a cloth, laughed, thumped him 
and then laughed some more. Again, the "victim" also 
laughed at the beginning in this case, but then it hurt 
and he cried, (M.60) Jannine threatened Daniel bran­
dishing a picture book with a bear in it saying "Oh oh". 
Giles laughed. Jannine then became so excited, she 
dropped the book. Both children laughed. (H.61)
There were other cases of a child who was the “victim* 
of an attack also laughing. Hugo, with a laughing face 
placed a lasso round Jannine who let him do so - and 
laughed. (M.62) Karen fabricated a folded piece of . 
paper into a snapping monster and used it to chomp at 
Charlotte's face. As the snapping monster snapped,
Karen laughed and so did the threatened Charlotte. (H.63) 
Once, Oliver walked so as to impale himself on a stick 
one of the teachers was holding - and laughing. (M.64)
A child watching aggression also might well laugh as 
Fifi did when Emma poked Daniel quite hard in the chest 
and Natham did when Gabriel attacked Jaunie with a whisk 
even though Jamie was whining he was hurt. (H.6S)
The sand taible is one of the places in the room 
where there is, in general, the least laughter. But co 
one occasion, Hugo thumps Jannine and than swings a 
ladle twice in the direction of Charlotte. Hugo does
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not laugh and Charlotte is not intimidated. She skips, 
laughs and goes away. Hugo now picks up a handful of 
sand and threatens to dump it over Giles. As Hugo 
places the sand against Giles* nostril, Hugo laughs.
A few moments later, however, he moves away from the 
sand table for no apparent reason other them to follow 
Jannine. (M.66) The most violent laugh occurred, pos­
sibly, when Gabriel was jujïç>ing on Giles' back and mak­
ing animal noises. Despite the animal noises, Gabriel 
was jumping hard - and laughing. Giles did not laugh. 
(M.67)
It has been suggested that one function of laughter 
is to be a behaviour which demarcates borders. Between 
fear and pleasure, there is laughter. In the play- 
gr#%), such Intimate situations were rare. Outside . 
the Wendy House, there was almost no tickling, for 
instance.
THEORETICAL. SÜMt-îARY:
All these examples of aggressive laughter culled 
from the group suggest that it would be neat to be able 
to claim that the children laughed only when the aggres­
sive situation was a safe pretence or only when there 
was aggression and soma other factor involved so that 
the laughter could be seen either as a borderline be 
haviour or as some form of displacement. Such an an­
alysis would be neat but incorrect. There were occasions 
when both children in a fight - and even when one was 
losing - would laugh. The laughter suggested that the 
fight was not that vicious but it was still a real and
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proper physical bout. There is a danger of a circular 
argument if one claims that laughter has to be a signal 
that the situation is essentially a safe one since the 
only fact to show that the situation is not "for real" 
is that there is laughter.
PRETENDING AND GAMES (0)
INTRODUCTION t
&
In the observations of my own children, I gave a 
nunber of instances in which the children pretended 
euid laughed. The first instances of pretence in 
Reuben's case came at 18 months. In the playgroup, 
there are many occasions when the children pretend 
and find their pretence amusing. Sometimes, they 
consciously set out to repeat a pretence they are en­
joying, saying they want to do it again. I have di­
vided the times the children laugh in pretending into 
two situations. There are, first, simple prete*.—  a 
as when Karen laughs as she pretends to chew a piece 
of flannel. The pretence is an isolated act and does 
not fit into any game. The second pretences are long 
games such as when the children play doctor or start 
swimming in the middle of the floor. There is, in des­
cribing simple pretences, some overlap with situations 
described earlier such as when the children are reading 
a book and put on gruff animal voices.
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OBSER^/ATIONS ;
Pifi makes grimacing eating noises and laughs as 
she does so. Emma, who is watching her, also laughs. 
(0.20) In the Wendy House, Reuben gives Daniel a 
plastic cup and Daniel pretends to drink, making slurp­
ing noises. He and Reuben both laugh. A few moments 
later, Reuben pretends to be "Fantastic Man", fie adds 
"Fantastic Man can stretch his arms" as he stretches 
his arms. Having mocked Fantastic Man, Daniel pulls 
Reuben's arms and they both laugh. The children often 
put on capes and hats and become Batman. But the 
Fantastic Man game does not catch on. (0.21) A 
minute later, Daniel pretends to drink out of a plastic 
kettle spout and he chuckles. (0.22) Reuben plays with 
the telephone and laughs. (0.23) He then pretends to 
pour water over himself and Damiel. Both of thcs laugg*. 
(0.24) A few moments later, Oliver and Daniel pretend 
to eat from a pot using imaginary spoons. They do not 
make slurping or any other exaggerated noises but, stilly 
they laugh as they eat. Then, Oliver throws the got to 
the floor but he merely smiles. There is no actual 
laugh. (0.25)
Feeding games continue. Reuben pretends to pimiar 
DMniel a cup from the kettle, saying: *Tes sir*.
Daniel giggles. (0.26) A few moments later* aftar a 
diva under a table in the Wendy House, SMalal 'Cets 
places a cup on his head, says: "Hello* i»ll©'"% Am 
bends his head forward, the cup falls to the tvifele
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he laughs. (0.27) > i^oment later, Reuben pretends to
P##" tea froir the kettle into a cup and chuckles. He 
then "feeds* Janie from the spout and both he and 
Daniel, laugh. The children then become bored with 
pretending to feed because Oliver shouts down the 
kettle spout and leaves the Wendy House. Reuben fol­
lows, laughing. (0.28)
Miming is often accompanied by laughter. Daniel 
tolls Fifi something about drinking and laughs as he 
mimes it, lifting his hands to his mouth and tilting 
back his head. He continues talking with broad smiles 
and chuckling as he looks at Fifi. (0.29) Later on 
the same day, Fifi goes through a similar routine. She 
is cutting pictures out of a magazine and she makes 
grimaces of greed/pleasure as she pretends to eat the 
pictures she has been cutting out. Emma laughs. Fifi 
goes on to mime eating, bringing her hamds to her mouth 
and chewing. (0.30)
t
The vast majority of the miming - with and without 
toys - has to do with eating or blowing or some form of 
aggressive behaviour. Sometimes, the children del­
iberately use toys which they cannot eat. Fifi gives 
Karen a big black block to eat. Karen puts the block 
in her mouth, laughs. There is a pause. Then, Enana 
says ; "I think 1*11 be sick". Fifi then puts the block 
in her mouth, and sucks, alsROSt kisses it, as if it were 
a pipe. She lau^s. (0.31) There are two exceptions 
to this oral pretending. Jannine picks up an old camera 
and pretends to take a picture of Giles who laughs. (0.32)
3<
Daniel pretends to cry which makes Jamie laugh. Then, 
Daniel laughs. (0.33) Another time, Gabriel tells 
Giles that Giles is Batman*s Daddy. They both laugh. 
(0.34)
In the next section, I will outline a number of 
elaborate fantasies the children devised. But, once 
or twice, the children started to pretend something and, 
despite it leading to laughter, dropped the topic. In 
the Wendy House, once, Toby said: "I'm an Indian Lion", 
which made Reuben and Daniel laugh. Daniel then 
crawled along the floor to Toby, said: "Red Indian Lion". 
Toby's response was to bang on the door and laugh. The 
children did not continue with this game, however, but 
started putting on different hats. No further word 
about lions or Indians could be heard. (O.35) Another 
time, Gabriel put on a cape and said: "I'm an Indian 
of the reef" - according to one observer andcfI'm an 
Indian of the teeth" - according to the other ob*<='»ver. 
This remark made Gabriel laugh. But again, the pretence 
went nowhere. (0.36)
Outside, I reported one occasion when Caroline 
said there was a witch loose and flew into a fit of gig­
gling ( ) The children do often say that one of
them is a witch which sometimes leads to laughter - 
and sometimes not. In one instance, without any 
laughter, it prompted a remark which conveys how sharp
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even such young children can be güüout the role of pre­
tending. Gabriel says to Fifi and Reuben; "There's a 
witch in the Wendy House. That's ajwitch dressed up". 
But there is no laughter. (0.37) Gabriel then moves 
towards the baby and smiles. "I only pretend to kiss 
your baby", says Gabriel to Nathan, "because he doesn't 
like kisses". (0.38) The conplexities of pretending 
that the children can manage come out best in some of 
the longer games they play.
SPACES TO IMAGINE
INTRODUCTION :
Even more than the book comer, the Wendy House 
provides a snug space set apart from the rest of the 
room. The Wendy House is in one comer and it is fit­
ted together from six different slats. Between each 
slat, there is a small gap which the children use to 
peer tlirough sometimes. There is no roof. Inside :he 
Wendy House, there is room for four, perhaps five, 
children to move aüaout. There is also an assortment 
of toys - a Welsh dresser complete with cups, saucers, 
a kettle, pans, a telephone, a shampoo hose, a small 
table, a stethoscope, even a cash register though this 
piece of plastic capitalism does not get much used. The 
end wall of the room serves as the end wall of the Wendy 
House. Some of the children's coats hang on pegs here 
and there is a bench, the bench Ben and Matthew scampered
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up and down on. The children only get to use the 
Weudy House after they have sat and worked at their 
tables for about 90 minutes. The children are aware 
that the Wendy House is a space set apart. Nathan 
says once: "We're going to do silly things in the 
Wendy House". And, more sinister, there is an aggressive 
exchange without laughter which goes like this :
"We'll kick up" says Nathan.
"We'll kick him when we're in the Wendy House",
Emma adds.
OBSERVATIONS :
Perhaps the most predictable games are the ones 
which are either obscene or aggressive. Sam, Giles and
M
Robert are in the Wendy House. Sam suggests: "Shall we 
both be dead and you be the doctor?" They lie down 
without laughing. Soon, Sam has his pants down in the 
Wendy House and Robert wipes Sam's bottom with a toy 
iron. There is no laughter. Now, Robert irons Sam's 
front. Again, there is no laughter. Robert says sud­
denly that it is his turn to be dead and adds: "I have 
to iron our bottoms". No laughter and, given that Sam 
is there, there is a very uncharacteristic quiet. (0.39)
Robert now begins to iron Sam's penis. Sam giggles. 
Giles now takes hold of the iron and irons both Sam and 
Robert's bottom. There ; is no laughter. Then, Giles 
begins to iron each of their penises. They giggle but
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not wildly. Then, Giles begins to iron each of their 
tummies. They are laughing now and, it seems to me, 
making an effort not to laugh too loudly. Robert says: 
"Do my toes". Giles obliges; Robert giggles. There is 
a period of ironing toes which provokes considerable 
giggling. So much so that Miss Sayer goes over to the 
Wendy House aind tells them that they should get dressed. 
(0.40)
Later, in the Wendy House, Sam tickles and is 
tickled with much laughter. It is, again, noteworthy 
that there is rather little tickling outside the Wendy 
House.
Another medical interlude - ttiough not quite as 
brazen - takes place when Jamie lies down dead in the  ^
Wendy House. Gabriel, (who has just been playing a 
game with the shartpoo hose) enters and says: "Are you 
ill?" Oliver laughs. Gabriel explores all the bits of 
Jamie's body that appear to be dead. He announce:-, "I 
don't know. I'm puffing you up to make you better".
He blows down the stethoscope at Jamie. Then, Gabriel 
puts the stethoscope through the Wendy House's letterbox 
and laughs. Hugo is the other side of the letterbox and 
laughs. Gabriel says: "I don't know. He might be dead". 
Then, Jamie gets up. "How did you fall over like that?", 
asks Gabriel. Jamie demonstrates and Gabriel laughs - 
at what could be seen as a play - triumphing over death. 
Then, Gabriel says: "If I came next, there can be no 
doctor, just a man who makes you better, no doctor".
At this apparent witticism, Gabriel laughs. (0.41)
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lî^TERPRETATIVE:
A number of times in the Wendy House, children play at 
being monsters, But what is perhaps curious is the way 
in which even quite simple imaginative games can he given 
a darker twist - a sign that the children's anxieties 
are being expressed perhaps.
In the Wendy House, Reuben, Toby and Daniel have 
been playing the feeding games which were described 
earlier. Toby says: "Batman sometimes has a tail" and 
chuckles. Gabriel says: "No, he doesn't". Toby says, 
with a fading smile: "He sometimes does". Reuben says 
to Toby: "You're a batman dog" emd smiles at him.
Having turned the situation away from a hostile one, 
Reuben now distances himself a little. Gabriel tells «a
Toby: "Batman, sit on your seat". Toby and Daniel laugh 
with their hands over their mouths. Gabriel picks up 
a piece of fluff off the "t^" and pushes it into the 
other boys' faces saying: "Here's a bit of Batdog'* cail" 
He laughs. Toby then barks like a dog and laughs. So 
far, no depths. But then Toby says: "I don't die".
And he laughs. (0.42)
INTERPRETATIVE:
It is impossible to guess what brought that last sentence 
out though, again, it is telling that, inside the Wendy 
House, the idea of dea th surfaces,
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Thare are simple aggressive games that occur in 
the Wendy House too. Gabriel, Nath am and Jamie tussle 
with a shampoo hose. Then, the three boys all get a 
hose and all blow d o m  it while watching each other. 
i;fhan they stop blowing, they all laugh. Later, still 
in the Wendy House, they bash each other with hoses and 
laugh. (0.43 see also Î-5.56)
One game which does not occur in the Wendy House 
but by the sandbox ought to provoke laughter but fails 
to provoke laughter, even though it begins promisingly. 
Rupert laughs as Hugo dribbles sand. Hugo says: "Itjs 
a volcano" and then scooping some sand up, "this is gun­
powder". Hugo pours sand into an old tomato ketchup 
bottle and spells out the letters on it. He makes 
no5ses as of gunpowder firing but there is no laughter. 
Hugo imitates some more gunpowder-like noises. The two 
boys scoop more sand into a vessel and sayj "This is the 
cannon". They are concentrating. Hugo announces: "I
ri -
use gunpowder to light my cannon". Jannine has already 
skipped over to try and join in but her arrival went un­
noticed. Now, Fifi runs over. Rupert says: "I'm a 
wizard". Fifi says: "I'm a witch". There is still no 
laughter. Hugo: "Hello Fifi". Fifi; "Hello Smellyboots 
And Fifi laughs. Hugo does not laugh. (0.44 see also 
N.39)
I . rfif
INTERPRETATIVE:
It is not clear why a game with so much noise and aggre­
ssiveness should not have led to laughter and it is in­
triguing that it should have taken place outside the
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Wendy üouee,
The children can use laughter to put other 
children down in longish arguments. In the Wendy 
House, Jannine is playing with Nathan, Gabriel and 
Oliver.
Jannine
Gabriel
Jannine
Nathan
Gabriel
Jannine
"I'm a Muamy" 
"I'm a Daddy"
i "They're three Daddies"
; "I'm a Daddy"
: "I'm we'rè both Daddies"
: 4ôf one of the boys) "He's just
a boy"
y
She laugiis and Charlotte laughs. (0.45)
V/olfenstein (1953) suggested that children laughed 
when they were assigned tiie wrong sex. The one time 
that happened when Damian was counted as a girl, 
nogone laughed. (0.46)
Throe other games take place outside the Wendy House
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and reveal, among other things, how the children can stick 
to a theme and elaborate it in quite different ways. Early 
one session, Toby is playing with the magnets. Much later 
during this session, he fabricates his one-legged clown with 
the leg unfortunately chopped off. But, before that ex­
perimenting with the magnets, getting them to stick together, 
Toby exclaims: "Magic".
"Can I do it", says Oliver. Oliver gets two magnets to 
stick together. "Tdagic", he says and laughs.
Fifi comes over. "That's not magic I see", says Fifi.
"It's a sort of magic", says Fifi.
"Doesn't feel like magic to me", says Fifi, "it's
not magic".
"It is magic", says Toby.
"He's just têücing it off witli the sticks", declares Fifi -
the sticks being the magnets.
"Well, it's a sort of a magic", Toby clings on.
Then one of the teachers, Julie, arrives. "If he thinks 
it's magic, it is". (It is curious, incidentally, that while 
the children in this argument function quite logically, Julie's 
own intervention is completely irrational, making Toby out to
be egocentric in a Piagetian sense). Toby goes on experiment­
ing with the magnets. Fifi subverts again: "I saw it on the 
telly". She laughs.
Julie : "She's got a cheeky laugh".
Charlotte : "She did see it on the telly".
It is interesting that though Toby goes on playing with 
the magnets, and builds his clown, we hear no more about the 
magic of magnets from him that day. (0.47 see also K.59)
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A more unlikely long game took place around a bottle 
of perfume. Ben started to play with a bottle of perfume.
He pretended to put some on his face and laughed. Louisa 
joined him and then Thea. While Ben was fiddling with the 
bottle, Louisa and Thea banged their heads gently together 
and lauded. Then, Ben left the table with the bottles, 
laughing. Dominic took over the bettles. He opened the 
perfume. "Look what happens", he said and poured out some.
"I smell it funny", he said. He then sniffed perfume and 
laughed. He then put the stopper back in the bottle and 
laughed, withdrew the stopper, sniffed again and laughed.
For a minute or so, Dominic then sorted out the various 
bottles on the table arranging them without laughing. The», 
Ben returned to the table. He and Dominic sang.
Dominic (singing) : "Out and about".
Ben : "Spout". Laughs.
Dominic (singing) : "Out and about".
Dominic sings on as he pours out perfume. Ben smiles 
as he unscrews the bottle top. Camilla (who has joined Ben) 
takes the bottles. Ben keeps on unscrewing the top, laughs, 
then actually removes the top, shows it to Camilla, laughs 
again. Camilla gives him another bottle to smell. Then, 
she turns round. Ben makes a hissing sound at Camilla and 
laughs. Camilla then sprays Louisa with perfume and Louisa 
says: "Yes please". Louisa has been drawing and shows her 
drawing to Ben and Camilla. Ben pours some more perfume on 
himself, passes the bottle on to Camilla half laughs. Louisa 
says to Dominic who is at the table still: "That's you with
a beard" and she laughs. Ben carries on unscrewing the 
beetle and tiien drops to much laughter. A few
moments later, he places the bottles back on the table. 
Then, he tries to whisk the bottle Camilla has been 
playing with from her and to pour some perfume on to 
her. Camilla laughs as she is perfumed against her will 
Then, she takes Ben's bottles. But Ben then loses 
interest in perfume eind pays attention to Dominic.
Soon, they begin playing the game withrasks that was 
described earlier. (0.48  ^see also X. 16 and X.18)
INTERPRETATIVE:
Much of the laughter round the bottle of perfume eeeme 
to be connected with novelty. The novelty is the smell 
and funny smells have many associations though, cur- 3 
iously, none of the children is tempted to suggest it 
stinks, Ben also shows a certain repetition compulsion, 
Be keeps on unscrewing the bottle and he keeps on laugh­
ing as he^performe that action. There is also 
obvious aggressive delight of pouring perfume on the 
unwilling Camilla, The children spent perhaps ten min­
utes enjoying this game. But,unlike the games in the 
Wendy House, it would seem difficult to argue that this 
frolic conceals hidden meanings.
The third long game occurs when Giles enters at 
11 o'clock having just been to visit the big school he 
will go to next term. Before Giles arrives, there is 
relative quiet, no manic activity or laughter. What
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follows follows on from his arrival, Emma and Karen 
laugh at Giles as soon as he enters, Jannine skips 
over, laughs, says "Hello", laughs. Then, Nathan 
skips over to Ciles and says "Hello". Karan leaves 
Giles to skip over to Rebecca and Emma. Emma then 
comes over to Giles, lauchs and then all three girls 
return to him. Emma and Karen ask Giles who he saw at 
the big school. Emma laughs. Karen then picks at 
Giles' new grey jumper and backs away. She tells Emma 
what she has done. Emma tells Giles. Karen smiles 
sheepishly. A moment later, Fifi skips over and says: 
"He does kick". It is not clear who kicks. But having 
said that, Fifi lies down in the middle of the class­
room. Karen lies down in the middle of the classroom
too. Both girls kick and wave their arms as they lie ^
down in the middle of the classroom. They laugh as they
Suddenly, Fifi says: "Just doing the backstroke". 
No-one has mentioned swimming before. Karen laughs at 
what Fifi has said. Then, Fifi laughs.
"I'm stuck", says Karen and tries to get up.
"I'm going on", says Fifi.
Julie, the teacher, says they can play that game 
in the Wendy House.
V The girls go into the Wendy House but quickly 
wander back to the centre of the main room. Fifi lies
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down again in the middle of the room and does the back­
stroke. She laughs. Fifi invites Henrietta to join her, 
then she gets up, skips over to the table she uses, 
then goes to the Wendy House. She knocks at the Wendy 
House. Gabriel says: "It's the Batman Cave". "No it 
isn't", says Fifi, and she goes in.
A few moments later, Fifi comes out of the Wendy 
Hôuse, says: "I'll swim again" and laughs. She settles 
herself back on the floor.
"Stop", yells Henrietta. Henrietta bends down 
over the swimming Fifi and lau^s. Then, Henrietta 
goes to look at the baby.
Karen joins Fifi down on the floor and starts making 
swimming movements too. "Henrietta's our teacher", says 
Karen.
Daniel now skips into the space they are using to 
swim in - clearly ah undefined space. Fifi laugh- 
"He's in the water”, she says. Daniel is still standing 
up. There is an explosion of laughter from Fifi who 
says: "You don't stand up in the water". She swims a 
little more, then returns to the Wendy House. But about 
two minutes later, Fifi and Karen are lying prone again. 
Giles and Daniel come out of the Wendy House and go 
"stamp stamp” over Fifi and Karen. As they utter their 
stamp, stamp, the boys laugh. (0.49)
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THEORETICAL SUMMARY;
These long fantasies differ enormously from each 
other. In the case of the perfume game, no deep point 
appears to be made, though within it, there is laughter 
provoked by a variety of stimuli and situations. The 
novelty of the smell is, clearly, a factor here. But 
in many of the other games there would seem to be, if 
not a deep purpose, at least moments when, in the middle 
of the laughter, some anxiety is being ventilated. The 
best example of that seems to be the times when the 
question of death is raised which, for these children, 
was certainly not immediate. No-one in the family of 
class members had died. It was a rather abstract 
issue, perhaps. Much less abstract was the matter of 
leaving the playgroup and heading off for Big School.
The episode which followed on Giles' arrival was, 
certainly, interesting. I would be pleased to be able 
to offer an interpretation which explained why the 
children first lay on the floor - was it to claim the 
floor and attach themselves to it? - and then started 
swimming. The swimming seems particularly hard to fit. 
It is worth noting that the older children alone par­
ticipated in this particular game. Younger children 
like Reuben and Gabriel did not get involved. All
the children of all ages did, however, join in the 
naughty/obscene fantasies such as ironing-the-penis.
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TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS:
The observations make it clear that the children 
engage in many different kinds of activities in order 
to make themselves laugh. It is also interesting 
that, while different sessions produced a different 
amount of laughter amd while observers could tall 
which were dullish days, there was always a con­
siderable amount of laughter. Never did a day pass 
without blocks being built up and toppled and children 
laughing. A number of actions, such as this one, 
suggest that, like N and R, these children set out 
to create their own laughter, aware that certain 
actions would culminate in it. It is hard not to 
read intentions into their behaviour.
This attempt at naturalistic observation is, 
perhaps, less novel now tiian it was when first 
envisaged. The grand master, Piaget, of course, 
indulged in just such naturalistic observation but 
the increasing sophistication of psychological 
research discouraged. Recently, however, there has been a
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trend towards such observation - and not just by 'dis­
placed* ethologists. Sluckin (1981), for instance, spent 
two years in a playground in Oxford without even the benefit 
of a co-observer. I have argued that there seemed to be no 
major difference in the laughter observed when I observed 
it solo and when I observed it with someone else there, t 
have also argued that there is enough similarity between 
the accounts given by both of us to suggest that my obser­
vations were not too theoretically polluted.
There are some very evident conclusions. First, while 
different sessions produced different amounts of laughter, 
there was always a considerable amount of laughter - even 
on dullish days. When towers were toppled, there w<bi nearly 
always lau^ter; when tricycles crashed, there was nearly 
always laughter. But as well as this consistency, there was 
a tremendous variety of laughter. The children sometimes 
laughed in response to unexpected events or stimuli but, 
often, they themselves created situations in which it was 
probable that they would laugh. Research has focussed too 
exclusively on the stimuli of laughter that produce. Some 
spaces seem particularly good at creating situations in which 
children will laugh - the Wendy House auid the Book Corner 
being evident, obvious ones. The observations in the play­
group, though not as detailed as the observations in the home, 
make it clear that any theory of laughter which settles for 
one cause as the cause of laughter, is bound to fail.
In some ways, the differences between laughter in the 
playgroup and laughter in the home were telling. There were
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ra^iitively few occasions of laughter in the playgroup wWen 
an adult wa s crucially involved. The children laughed far 
more often in reaponae to other children than they did in 
response to anything an adult did or said. And the adults 
laughed only occasionally at anything the children did, 
though they often smiled. One interesting difference was 
that it was rare to find a child laughing as he said "No" 
or contradicted a teacher. There was Infinitely less 
defiant laughter in the playgroup than in the home and 
was also mucii rarer to see affectionate laughter.
In my description of Nicholas and Reuben's laughter, I 
outlined a number of physical games between them and their 
parents which involved much laughter. Tliere were times 
when such games and the laughter they produced was intense. 
The only remotely coxrparable intensity in the playgroup 
was found in the Wendy House and with tricycles and the 
see-saw. These last two pieces of equipment produced 
tremendous physical energy at times. Given the recent 
emphasis on environmental psychology (Canter 1981), it 
would be interesting to test this notion that cramped spaces 
do produce laughter. Informal observations of a gazebo in 
another playground by the present writer ratalsd the 
same pattern.
The evidence from the group as well as the home 
suggests that children create their own occasions for 
laughter often. They elaborated incongruities in "class"
but usually with help from each other rather than help 
from a teacher or adult#
It is important to graÿp the difference between the 
two situations because these observations suggest that, 
by the ago of three, children are perfectly competent at 
evoking laughter from their peers. I would argue that, 
to some extent, their parents have trained or taught 
them to laugh#
Finally, these observations in the playgroup lead 
on to two more general points. Nearly everything in 
this section has been describing rather than explaining 
occasions of lau^ter. I have often given an exair^le 
of a laugh and then offered a plausible explanation of 
it. The dangers of such an approach are evident. I 
believe, however, that the observations have pointed up 
much useful data neglected by more experimental approaches 
which require children to respond to stimuli, and usually, to 
stimuli adults select. Nevertheless, what is offered is 
descriptions with plausible interpretations - and a 
proper sense of the empirical limits that roust be kept. 
Secondly, and forgetting such limits, it seems to me that 
the observations recorded here make it possible to offer 
a more realistic view of what a thoery of laughter must 
include if it is to cope with all the data.
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The detail of such a theory will be offered in
the Conclusions but, it seems mani^st, that the questions
which psychologists have asked about laughter have tended
either to be too simple or too intricate. Where Bergson,
like Hobbes, like Ludovici wanted the one cause of laughter,
others like Chapman and Foot have tried to unravel the
minutiae of relationships between who is your friend and
how much you laugh. It seems that a propar account of 
laughter will need to Incorporate four different levels.
(i) It is necessary to understand the social 
situation in which laughter is produced. It is usually 
assumed tiiat one laughs in situations where one feels safe 
or to signal that it is not for real. But it is clear that 
this is not always the case. For all the laughter that a 
friendly dinner party may produce, consider this story of 
Marie Jahoda. In 1937, she was captured by the Nazis and 
imprisoned. They believed she had socialist party funds.
At one interrogation she was confronted with research notes 
by her interrogator. She had been collecting jokes to study. 
She hated the interrogator; he hated her. But he started 
reading the jokes. He started laughing? then she started 
laughing. They laughed for an hour and a half in a stressful
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situation in which they hated each other. Examples like 
this suggest that no simple model of "safe" laughter will do.
(ii) The structure of the joke. Theories have tended 
to concentrate on gutting tiie structure of the joke. This 
is clearly important but by itself it will not suffice to 
offer a total account. Some jokes are funny one day but 
not funny the next. Pollio (1975) has found that cinema 
audiences laugh at different points in the same film - and 
a film is, after all, always the same stimulus.
(ill) The personality of the laugher. The evidence 
from adults shows that some people laugh more, that there 
are highly individual tastes in humour. Even amongst the 
children studied here, differences in "personality* are 
clear. Fifi laughs more often ttian anyone else in the 
group; other children laugh rarely and rarely find a mention. 
Any account of the development of laughter needs to examine 
this area and any proper theory will need to look at the 
interaction between (i), (ii) and (iii).
(iv) Finally, there is the "personality" of the teller 
of jokes. It seems to be the case that some people tell 
a 3tory_^#uW it is apt to fall flat while, when others do 
it, it is likely to win a laugh. This is much less observed 
amongst the children than (i), (ii) or (iii) but it is a 
facet of laughter that requires study.
In those tentative conclusions, I have not tried to 
interpret again the laughs I observed. It seemed more sensible 
to do this after describing them, which risks "theoretical 
pollution" but is, perhaps, easier to follow. The variety
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of laughter suggests, however, that we need a multi-facetted 
account of laughter - and that between children laughter 
is not exactly the same as it is between parents and 
children.
LAUGHTER CONCLUSIONS
One aim of this thesis has been to chart the 
development of laughter in as much naturalistic detail as 
possible. I have argued throughout that the laboratory 
was a difficult setting in which to study such coro^  
plex, spontaneous behaviour. Pollio (19 75), a leading ” 
researcher, has noted that he never in his experience 
witnessed a 'Class 4* full-scale belly laugh in the 
laboratory. Usually, in the laboratory, the scientist 
controls what is going to happen. Tihlle it is cer­
tainly possible to deceive subjects and video their 
conversations this may limit the laughter evoked. One 
of the findings of this thesis has been that even young 
children often create, for themselves, the occasions 
on which tiiey laugh. That sort of event seems ex- ^
ceedingly hard to recreate in the laboratory even if 
one were to skilfully deceive subjects in the tradition 
of some clever social psychology experiments.
This t h e s i s t o t a l  reliance on naturalistic
ooeervation runs counter to a particularly well-accepted 
tradition of research. The 1560*s and 70's saw mu(2i 
controversy on whether psychology should be scientific 
or humanistic with perhaps the most eloquent defence 
of the traditional position coming from Donald Broadbent 
(1974) in his In Defence of Empirical Psychology.
mm
Broadbent was worried by the self-indulgence of human­
istic psychologists whose gut intuitions turned out to 
a
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be wrong. Their 'insights* were often flights of 
fancy prompted by self-regarding motives and they had 
no patience with the proper rules of science.
Naturalistic observation, however, need not be 
undisciplined or self-indulgent. It Is hard to argue, 
in the field of children's laughter, that adherence to 
the rules of science - or one set of them - has led to 
much gain in real understanding. Failure to get sub­
jects to laugh in the laboratory has driven psych­
ologists to examine secondary areas such as judgments 
of humourousness or relationships between cognitive 
development and joke preferences. Laughter itself has 
been simply too difficult to evoke in order to study 
systematically.
Such considerations led me to try and study my 
own children in their own home over a long period of 
time. There are obvious empirical disadvantages to 
such a procedi^e. The sample is tiny. I, as the 
observer, could hardly remain totally detached. Never­
theless, the tnetliod used can be justified both pra­
ctically and theoretically. Practically, it seems 
possible to argue that the great variety of naturalistic 
observations set out in this thesis could only be 
recorded over a long period in a home. Some of the 
occasions of laughter - especially those where the 
children created their own laughter - were unlikely 
to occur in a laboratory where the experimenter would.
>'
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of necessity, have to impose the structure of an ex- 
parinvent. This has usually meant that children react 
to stimuli to see how funny they find them. It can also 
be argued that adequate developmental work requires the 
close and continuous observation of a very few subjects 
over a long period of time.
Theoretically, Clarke (1982) has argued the case 
for intensive as against extensive design. Though the 
observations were of just two middle class children 
there is no reason to suppose that their development of 
laughter was abnormal. Moreover, in an attempt to guard 
against this, I added observations of children in a play­
group which were carried out with the help of another 
observer. There were differences in the kinds of 
laughter found in the playgroup and, in the observations 
of N and R, but ttie differences were not so vast as to 
make it easy to argue that the observations in the home 
were vastly untypical or skewed because of the fact that 
they were the children of the researcher.
In the playgroup, a deliberate decision was made 
not to use a checklist as Groch (1974) had done. Check­
lists constrain observations to predetermined categories. 
Part of the aim of my research was to use the yield of 
ricn qualitative data to establish categories. Groch 
reported, fundamenta1ly, on the ways in which boys and 
girls tallied different numbers of aggressive laughs, 
naughty laughs, glee laughs and 'productive* laughs, so 
preempting the classificatory categories available.
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The other possibility would have been to rely on 
the use of video. One such session was set up at the 
Institute of Education but, unfortunately, the tapes 
went nisging. The session required the children to 
come into tiie Institute of Education studio for a sub­
stantial period because to find out what causes a 
laugh one needs to observe in sound and vision, before, 
during and after the laugh. This is a complex project, 
and requires skilled video technicians and very crafty 
filming. The pilot attempt in the studio showed that 
though tliG children acted up to the cameras there were 
some useful observations by exploiting their reactions 
to when tliey saw themselves on screen.
In order to get the full richness of the playgroup 
data, there seemed no alternative but to rely on two 
human observers who could comparé observations. There 
are risks and flaws with such a technique, but, used 
properly, it does seem to have much to offer as it 
enables one to deal with complicated behaviour in a 
natural setting with some rigour. The technique is 
well established in ethology. The joint observations 
revealed many parallels with my own home observations 
which suggests that, perhaps, X was not too deluded 
or biased in these. These methodological points are 
important because joint naturalistic observation, which 
has some checks upon it, seems to offer a way forward 
in studies of laughter.
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The data gathered in the course of this study 
suggest that, even with very young children, the kinds 
of simple theories advocated by Hobbes, Bergson, Freud 
and many others fail to account for the wide variety 
of laughter that can be easily observed in any 
naturalistic setting. Even children under one year of 
age laugh for a wide variety of reasons. The par­
simonious imperative - the desire to find one stunning 
cause for a complex behaviour - has served laughter 
research badly. Few authors have been willing to 
admit that the question of why we laugh is unlikely to 
have a simple answer that it is due to one cause.
One principal conclusion of my observations has 
been that any proper account of the development of 
laughter has to examine the problem from, at least, 
three different perspectives. First, there is the 
stimulus that is said to provoke laughter; second, 
there is the situation in which laughter does or does 
not occur; third, there is the personality of the people 
involved in the " laughter-situation" , a neologism I 
shall attempt not to use again. The observations 
have highlighted the variability of laughter. Almost 
no situation, not even tickling, always produces laughter, 
These observations in this thesis offer good evidence of 
such variability. They add to the work of Pollio (1975) 
with adults to show that the same stimulus does not
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produce the same laughter. Pollio rigged a cinema with 
microphones. He measured the points in a film where 
the audience laughed. On different nights, different 
audiences laughed in different places. This would be 
no news to a stand up comic but it had implications 
for psychology. The unchanging stimulus, the celluloid 
film, was always the same. But the audiences laughed 
at different points so that they saw the stimulus in 
different ways. Toppling the tower in the playgroup 
showed the same variation. Leuba (1941) also found that 
a child did not always laugh when tickled. If Leuba 
donned a frightening mask or even just a bizarre 
Santa Claus maak, tickling generally did not lead to 
laughter.
The great variety of laughter suggests that there 
are also personal differences in what jokes people like 
best and, perhaps too, in the ways in which they try 
to elicit laughter. The data on my own children sug­
gests, too, that parents do teach their children what 
to laugh at. The parent who plays with a child is not 
just having a "good time" and creating affectionate 
bonds but may also be moulding that child's sense of 
humour. There has been so far almost no work on the 
way laughter is used in family life apart from some 
observations of Valentine's (1942) and the data pro- ' 
ferred here. Piaget (1952) in his account of play has
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very little to say about laughter. The data gathered 
here suggests strongly this an area worth investigat­
ing further. The creation and use of laughter in the 
family setting leads to one of the major themes of 
this thesis, the ability of v#ry young children to act 
intentionally.
One important conclusion to emerge from the data 
concerns intontionality. The observations show that 
even when very young, N and R set out to create sit­
uations in which they knew that there would be laughter 
at the end. It is hard not to claim that they sometimes 
intended or even planned to laugh. The same happened in 
the playgroup. There, too, children could create the 
occasions for their own laughter. They appear to set 
up situations, such as building a Lego tower, where 
they know in advance that the end result will be laughter. 
Observations such as those in Falling suggest either that 
when an individual child begins the process of building 
towers, or when two or more children begin the process 
of building, they already have enough experience of the 
game to know it must end in a laugh. Observations of 
my own children such as when N asked Aileen to repeat 
the game about the train on Saturn or ... when R 
started a game of Batman lead one to the same conclusion - 
that the children intend to create laughter. The 
earliest observation that could be interpreted in this 
sense is that of R when, at the age of 1.2, he began
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to play peek-abo. By that age, he had played peek-abo 
enough times for it to be reasonable to conclude that 
he knew it would terminate in a laugh and intended it 
to do so. Moreover, the Observations noted that R 
was laughing just before he started the gar«.
This model of laughter supplements, of course, _ ÿ  
the traditional view that a particular stimulus will 
"cause" laughter. In cases like N asking Aileen to ^ 
repeat a game, it is clear that the child acts to 
create laughter as opposed to reacting to a stimulus.
The two models are, however, not exclusive. I analysed 
Observation 0.18 in such a way as to find a point 
where, it seemed, that N's intentional attempts to 
produce more laughter had petered out, almost run out 
of steam. Then, when Aileen used a fork to eat soup, 
he reacted by laughing. The intentional and reactive 
models of explanation are not in direct conflict but 
ought to be used in tandem. It is, of course, par­
ticularly interesting to see that certainly R by 2.0 
was able to intend to laugh. Valentine (1942) noted 
a not dissimilar skill when he said of one of his 
children, Y, at 2.11 :
"she meüces up a hearty laugh to make her 
mother laugh".
Though not concerned with Intention as such, Valentine 
did note that children of three could use laughter as
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a "creator of friendly feeling" (p.247). His impli­
cation seems to have been that, at three, the children 
knew that by laughing they could summon up friendliness. 
It could be argued, therefore, that he saw not unsimilar 
intentions at work. Intention flowers early, in other 
words.
Precisely because it has been, until recently, 
traditional to regard the child as reacting rather than 
acting; there have been few studies of children's 
ability to act intentionally. Even Wells' studies 
(1981) on language interaction, studies which show 15 
month olds to be able to take part in a complex social 
act, tend to see the child learning to speak through 
reacting to its parents. The data on laughter gathered 
here suggests both that very young children can form 
the intention to create laughter and learn quickly the 
skills needed to carry that intention out. Often, they 
take the lead, becoming agents rather than reactors.
It would be interesting to examine other social and 
communicative actions to see where, in those cases 
also, children show signs of acting intentionally.
A second important conclusion concerns the child's 
ability to laugh at increasingly complex situations and, 
also, to create more complex occasions of laughter for 
himself emd others. These abilities are linked to the 
social cognitive development of the child. The data
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shows that the range of what children can laugh at 
grows ~ and grows very fast. Whatever produces the 
first laugh, by the age of 6 months, the infant can 
laugh in response to a variety of social aind audio/ 
visual "situations".
Developmental studies have often aimed to identify 
the stages in which children master skills. Piaget 
again offers the best known such theory although 
Fischer (1980) offers a rather looser notion of stages 
based on hierarchies of skills. Classic stage theories 
suggest that the child at a particular stage has 
only the option of one kind of behaviour. There would 
be something very strange in a child of eleven who 
failed to understand conservation. Freud's theory of 
psychosexual development suggests that those who stay 
stuck at early stages of sexual development become 
neurotic. With both cognitive and emotional behaviour, 
development seems to involve not merely evolving higher 
forms of behaviour but shedding more primitive ones.
In times of acute stress, an adult can act as a child, 
bursting into tears, but, normally, such behaviour is 
not appropriate. One is meant to be beyond such "child­
ish" behaviour.
The interesting possibility with laughter is that 
it is an exception to this developmental rule. It will 
be proposed that the developmental framework in which 
laughter needs to be studied is singular. Children do
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"progress" and develop in their laughter but, by and 
large, they do not lose the capacity to laugh at things 
they found funny at earlier levels of development.
Clearly, laughter does develop. No one year old child 
is going to make the crack that Valentine reported when 
one of his children, hearing on the radio that the House 
of Commons was swept off its feet retorted that it was 
nonsense as "Houses aren’t swept off their feet". The 
six y&ar old has quite different ways of laughing than 
the three year old. However, it will be also clear from 
looking at N ’s laughter from 3.6 to 6.4, that N can still 
laugh at precisely the kinds of things that he laughed at
3.6. But he can also laugh at other situations and 
jokes. He has a wider range of humour he can create and, 
often, the "funny games" he makes up for himself at the 
age of 6.4 are very different from those he played at
3.6. However, he can still laugh on the level of 3.6.
The repertoire of what the child can make funny, and can 
find funny, develops with age. But the child does not 
lose access to earlier, more primitive laughter. Further­
more, many kinds of primitive laughter continue to be 
acceptable into adulthood. It seems in laughter, we can 
progress without losing the means, or the social per­
mission, to regress.
Earlier, it was argued that one of the interesting 
conclusions from the observational data was that children 
could create laughter. A similar growth of complexity 
seems to function here.
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There is a point at which young children can 
act in such a way that it is reasonable to assume 
they intend to create laughter. Once they have be­
come able to do that, they can develop and refine the 
capacity. They become more skilful and diverse in 
the ways they set about making themselves and others 
laugh but these are all evolutions of one basic capa­
city. The fundamental point is that the young child 
moves beyond laughing only in response to stimuli or 
people. Valentine's first classes of laughter all 
appear to be non-intenticnal, examples of where the 
child responds by laughing rather than creating it. 
Again, a framework will be suggested where, as the 
child grows older he acquires new techniques for 
promoting laughs but he still can use many earlier 
ones. In some situations, after all, adults enjoy 
tickling each other, "childishly", perhaps.
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In the chapters on my own children I have tried 
to chart expansion of objects and occasions of 
laughter - while still retaining the ability to laugh 
in a "primitive" way. By the age of ten, the child 
can laugh at sophisticated cognitive jokes, at in­
cipient dirty jokes, but also at being tickled, like 
a baby. One of the more interesting kinds of laughter 
I saw develop between the ages of three and four was 
a capacity to laugh at oneself, necessitating suf­
ficient cognitive sophistication to treat oneself as 
an object of attention and assessment. In the play­
group, I recorded incidents such as when Caroline fell 
down accidentally, laughed a little, got up and asked 
her playmates to watch while she fell down again.
Which she did, laughing. Games by the clothes pegs 
on the bench - such as that described with Ben and 
Matthew - showed this sane pattern of learning to laugh 
at one’s physical mistakes. It can be argued that the 
middle cï&ss children studied in this thesis were pri­
vileged and, perhaps, precocious. But there is little 
reason to suppose that other children do not develop 
just such self-critical laughter. My reason for focus­
sing on this is that it seems to me to be the best
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illustration of a very cognitively and emotionally 
complex form of laughter - which develops early. My 
suspicion (and I have no evidence for it outside my 
own children) would be that many of the parents of the 
children in that playgroup encouraged their children 
to laugh at their own mistakes rather than scold them 
too harshly.
The data suggests, that children build their 
ability to laugh at a variety of different levels.
They do not usually lose touch with the "earliest" 
forms of laughter and they quickly learn the different 
occasions in which different kinds of laughter are 
socially acceptable. As Valentine observed, his 
children had mastered by the age of three, many 
social uses of laughter, including the vital one of 
appeasing angry parents. Older children know that it 
is fine to mimic a schoolteacher behind his back but 
to hi# fàoe would be very aggressive and, possibly, 
hurtful to him. One form of laughter which dwindles 
with age is triumphant laughter. At about 4 years of 
age, it is quite acceptable to laugh at being "king 
of the castle" or, when thumping another child and 
guffawing that he's an idiot. By the age of ten, certainly, 
that disappears cind adults know that it is "not done" 
to do so. Laughter is a social act with social uses.
As they grow older, children's mastery in this area , %' 
increases. There is clearly a need for research both 
in the family, and in the school, with children older 
than those studied here.
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One additional area where the observations may be 
useful is that of safety. It has been said that we 
usually laugh in safe situations but this generalisation 
has its liijaits. Children and adults certainly often 
laugh in "safe" situations where social cues abound 
to confirm that this exchange is not "for real"; it is 
a joke, part of a game. The ice has already been 
broken so one can laugh. A second version is different; 
it focusses on laughter as a signal. Here, the laugh 
occurs not when it is safe but, rather, laughter itself 
acts as a signal to indicate tliat tlie situation is one 
which is not threatening. Laughter itself breaks the 
ice. No experiment has yet been ingenious enough to 
disentangle these two closely related accounts of 
daughter. There are instances reported in this thesis 
of children laughing in situations that are safe, such 
as games in which there was much running and chasing.
By the time N was 4.6, however, there are observations 
which suggest that he could try to laugh in order to 
make the situation less threatening (Observation Ml8) 
or in order to get away with naughty behaviour 
(Observation N.23)
There are, however, no instances it seems of 
laughter being used to evoke relief in a genuinely 
stressful situation. Though the children observed in 
this study were not in such situations many children 
no doubt sometimes are. There is a view that laughter
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is a ’’borderline" behaviour which occurs in frightening 
situations. The data presented here suggests that this 
does occur but not frequently.
It wo lid be neat if one could argue that the dif­
ferent models of laughter outlined earlier applied to 
different social situations. For example, it would be 
comprehensible if, in relaxed "safe" situations, people 
laughed when they intended to laugh. In stressful, 
"bolderline" situations, however, they laughed when 
laughter was forced upon them by implacably funny 
stimuli. Unfortunately, the data do not fit such a 
neat pattern. Perhaps the closest to physically 
dangerous situations occurred in the playground since 
children could fall off the tricycles at speed and 
hurt themselves. Here, however, there was much laughter 
and, arguably, the children intended to laugh when 
they set up the chases. Though the bicycle chases 
looked stressful - the children seemed also to know 
laughter was a likely end result. And there are also 
instances of children laughing in "safe" situations 
where it is clearly not their plan to laugh, such as 
those described in Observation M.13 for example.
One aim of a naturalistic thesis ought to be to 
throw up some potential experiments. Despite my 
reservations about laboratory work, it might well be 
fruitful to carry out studies in which the same jokes
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are told to people in quite different situations. The 
jokes would need to be told by believable stooges and 
they would need to occur during the flow of ordinary 
conversations so that subjects should not be bombarded 
with humour. Rather, they should be fed jokes as part 
of as realistic a situation as possible. One could 
do worse than look at some of the experimental designs 
used by Argyle and by the cognitive dissonance en­
thusiasts for inspiration. It would be importcint to 
check how subjects perceived these situations. Such 
an approach, realistically telling jokes in different 
settings, might help clarify what is special abmt sit­
uations in which people laugh more easily.
It is not just the stimuli and the situation, as 
perceived by those in it, that determines whether or 
not there is laughter. A theory of laughter must also 
incorporate reference to the personality of the teller 
of the joke and his/her relation to the audience. I 
did not perform personality tests on my own children 
or on the children in the playgroup though there are 
scattered asides on the personality of various children, 
McGhee has suggested that, by the age of seven, it is 
possible to identify children who will create laughter 
in class. McGhee argues that these children are ex­
trovert, seen as leaders and that they use laughter as 
a way of being acceptably aggressive. Though McGhee 
does not draw the conclusion, this suggests that 
laughter is being used intentionally. A similar point 
»
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emerges from a rather rambling account by Fisher and 
Fisher (1982) of the psychology of clowns and coinediams. 
They suggest that comedians had used laughter quite 
consciously as children in order to defend themselves 
both against their parents and in schools. Woody 
Allen's comic neuroses are true to life - and started 
young !
But many children who are unlikely to become pro­
fessional comedians use humour as part of their person­
ality style - to be clever, to get away with naughtiness 
and, most controversially, to see themselves in per­
spective. The observations where N refused to brush 
his teeth and laughed or set out to miskick a football 
and trip himself up, suggest to me that one aspect of 
laughing is that it allows the child to play out a 
variety of roles. The observations of R playing 
Batman games from 1.6 suggest, at least, that he knew 
he was doing something that was not quite like being 
his ordinary self.
Self critical laughter also appears quite young.
The earliest instances are to be found when R laughs 
having slipped down the stairs accidentally and, then, 
deliberately, sets about making himself slip down the 
stairs. In the playgroup Caroline (4.3) set herself 
to falling on her bottom again on the trampoline having 
made a friend watch her. Such actions are not a 
question of children laughing at mistakes but, inten­
tionally, setting out to repeat mistakes in order to 
laugh at them. I would argue that this process is a
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little like that Goffman (1963) has called "taking 
role distance" in that the child acts out the role 
of being himself or herself and treats being clumsy 
as another role. It would seem worthwhile exploring 
the hypothesis that children who spontaneously produce 
such self-critical laughter are different - and, 
arguably, happier with themselves - than those who do 
not. Such a study would require a mix of naturalistic 
observation and more conventional techniques.
Any theory roust also deal with the notion of the 
audience. Only rarely do children, or adults, laugh 
alone. In his cinema study, Pollio (1975) established 
that different audiences laugh at different things.
He attributed "high laugh" nights to the presence of 
a group of hearty laughers. He did not, however, 
specify what made the hearty laughers laugh more 
heartily nor did he learn why, on different nights, 
hearty laughers laughed heartily at different points. 
Together with the other observations this leads one to 
suggest that a proper account of any laugh must involve 
a four-sided analysis of :
i. the structure of the stimuli that "evokes" 
laughter.
ii. the structure of the situation as perceived 
by the person who may laugh. The findings con­
cerning the creation of laughter suggest that 
there are two quite different relations between 
person and situation involved here.
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There are occasions where laughter is simply 
"caused". The child does not intend to laugh but is 
faced with an overwhelmingly funny stimulus such as a 
loud noise or a parent starting to play peek-abo. The 
child is, so to speak, a victim of the situation. The 
traditional model in which laughter is "caused" applies 
here as long as the child is not too frightened or too 
distracted or, mysteriously, not "in the mood". Rely­
ing on such a vague expression shows that there is still 
a vast amount of work to do to explain the variability 
of laughter these observations have revealed.
Another and active relation obtains between child 
and situation in those instances when the child intends 
to laugh or to produce laughter. From the age of 
roughly 18 to 20 months, R was able to set in train 
actions which, it is reasonable to infer, he knew would 
provoke laughter. The model of laughter being "caused" 
by stimuli is inappropriate here. The infant creates 
his own occasions of laughter. It seems plausible to 
suggest that the situation as he perceives it is quite 
different from that where laughter is caused. In the 
latter, it tends to be the absence of negatives that 
allows laughter. If the child is not too frightened 
or too upset or too distracted, he may laugh. Where 
the child sets out to create laughter, all these may 
also apply but there is a crucial difference in that
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the child means to do it. The situations are thus 
quite different. It seems useful to explore these 
differences.
The other two factors needed to understand a 
laugh are also complex though, perhaps, not philoso­
phically complex.
iii. the personality of the teller of the joke 
or the person making the laugh.
iv. the personality and characteristics of 
his audience where, of course, the audience 
may be just one other person.
It is to be hoped that the evidence presented here 
in this thesis will make it possible to lay down a useful 
framework for the study of laughter. The observations 
do seem to show that children learn early what stimuli 
rdght be funny, some of the situations in which it is 
right to be funny and hŒv to use laughter in the stream 
of their life. Placing laughter in the context of family 
and school, as model social worlds, may not solve the 
"problem of laughter" but it should push studies forward 
and may even offer clues to the crucial point that 
Allport raised. Allport noted (1937) : "The greatest 
obstacles to a satisfactory explanation have been that 
unlike other basic forms of behaviour, laughter does 
not serve any known biological purpose". Curiously, for 
a social psychologist, Allport seems not to have followed
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up the possible social purposes of laughter. The 
observations suggest a good many social uses though 
there are others too. At any rate the approach offered 
here may indicate useful methods and hypotheses in what 
has been a very problematical field.
The substantial implication of the data gathered 
is, therefore, that it is no good trying to home in on
the stimulus - and grand analyses thereof - for a
theory of laughter. There need to be at least the 
four elements considered - the "audience", the stimulus, 
the situation and the personality. So far, much work 
has concentrated on analyses of the stimuli to the ex­
clusion of the other important factors.
The kind of development plotted in these pages 
also shows how dynamic the process of laughing is. At
the very start of this thesis, I pointed out that it
was odd psychologists had ignored laughter, given how 
powerful it was, and given, too, the cultural evidence 
which suggests that much of what the ancient Athenians 
took for a joke, we still can. Some authors like 
Frankl (1971) have suggested that laughter is a uniquely 
human act. The most fervent supporters of the abilities 
of apes do not suggest that gorillas or chimps can see 
a joke and especially not a joke against themselves.
In "The Mentality of Apes", Kohler (1925) noted that he 
had never seen an anthropoid ape laugh or cry in quite 
human a manner. Other species do not see a joke. Yet
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much of the developmental evidence I have adduced 
suggests that very young infants develop the ability to 
laugh young - and even to see a joke. That must prompt 
speculation as to the origins of laughter. And per­
haps also speculation as to why wa carry out the action 
of laughing when we find things funny, We could, after 
all, respond in different ways. By winking, or waving 
our left arms about or yodelling. It is only because 
we are so used to laughing when we find things funny 
that such ideas prompt Monty Pythonesque images. But 
why laugh ... 7 Because of its old roots, we do still 
laugh at things that are not funny but such laughs are 
the exceptions. It is pure speculation but it is not 
meant as a joke.
Ethologists have often claimed that the sort of 
laughter apes use either in order to threaten or to 
appease is very much an action associated with hier­
archy within a group or between groups. We still 
smile, the argument runs, when we enter a new group 
echoing our hairy ancestors who offered up the appeas­
ing smile-like grimace in order not to be belted with 
bananas by other baboons! There must have coma a 
time, in theevolution of the human species, when the 
evolution of speech allowed some of these acts of 
threat or appeasement to be expressed more verbally.
We, now a verbal species, could use words in order to 
threaten or to appease. There must have come a point
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also in evolution when the repertoire of threat and 
appeasement apes used became just not subtle enough* 
Merely laughing at a rival was too crude. At the same 
time, laughter was a powerful and perfected action.
The growing human brain also allowed its owners to 
perceive incongruities, oddities which had quite 
passed by the duller ape. My speculation is that 
the old perfected behavioural act (laughter) and the 
new skill (seeing the funny side of neanderthal things) 
married up. And we came to laugh when things were 
funny.
William McDougall wrote; "The perfectly happy man 
would, never need to laugh", I hope by now it will be 
clear that the perfectly happy child who never laughed 
would be not merely perfectly unhappy but rather cat­
atonic. Learning to laugh at many different things is 
an integral part of growing up, stretching?one's mind 
and one's personality. And McDougall, in seeing the 
happy man as never laughing and in claiming we laugh 
at minor mishaps mainly, may have been wrong. Sut he 
did, at least, pay attention to the topic. Most psy­
chologists to date have treated it as peripheral.
Given how Interesting and how "human" laughter is, that 
neglect remains unfortunates
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